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FREEDOM AND PERSONALITY

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"Moral science, if it is a science at all, must be a science of a higher order than simply positive sciences are. . . . Its subject being human choice or liberty, the world immediately before its view is not the world of that which *is*, but of that which *may be*, and its task is to find in this that which *should be*."—J. Grote.

Is it possible to say anything on the well-worn theme of human freedom or unfreedom which has not been already better said by someone else before us? It may be doubted; yet it is always worth while to see whether we cannot at least set what is perhaps 'already familiar to us in a fresh light and so come to a clearer comprehension of our own meaning. This, at any rate, is all that will be attempted in these pages; I have spoken in an earlier essay of the "practical situation" in which we find ourselves whenever we have to make a decision as involving *indetermination*, and my purpose is simply to make it plainer to myself, and so incidentally perhaps to a reader, what I mean by such an expression. I shall start, then, by adopting what we may perhaps agree to call a phenomenological attitude to the subject; that is, I will try to describe the facts in a way which anyone who recalls occasions when he has been driven to take a decision will recognize as faithful to his experience, without imparting into the description any element of explanatory speculative hypothesis. The description is meant to be one which will be admitted to be true to the "appearances," independently of any theory about the "freedom of the will"—to describe correctly that which it is the object of all such theories to explain.

Let us take for the purpose of our argument an actual historical example of such a practical situation involving a decision. We can

hardly do better than select a particularly momentous instance. "The governor answered and said unto them, Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you? They said, Barabbas." If we examine the situation described in these words in an "unsophisticated" spirit, as it presents itself not to a reader trying to fit it into the pre-determinal scheme of some metaphysical interpretation of things but to the parties who are actually living through it in its concreteness, the first thing that would strike us is that both parties, the "governor" on the one side, and the populace on the other, are assuming that the pattern of the event which is to issue is not yet made. I do not mean merely that the event is still in the future, and cannot therefore be already certainly known beforehand. This would be equally true if the question were, for example, *Will it rain before noon to-day, or will it not?* or *Will this electric lamp, if left lighted, continue to burn for another six? hours* though in these cases, at least as we commonly think, all the conditions on which the still future event depends may be already present. In our case the pattern of the future event is still unmade in a deeper sense; it may take either of two forms, and which form it will take depends on the decision of the multitude, which decision is itself not yet taken. It is not merely that they have already a preference, though neither they nor the "governor" can say which it is; they are now to *make* a choice. Pilate calls on them, not to find out how their minds have been already made up, but to *make up* their minds. And this is the situation which is daily confronting every one of us whenever he is called to exercise a choice. A believer in rigid scientific determinism has, in practice, to accept this situation on the same terms as everyone else. He may hold theoretically that, his "character" and his "circumstances" being what they are, there is only one course ever open to him, and that all he really does when he is said to choose is to find out what that one course is. But in actual life, when he is not theorizing about the nature of choice but choosing, he in fact always acts on the assumption that it is still open to him to do *A* or not to do *A*, and that the option will remain open until he closes down one of the alternative "routes" of action by the decision which is still to be made. Hence the paradox which I have heard formulated in the phrase that the "determinist" never applies to his own action the deterministic theory which he treats as valid for that of everyone else. He may persuade himself that all the apparent "decisions" of his fellow-men are no more than "conditioned reflexes," the like of which he could produce by "laboratory" methods which would preclude all possibility of genuine choosing on the part of his "subjects." But he does not think of his own imagined procedure in instituting his laboratory experiments on his subjects as a "conditioned reflex." *That* he regards as throughout controlled, not by

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"antecedent conditions," but, in a wholly different way, by a final cause, or purpose, his intelligent purpose to conduct a series of experiments which will establish his theories, and to conduct them on lines not prescribed for him by anything but their relevance to the conclusion which is to be established. On his own theory, there must be at least one being in a universe of "robots" who is not a "robot"—the experimenter in his laboratory. It follows that even the "scientific" determinist habitually admits the real existence of one "free" agent—himself when he is acting in his capacity as experimenter. If he will not concede this, it must follow that he is not really "free" in selecting the experiments to be performed on the "subject"; he performs those which he does perform, rather than any others, merely because, being built as he is, he can do nothing else. And he is equally "unfree" in drawing the conclusion that these experiments have, or have not, established his case. Being built as he is, he inevitably thinks that the experiments have proved his case, but that he thinks it proved is no more evidence that it really is proved than the fact that his "unscientific" neighbour, being built as *he* is, equally inevitably thinks the experiments entirely inconclusive is proof to the contrary. Each of us, if we are to push the "determinist" theory to its logical conclusion, thinks what he does think, and that is all there is to be said on the matter; which of us thinks *truly* is a question which, even if it has an intelligible meaning, is, and eternally must remain, without an answer. Thus, as has been well said by Professor Karl Schmidt,¹ the "determinism" which we are asked to accept because it is said to be scientifically proved (and what is proved by science must be true) ends in pronouncing science and scientific proof themselves to be pure illusions.

But if—under the general assumption that there is such a thing as scientific truth—there must be at least one class of acts which are not "conditioned reflexes," those of the man of science in his laboratory selecting² the experiments which he will perform, there is no reason why the decisions taken by the man of science when he comes out of his laboratory and mingles in the general business of the world, or those of the rest of us who are not men of science, should be "conditioned reflexes." Whether I am deciding which of two experiments it will be more to my purpose to perform, which

¹ *The Creative I and the Divine*, chapter ix.

² Though the use of the word "selecting" is really an understatement; often enough the investigator has quite literally to *invent* his crucial experiment; it is a proceeding which has never been tried before and has not even "entered into the heart of man." He is like a man who has to open a curiously locked safe and must first forge the key he needs, not like one who has no more to do than to try one key after another out of an already constructed stock until he finds the one which fits. Hence the indispensability in the really great scientific experimenter of the right kind of imagination.

of two investments it will be more prudent to prefer, to which of two schools it will be wiser to send my son, the process of deciding is recognizably the same in all cases. All the considerations which show that the physicist in his laboratory, when he decides to perform this experiment rather than another, is really intervening to make the subsequent course of events (as far as what happens in his laboratory is concerned) different from what it would have been without his decision, equally prove the same thing of all the interventions made in the course of things by the commonest fellow of us all in the conduct of his daily affairs. They too are genuinely things *à faire*, not merely events to be noted and described.

I dwell on this rather obvious consideration because, as it seems to me, it is of itself enough to prove that wherever choice intervenes in shaping the course of events, there must necessarily have been an antecedent state of *indetermination*, or, if you prefer the milder expression, incomplete determination. Too many writers on ethical subjects a generation ago were still, for some reason, afraid of the word *indetermination*, and I am not sure that the prejudice is even yet wholly extinct. One might almost suppose, from the shame-faced way in which the fact was commonly wrapped up in circumlocution and euphemism, that the incompleteness of determination characteristic of all situations where choice and decision are possible were a *partie honteuse* of the creation which decency forbids us to call by its plain name. Serious moralists like Green, and at a later date Rashdall, found it indispensable to their whole conception of moral action to insist on the point that when we make up our minds to a course of action we really are "determining" to do something, and so determining what the sequence of events shall be. But when it came to the recognition of the manifest implication that until we intervene the sequence is as yet not determined, both Green and Rashdall—to mention no other names—apparently felt as uncomfortable as an early Victorian driven to mention his trousers in "mixed company." The contemporary of Thackeray or Dickens was afraid that the word "trousers" would affront *la pudeur des dames*, Green or Rashdall that the mention of indetermination might shock the sensitive delicacy of the men of science. We have long ago learned that female modesty is not the fragile plant our grandfathers imagined it to be, and that we do not really "bring a blush to the cheek of the young person" by naming our trousers; it is high time that *la science* too should have done with affected prudery and accustom her ears to listen to the mention of indetermination without taking alarm. Our virtuous ladies are allowed to read Shakespeare and Fielding unexpurgated; they may, if they like, enjoy the humour of Chaucer. Why then need we beat about the bush if we want to direct the attention of "science" to the good

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sense and plain speaking of an admirable passage like the following from Richard Price?

"As far as it is true of a being that he *acts*, so far he must *himself* be the cause of the action, and therefore not necessarily determined to act. Let anyone try to put a sense in the expressions: *I will; I act*; which is consistent with supposing that the volition or action does not proceed from myself. Virtue supposes determination, and determination supposes a determiner; and a determiner that determines not himself is a palpable contradiction. Determination requires an efficient cause. If this cause is the being himself, I plead for no more. If not, then it is no longer *his* determination; that is, *he* is no longer the determiner, but the motive, or whatever else anyone will say to be the cause of the determination. To ask what effects the cause of *our* determination is the very same thing with asking who did an action, after being informed that such a one did it."¹

I choose this particular passage for citation, of course, precisely because the last two sentences so effectually dispose of the subterfuge by which writers like Green and Rashdall try to avoid shocking the sensitive ears of "science." Both of them talk often enough of "self-determination," but both try to take the supposed indecency out of their language by the suggestion that there is all the time behind the supposedly self-determining agent something in the background which determines *him*, and so they take away with the left hand all they seem to be giving us with the right. At bottom they are both falling into the error which Price meant to exclude by his denial that a "motive" is an "efficient cause"; they talk as though the "motive" *determined* the agent in the very same sense in which the agent *determined* what he would do; that is, they virtually make the "motive" itself into an agent behind the scenes. They will not see, as Price said, that, to use Kant's language, if there is really such a thing as an *agent*, then, whenever the agent acts, he is not only the cause but, in a real sense, the *first* cause of the act he does. Indeed, Rashdall at least is righteously indignant with Kant for the frankness with which he had stated the disconcerting fact. Even where one cannot avoid recognizing the fact of indetermination, one is expected apparently to veil the shocking fact under an "hypocoristic" name.

But in moral philosophy, as well as elsewhere, it is commonly the wiser part to act on the maxim, *quand la chose est, dites le mot*; not to do so is merely to accumulate subsequent trouble for yourself. And in the case of the making of a conscious choice, there ought to be no doubt that *la chose est* since, as Price saw so clearly, when I determine to do or not to do an act, there is no invisible agent who "determines" how I shall determine. As the very statement that I

¹ *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, pp. 305-6.

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terminate certain proceedings by taking such and such a step implies that they were not terminated until the step was taken, so the statement that I determine to do *A* presupposes that before I have made my choice it is *not* determined whether *A* shall be done or not. And to take refuge, as Rashdall for example does, behind the allegation that what I shall determine is settled for me in advance by something called my "character" (which, it is assumed, when confronted with a set of circumstances, can only react in one way), is to commit a double error. There is first the error of principle exposed by Price, when he contends that a "motive" is not an "efficient cause," the error of imagining that it is "motives" which act, and not persons who act in virtue of their "motives." And there is the manifest error of fact involved in the assumption that my "character" is something there, definitely made on a certain pattern, before I make the choices which actually fashion my character. To revert to the historical illustration with which we began these observations, when the mob shouted "Barabbas" they did not simply lay open to inspection a moral character which they already possessed before the choice was made. If the act was a real choice, in shouting "Barabbas" they made their characters into something different from what they would have been if they had cried "Jesus who is called Christ." Pilate, again, when he shirked the duty incumbent on him in virtue of his office, to give judgment in accord with the law and equity of the case, by leaving the multitude to decide an issue which he ought to have decided himself, was not merely revealing himself as an evader of his responsibilities, he was making himself one; it is *conceivable* that he had never been in the past the sort of man he showed himself to be at that moment. The plain fact is that, so far as we can tell, no man's character is a thing finally made and fully determinate while the life remains in him, and being itself not completely determinate cannot be the source of complete determination in anything else.

This is precisely why the very mention of free choice or free will sounded in the ears of the "scientific" philosophers of the nineteenth century as an obscenity. If you set out with the notion that the only methods available for the attaining of truth in all matters must be those of the experimental man of science in his laboratory, you will be forced to add not merely that all truths must be established by "induction" from observed facts, but that the observed facts must be "laboratory" facts, facts of the kind which lend themselves to the purposes of the man of science. And the only facts which are suitable to his purpose are facts which are not merely determinate, but quantitatively determinate in all their features, records of minute and precise measurements. Once admit about any fact whatever that it in any respect eludes the possibility of such measurement, and

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you have rendered it unavailable for the purposes of the laboratory. (Or, at best, what you can extract from it for those purposes is not the full fact, but a mutilated aspect of it which excludes the features in it not amenable to measurement.) And for this simple reason no concrete fact of life is a "laboratory" fact at all, and can only be made to appear as one by the most unscrupulous "editing." You cannot make the facts about life and living beings full, amenable to what a naturalistic metaphysic regards as the only legitimate method for the attainment of truth without the suppression of life itself; you *must* "murder to dissect." So long as you are dealing with a subject which is alive, you are throughout in the presence of facts about its behaviour which cannot be fully and exhaustively subjected to the precise measurement involved in the scientific ideal. You get nearer to something like your ideal of what a scientific fact should be as you go further and further down the scale of living organisms in the direction of rudimentary simplicity. When you wish to deal with the behaviour of an organism which is less rudimentary, to get anything like the sort of "scientific facts" you are in quest of, you have to reduce it to a more or less death-like condition, to inhibit the action of the "highest centres" by drugs, or actually to remove those centres themselves (as in the case of the "headless frogs" of our scientific text-books). Even then you do not succeed completely. You know with a great deal of probability how a "headless frog" will respond to a certain precisely measured stimulus, but even here alternatives are apparently not completely excluded. But *just* how a frog left as God made him will respond to your stimulus is something which you cannot "know as a *scientific* fact." And how an intelligent being like a man will respond to it you know still less. And that for the soundest of reasons: the man has actually, by his intelligence, to *make* his character for himself as his life goes on in a way in which the frog does not and cannot make its character. The whole notion that the man, or even the frog, has *ab initio* a fully made "character," which has merely to be played upon by varying circumstances to respond to each set of conditions with one definite prepared "reaction," is the purest metaphysical mythology; it is tantamount to denying what is really the most patent "fact" about both of them—though it is, to be sure, not a "laboratory" fact—the fact that both are *alive*.

We know, of course, that this fact of being alive is just the one fact of all others which is most disconcerting to the thoroughgoing "naturalist." We know how obstinately, in spite of discouraging prospects, he clings to the hope of some day being able to manufacture a living organism in his laboratory, apparently in the hope that if he could do so he would have got rid of the inconvenient fact of life itself, and have shown that there is no real difference in

principle between being alive and being lifeless. But what is too often forgotten is that even if the experiment were to succeed, it would do nothing to prove what it was really intended to prove. Probably not even the most sanguine of "naturalists" expects that the man of science will ever be able to rival Moses by transforming a stick into a serpent. But even if the man of science should some day succeed in doing this, the fact would remain that he himself, the producer of the laboratory-made serpent, was not made in a laboratory. The transformation of the lifeless into the living would only have been effected by the action of an already living being. If we like to indulge in a still more extravagant flight of fancy, and to imagine a distant future when our scientific workers will themselves be artificially constructed in laboratories—not that I would accuse the most naturalistic of "naturalists" of really entertaining the notion—even so, it would be true that the factory-made men of science would have been, in the last resort, made by precursors who were not themselves made in any factory, and we should be as far as ever from having got rid of the very unscientific fact of life and its significance.

Meanwhile the "subjects" with whose behaviour we have to deal in certain situations of the moral life are ourselves and the members of our various "social groups," and we at least have not been put together in laboratories—we are *geniti non facti*. We really and truly *grow*. Now the plain truth about anything which is growing is that it is *not* fully determined in its reactions to the various situations in which it is placed, in the sense in which the experimentalist wedded to the methods of the laboratory uses the word "determined." How it will respond to a situation is not definitely and once for all settled by its antecedent "nature," a plan already embodied in its structure; the very fact that it is growing, and if it should further be in any degree intelligent, is learning by experiment and success or failure, means that it is steadily modifying its own patterns of action, and thus modifying its "nature," by the very responses which it makes. And what is thus really modifiable is obviously, so far as modifiable, not yet "determined." It is thus only because there is indetermination as well as determination in the scheme of things that there is an opening for choice to influence the course of events as we all know that it does. And it is idle to evade the issue by the retort that choices are not made in pure caprice but are "determined by motives." For all that such a phrase really means is that a responsible agent, when he chooses his line of action, has what he regards as intelligible justificatory *reasons* for choosing as he does and not otherwise. His "motive" is neither an agent nor a "driving force," nor an "antedecent event"; it is just the character of significance *in* the choice which he is making.

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A man has often been said, for example, to do certain acts, to choose certain alternatives rather than others "from the love of God." But this does not mean that his present act or choice is one event, and that the love of God is another distinct thing or event which somehow makes the first-named event happen. It means only that the *man* in making the choice or doing the act in question is showing that he loves God. If we care to call his love of God a "determinant" of his choice, we must add that it is a determinant intrinsic to the act of choice itself; whereas the whole point of the theory called determinism is that it regards the determinant as invariably extrinsic to that which is determined by it. This is why I feel bound to regard any moralist who talks of self-determination as a sub-species of determination, and hopes to make his peace on those terms with the "scientific man," as an unconscious traitor to the cause he is undertaking to defend. The whole point of "determinism" is that you never do and never can determine yourself; you are always determined to take the line you are now taking by something external to the present act of choosing. And if any "scientific man" so far forgets this as to concede that choosing itself is a genuine feat, he is, in his turn, a traitor to the determinism he supposes himself to be asserting.

The simple fact is that *intentionality* is inseparable from personal activity; where there is no intention there is, properly speaking, no act, but only the happening of an event. And intention is just that which a consistent scientific determinism cannot possibly recognize; to be consistent, determinism must reduce the universe to a scene in which there are *events* which "take place," and perhaps, though less certainly, *things* in which the events take place, but no *acts* which are done or *persons* who do them. A good illustration is afforded by some sentences of an address delivered a few years ago by Professor Hogben to the British Association in Capetown.¹ "The modern mechanist," says the Professor, "does not say that thought and love and heroism do not exist; he says, show me behaviour to which you apply the adjectives thoughtful or loving or heroic, and we will, one fine day, endeavour to arrive at predictable conclusions with reference to it by following the only method of inquiry which we have learned by experience to trust."

Now there are several points in this pronouncement which might fairly call for comment. A sceptical critic might perhaps commend the caution of the speaker in postponing his demonstration to "one fine day"—in other words, to the "Greek Calends"—and still more in undertaking, when that "fine day" arrives, not to prove his point, but only to "endeavour" to do so (with the possible result of

¹ July 25, 1929. I quote from the report of the Address published by the *Cape Times* as revised by the author.

complete failure). But I take it Mr. Hogben really means that the "fine day" will yet arrive, and that the "endeavour" will be successful. And his language also shows two further things. The "only method we have learned by experience to trust" had been previously described as consisting in the analysis of all human conduct into "conditioned reflexes"; we had also been told that this analysis is being undertaken by a "new school of psychologists"—incidentally one would like to know something more about their claim to speak with authority in psychology—and its "express object" had been said to be that of "relieving Man . . . of his burden of soul." Clearly this can only be done if you "relieve Man" of intentionality. Reflexes can be measured exactly in the laboratory; intentions cannot be observed there at all. Man is to be "relieved" of the "burden" of a soul—in other words, discharged from the responsibility for his conduct—by *proving* that he never acts with an intention. Now what manner of proof is such a thesis susceptible of? I can just conceive that the experimentalist might somehow produce by experiment a number of *crétins* who would, when subjected to a particular stimulus, go through the motions of mounting the scaffold and placing their necks under the axe of the guillotine. So much, then, might be "predictable"—that is, in pure abstract theory—for in actual fact it is safe to assume that the very complicated "mechanisms" presupposed by such a performance would be liable to break down in a variety of unforeseeable ways. But how does this bring us nearer to the predictability "of acts of *heroism*"? The *heroism* does not consist simply in placing one's neck, or other members, in a situation of peril; if it did, the absent-minded or careless pedestrian who crosses the street at a dangerous point would be a "hero"; what makes the performance "heroic" is that the agent exposes himself to the extreme peril with full consciousness of what he is doing, and because he judges the facing of it to be called for by honour or patriotism or religion.

And no laboratory method will enable Professor Hogben or anyone else to "predict" that a man's devotion to ideals like these will or will not fail. To make the "act of heroism" predictable by the "only method" which the "modern mechanist" has "learned by experience to trust," you must first take out of it everything which makes it either "heroic" or, in any true sense of the word, "active"; you must reduce it to no more than that which it has in common with the behaviour of an hypnotic subject or a somnambulist—so much muscular movement. "These," as a better psychologist than Mr. Hogben long ago remarked, "are the absurdities which even men of capacity run into, when they have occasion to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally

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stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly discernible upon the mind of man."

It is not that the moralist is in any way called upon to deny the important part played in human life by "conditioned reflexes" and *la machine*; he ought in the course of his own studies to have learned the lesson of their importance sufficiently from such relatively unmodern thinkers as Pascal and Leibniz. But in fully accountable and responsible human action the part of the "machine" is always subservient to something which is not "mechanical," to an intention which is that of the agent himself. A machine, too, exhibits *intentionality*, but the intentions subserved by its functioning are not its own; they are those of the maker and the user of it. As the same noble thinker whom we have just quoted said, briefly but sufficiently: "there is indeed a difference . . . too important an one ever to be overlooked. A machine is inanimate and passive: but we are agents. Our constitution is put in our own power. We are charged with it; and therefore are accountable for any disorder or violation of it."¹

Yes, it may be said—and there precisely is the "rub"—What is the "we" which can be so sharply distinguished from "our constitution" that Butler can speak of that constitution as put in "our power"? If "I," as distinguished from my "constitution," have *no* determinate character at all, has the statement that this constitution is placed in "my power" any definite meaning, and how does that meaning differ from the meaning of the statement that my "constitution" is at the mercy of my natal star or of the "genius to whom I have been allotted"? If this "I" has a determinate character, are

¹ This is also, I take it, the real meaning of the familiar scholastic expression that the sane man is *dominus sui*, lord of himself. The phrase is not meant primarily to exalt us with a sense of our own importance; the sarcastic gloss of the poet, "Lord of himself—that heritage of woe," misrepresents the thought. To understand it rightly we need to have in our minds the position of the "serf" or the vassal. They have some other person who is their *dominus*, and accordingly, as long as they are acting strictly in fulfilment of the directions given them by this "lord" or superior, it is he, and not they, who in fairness is to be held to account for what they do. As Trinalchio says in Petronius, in excuse of some of his own earlier misdeeds, *nec turpe est quod dominus inbet*. (The same thing is true equally of a military man who is simply carrying out the instructions of his superior, e.g. in furnishing the firing party for an execution; if the sentence was iniquitous, the iniquity is not that of the officer charged with putting it into effect.) But the man who is *dominus sui* has no "superior" by whose direction he is bound to act, and therefore the accountability for his act cannot be devolved upon anyone else. He cannot honestly put in the plea of "no official responsibility." It was just because Hobbes held that none of us, except the "sovereign," is in the "civil state" *dominus sui* that he confidently argued that a "subject" is morally obliged to commit a sin, if ordered to do so by the "prince." The "prince" is the *dominus*, and the sin is therefore his and not mine.

you not saying that "my constitution" is controlled entirely by a constitution "of a higher order," and thus committing yourself at once to an "indefinite regress" as well as to the very "determinism" you are so pertinaciously trying to avoid? To give any intelligible meaning to your distinction between "me" and "my constitution" you must ascribe some definite character to the "me," and the moment you do this the distinction between "me" and "my constitution" seems to be obliterated, and obliterated by yourself. Does not this sufficiently justify a writer like Rashdall for deciding to come down in the end on the determinist side of the fence?

Well, no, I honestly believe that it does not, but if we are not simply to lose our heads over the *abyssus humanae conscientiae*, it behoves us to keep all our wits about us as we contemplate its depths. We must note, therefore, in the first place, that the indetermination necessarily implied as antecedent to an act of genuine choice is not an absolute indeterminateness in every conceivable respect, but only an absence of complete determination. That my will may be free it is not requisite that I shall be at every moment able to will any and every conceivable course of action. It is perfectly consistent with any freedom requisite for moral action that it should always have been beyond my power to will certain things effectively from deficiency in natural aptitudes, and that it should now be out of my power to will others in consequence of the way in which my past willing has been directed. It has never been in the power of a tone-deaf man to will to be a musician, or of a colour-blind man to will to distinguish himself as a painter. It is equally possible that from lack of special native capacity it should never have been in my power to will to attain eminence as a mathematician or a linguist; from my birth I may have been all through life incapable of more than wishing that I could have been either. And again, even if I once had the natural capacity by cultivation of which I might have become a first-rate linguist or musician, it may well be, if my activities have been directed to very different ends, that I can now will neither of these kinds of distinction; I may have lost what was once a genuine capacity by want of use, as Darwin, by his own account, lost in mature life the capacity to enjoy literature. But limitations of this sort, whether native or acquired, have nothing to do with the freedom which is in question in moral philosophy. The question there is simply one of freedom to do my duty or to neglect the doing of it, and if I had never the special aptitudes demanded for eminence in, say, mathematics, it never has been my duty to be an eminent mathematician; if I once had the capacity, let us say, to produce poetry, but have lost it by devoting my energies to civil administration, it cannot now be my duty to write a poem. The real question for us as moralists is only this: if it is now my known duty

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to do *A* and I am accountable for the discharge or neglect of this duty, must it not be true that until I decide the issue by willing to do *A*, it remains *undetermined* whether *A* will be done or not? Can it be true consistently with the genuineness of moral accountability that it is already *predetermined* (by my character and the situation in conjunction) which event will ensue?

(Of course when I actually will to do *A*, it is now definitely determined what direction my willing takes, and we may say, if we please, that this is determined by my character reacting to the situation. But if we use this language, we must carefully note (1) that the phraseology is inexact, since it is not "my character" but *I* who am the *agent* making the decision, though I make it in the way I do in virtue of possessing the character I do possess; (2) that "my character," if the statement is to be more than a *petitio principii*, must mean the character I possess in the moment of willing to do *A* and exhibit by that volition, not my character as it was *antecedently* to the choice in question, "up to date," as the phrase goes. By willing the doing of *A* rather than the leaving of *A* undone I show what I am at this moment, not what I was at some earlier moment. The formula, rightly interpreted, thus throws no light on the question—if it is really a proper question—what *makes* me now of a character which shows itself by my choice to do *A*.)

Further, the question we are really concerned to answer is not that of the "predictability" of our voluntary decisions. In practice, I take it, none of us, not even the "modern mechanist," ever expects to be able to predict his own voluntary actions and those of others with anything more than probability, and he only expects his anticipations to possess high probability when they are founded on an intimate personal "acquaintance" and influenced by all those "imponderables" of which "scientific method" can take no account. His forecasts are rather divinations for which he could not himself set out convincing reasons than predictions. "I am sure *X* will refuse that offer." But only "because he is the sort of man I know him to be." That is about as far as we are ever prepared to go. And often we are not prepared to go so far; we have to say "I do not know how he will meet the situation; only I am sure that, whatever he does, he will act like a wise man and a man of honour." The predictability of which we found Professor Hogben speaking would only be possible if we were dealing, not with men and women shaping their course through the situations of life in the real world, but with doctored laboratory "subjects" in artificially simplified situations contrived for them by the experimenter. From the dallings of such puppets in circumstances artificially prepared for them there is no inference to the bearing of undoped men and women in situations which are largely of their own contriving. Granting, then, the patent

fact that an intimate acquaintance with *X* will enable us very often to divine how *X* will bear himself, or would bear himself, in this or that situation, we are still no nearer answering the questions we had put to ourselves: What is the *I* in whose "charge," in the phraseology of Butler, "our constitution is put," and how does it differ from the "constitution" which is said to be put in its charge?

Perhaps the answer to this question is already supplied in principle when we remind ourselves of a truism which some of our scientific investigators seem in danger of forgetting, that a man is a *rational* animal. There is plainly a sense in which the possession of rationality involves absence of complete determination. The path of a particle of inanimate matter (so we commonly think, rightly or not) is quite definitely marked out for it by the magnitude and direction of the "forces acting upon it." Or if this expression be found too old-fashioned, its path through a magnetic field, we may perhaps be allowed to say, is marked out by the nature of the field. There is just this one path open to it, and there is no other. So in a creature which is merely sensitive and "irritable," we can at least conceive that given certain perfectly definite stimuli, the precise character of the organism's response to these stimuli is exactly determined. (I do not, of course, assert that in point of fact any organism is such a piece of clockwork as this, but we can at any rate conceive that it may be so.) But a rational creature, just in the degree to which it is rational, is always only imperfectly amenable to suggestion. It responds to the suggestions of the environment by assent or by the performance of an action or meets them with dissent or refusal to act, "according as it sees reason." And the more rational it is, the more thoroughly does it look into the "reason" on both sides of the alternative before it commits itself in theory or in practice. Now it could not do this unless it were strictly true that until it has "seen reason" it remains undetermined in respect of the suggestion which is yet to be accepted or rejected. If it is to make up its mind according as it "sees reason," there must be a preliminary stage in which a suggestion is there, but acceptance or rejection is not yet determined. In our possession of reason we are thus provided with an internal source of indetermination within ourselves.

The curious thing is that the "scientific determinist" himself accepts this account of the facts when it is a question of belief or disbelief, though he insists on rejecting it when the question is to act or not to act. He always assumes that his own belief in determinism is based upon and justified by the reasons which he produces for its truth; it is not, as the rival beliefs of his fellows may be, a baseless superstition or prejudice. But he is only entitled to claim as much as this if he is prepared to say that he has considered those reasons with an "open mind"; in other words, that there was a time

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when he was undetermined between the alternatives of determinism and indeterminism. It would be fatal to his whole case for the truth of determinism to admit that his acceptance of it was already predetermined for him in advance by his peculiar hereditary temperament and his past history. For he will have to admit that, in that case, he is in exactly the same predicament as the opponent whose views he rejects; both are victims of inevitable prejudice, and there can be no sense in asking on which side the truth lies. Yet the same man persistently refuses to admit that one can come to the practical question whether to do *A* or to leave it undone with an "open mind," undetermined to either alternative until one has judged that one course is better than the other. Here, according to the consistent determinist, we are all of us and always at the mercy of the prejudices due to native bias and past history. Yet if the "open mind" is really ever possible towards a speculative problem, what ground can there be for holding that it is never possible in relation to action?

Reason or intelligence is in its very nature a principle of indetermination in each of us.

The suggestion may sound paradoxical. Is not what is fully known or understood known also as fully determinate? Where I cannot say of the object before me whether it has a certain characteristic or not, or in what degree it has it, I do not really know or understand; the uncertainty or indefiniteness is in me, not in the object, and in me it is a defect of understanding, or a want of relevant information. True enough; and if I had an "angelic understanding," what I knew at all I should know with perfect definiteness and certainty in all its particulars. Conceivably there would be things which fell wholly outside the range of my contemplations, but within the range of my apprehension there would be no penumbra of doubt and uncertainty. But "such is not our condition"; we find ourselves in a world of which, to begin with, we have no understanding at all, and have to make our way to comprehension of it slowly and step by step. In beings like ourselves it is the very prerogative of our rationality that we are not tied to acceptance of the scene presented to us on a "face view." We can and must ask ourselves whether the grounds for acceptance of the immediate suggestions conveyed by such a view are in reason sufficient; we must go out of our way to test the suggestions of the "appearances" in all sorts of subtle ways if ever we are to arrive at truth. And to do this at all, as Descartes understood so well, we must be capable of intellectual detachment; we must be able to entertain a thesis for scrutiny without being intellectually determined either to accept or to reject it. It may often be hard to attain this detachment from "prejudices," but if, in dealing with any subject-matter, it is not only hard but impossible, there knowledge must be eternally

beyond us; even if the proposition we "inevitably" assert should in point of fact be a true one, we are unable to know that it is true, just as, if we had no sense but that of sight and no organs for manipulating anything, we could never know whether the partially immersed stick really is bent or only looks to be so.

It stands no otherwise with action and "practice." My native temperament and my past habits provide endless more or less powerful suggestions of action to be done in the various situations in which I find myself, endless "solicitations," as T. H. Green was accustomed to say. But being a rational being, I can ask whether the action to which I am thus "solicited" is good or right, exactly as I can ask about a belief suggested to me by the first look of things whether it is true. Both questions are questions which I not merely can ask, but, if I am to live up to the standard imposed on me by my rationality, ought to ask. And the very asking of the question about good or right implies, as a precondition of its answerability, that while it is still unanswered I can hold myself in a moral detachment between compliance with a "solicitation" and non-compliance, a detachment in which my will is as yet "undetermined." If I cannot do this, if there is no such condition of indetermination of the will, then there is in truth no such being as an "I," or reasonable person, and what I mistake for my self is no more than an empty stage on which conflicting impulses and "urges" fight out their quarrels. If the "modern mechanist" honestly recognizes this as a true and adequate description of his own mental life, I for one cannot undertake to confute him, and shall be content to remark that, except in external configuration, he must be of a different species from myself and the men and women with whom I find myself concerned in my daily life. But he should in consistency add that the species to which he and his congeners belong is one to which morality is unmeaning. There can be no "ought" where there is no person to be obliged, but only a medley of impulses, each of them inevitably just the impulse it is, with the particular strength it has. Reasonable will, just because it is reasonable, cannot be a conatus towards this or the other precise and determinate "gratification," nor a resultant of any combination of such conatus; it is a conatus not towards a determinate *τὸδε τι* but towards "what I shall, on consideration, pronounce to be good, or to be right." (The difference is like that between the contentment enjoined by the Anglican Church with "that station to which it shall please God to call me," and a contentment which the Church has been disingenuously charged with inculcating with that station in which I happen at the moment to find myself.)

To put the point in what is perhaps a still more general way: reason "in its speculative use" has its appropriate correlated object, but that object is not *A*'s theorem or *B*'s theorem or end, but *truth*;

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and *A*'s or *B*'s theorem only secondarily and *because* they are true; the concern of "reason" with them is *sub specie veri*. In other words, speculative reason is the *potentia* or "faculty" of cognition of truth, not further determined as this or that particular truth. Similarly, the appropriate object of "reason in its practical use" is not this or that determinate "good," but *good* or *right* not further determined; this or that only becomes an object to it in so far as, and *because* good or right, *sub specie boni*. The pursuit of good as good demands, if it is to be possible at all, freedom from absolute determination towards this or that particular "good," exactly as the pursuit of truth as truth demands freedom from absolute determination to acquiescence in this or that particular "truth."

That intelligence, or rationality, is a principle of indetermination within us is, in fact, only another way of saying that it is the *universal* in us, in virtue of which each of us transcends his own particularity. Just as there could be no science if we could never say "this is manifestly true," but only "I, John Smith, being John Smith, cannot help believing this," so there could be no morality unless we could get behind "I, John Smith, being John Smith, cannot help choosing this" to "this is what ought to be chosen." The rock on which a writer like Rashdall is bound to come to grief is just his determination to say both things at once. When he talks determinism to please the scientific men, he is treating human personality, as the scientific man is only too apt to do, as a "bare particular"; when he says "ought," he is recognizing its true character as a universal. But nothing can be at once a universal and a bare particular.

We shall say, then, by way of answer to the question which has been occupying us so long, that the "me" in whose "charge" our constitution is put is the universal within us, our rationality; the "constitution" put in its charge is the particular, the temperament, aptitudes, idiosyncrasies which vary indefinitely from man to man; our character is what we make out of this material by exercising or neglecting to exercise "reason in its practical use." This may indeed seem at first a very unsatisfactory solution of the problem. It is natural to ask why then it is sometimes easy, but more often difficult to exercise the "practical reason"? Why are we so often remiss? Why do not all of us actually bring all suggested courses of action "before the bar of conscience" before we close with them? But we must remember, as is too often forgotten in discussions of the question, that precisely the same difficulty may be raised about the "speculative use of reason." Why do we ever fall into error? Why do we not always wait until we have "clearly and evidently" discerned the truth of a proposition before we affirm it, as we sometimes have the discretion to do? If it be objected to the champion of free will that he cannot explain why a free will is not impeccable, it

may be justly objected to the "free" thinker that he cannot explain why free thought is not inerrant. Yet though he is well aware of the besetting tendencies to assent or dissent on insufficient evidence and to allow our prejudices or wishes to decide what we shall accept as true, he does not deny that evidence is sometimes properly weighed, or regard the conclusions which are reached after such a weighing of the evidence as dictated by anything but their own seen reasonableness. Nor does he hesitate to assume that we can and ought to foster in ourselves the practice of such impartial weighing of evidence and to discourage the opposing tendency to let our beliefs be decided for us by temperamental bias or acquired prejudice. If I have been brought up in the traditions of Scottish Presbyterianism, it will probably be no easy matter for me to achieve anything like "objectivity" in my beliefs about the actions and characters of Claverhouse and Archbishop Sharp. If my attachments are strongly on the side of Romanism or Anglicanism, I shall find it no less hard to be "objective" in my version of the life of Knox, or, let us say, the Marquis of Argyle. Yet no one doubts that I ought to strive after such "objectivity" if I think about Scottish history in the seventeenth century, and that if I do not achieve it I have no business to come forward as a writer on that period of history at all. I ought in that case to follow the example of Scott, who refused to write the life of Mary Stuart on the ground that he knew himself unable to do it with the requisite impartiality, rather than that of Macaulay or Froude. So whenever I have to decide what it is right or wrong for me to do, it is my business to aim at reaching a judgment not dictated to me by temperament, or wishes, or habit. I shall not always succeed, and where I am unsuccessful my decision will not be truly free, any more than my judgment is free when I cannot weigh evidence in a balance undistorted by prejudice, but I ought to make the attempt, and the very knowledge that I ought to make it is the proof that I can try to make it.

It may follow that our fully free decisions are rare, as convictions based on evidence undistorted by prejudice are also probably rare. And it may therefore be that it is only on comparatively rare occasions that the whole responsibility for our decisions falls upon ourselves without shadow of excuse. But what then? It is not I who am asked to sit on the "great white throne" and pronounce the final judgment on my neighbours, or even on myself. That business is happily in other hands than mine. But at least I know that I ought in all my decisions to aim at freedom from "personal bias," exactly as I ought to aim at the same thing in all my judgments about "fact." And however rarely the ideal is achieved, when it is achieved there is no more reason to doubt the freedom of the will in the one case than to doubt the freedom of the judgment of true or false in

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the other. We have to educate ourselves into moral freedom of choice as we have to educate ourselves into impartial examination of scientific or historical propositions propounded for our acceptance. Neither process would be possible if it were already prescribed for us by a "ready-made" constitution just what we shall choose as good, or just what we shall believe to be true.

If you say that for any man there may be temptations to do wrong which are to him with his particular temperament insuperable, it may be said that there is just as much or as little reason to hold that there are also for him, with his temperament, prepossessions which make unbiased estimation of evidence as to fact impossible. It is just as true to say of a given man that he, being the man he is, "cannot help" fuddling himself when there are a bottle, a glass, and a corkscrew at hand, although he knows it to be wrong, as it is to say that, being the man he is, he "cannot help" believing in the "Popish Plot," or in the passage of Russian troops through this country in 1914, though he knows the evidence to be worthless. No man can know that any temptation to do wrong is "insuperable" for him, or that he "cannot help" thinking the wrong act to be a right one. "You never can tell" until you make the attempt, and even if you make it and fail you cannot tell. You do not know that you would not have overcome the temptation, or have seen the path of right more clearly, if you had only tried harder. "But," says the scientific determinist, "*you* could not have tried harder." It is sufficient reply to ask him how he knows that. In fact, he does not know it at all. All that he really knows is that *if* it is ever true to say of you that you could have made an effort which you did not make, you must be a being of a different kind from any that he is accustomed to manipulate in his laboratory. And so, in fact, you are: you are a *person*, the peer not of the experimenter's "subjects," but of the experimenter. You do not "stay put"; the "subjects" must. It is really preposterous that proposals to clear society of such "medieval rubbish" as morality and religion should be gravely laid before us by "men of science" so simple-minded that it has not occurred to them that there is a difference which is not merely one of complexity between a person and a thing, or even between a person and a string of events. It will be time to consider their claims to be taken seriously as advisers on the conduct of life when they have made that elementary discovery. Meanwhile moralists who are trustful enough to repeat the deterministic *credo* because they have heard it from the men of science *qui errare non possunt* (like the Medieval Church) may be invited to ponder an old saying: "If the blind lead the blind, they shall both fall into the ditch."

So much, then by way of defence of the conception of our "constitution" as a "machine" which has been "put in our own

charge." But I should like also to remark that even the analogy here assumed, like most analogies, is an imperfect one and may mislead, unless we remark the point where it becomes inadequate. When a man is put in charge of a machine, the machine is already made before he is set to control it. He may tend it carefully, use it rightly, and get the maximum of work out of it, or he may neglect it, use it for the wrong purposes, or get much less out of it in the way of work than he might have done. A man may, for example, in a few minutes ruin a razor-blade which would have done the proper work of a razor-blade for years, if he tries to whittle chips with it. Or, again, he may merely leave it to corrode unused. But what is the proper work which the machine will execute, how much of this work it will do, and at what expense of wear and tear is determined initially before the implement comes into the hands of the user by its material and construction.

The razor-blade, to take a particularly simple example, if kept properly ground and stropped, is equal to yielding a certain number of "clean shaves" and no more before it is worn out. If improperly used, it will be worn out before it has completed the tale; but however properly handled, it will not exceed the tale. But there is no ground whatever for supposing that "our constitution" resembles a machine in this important respect. Who in his senses would suggest, for example, that the active generosity which is part of the "constitution" of the magnanimous man is just equal to forgiving his offending brother "unto seventy times" seven, but must collapse under the strain of a four hundred and ninety-first occasion for pardon; or that the ingenuity and resource of the great classical scholar is equal to making, let us say, three hundred admirable corrections of depraved texts, but unable to stand the strain of making one more?

It is not merely—though this is a point of some importance—that the yield in work of intellectual and moral endowments cannot, like that of a machine, be properly estimated by any numerical formula. What is more, the "constitution" of which we are "put in charge" is not something ready made and complete before we are charged with it; we actually make it, for better and for worse—of course, always within limit—in the process of "using." There is a wealth of meaning not, I think, always fully appreciated by the commentators, in the words of the "prophet" of Plato's myth of Er: "Virtue has no master over her, and each shall have more or less of her as he honours her or does her despite."¹ It is just because these words are so exactly true that "virtue" can be no part and no product of *la machine*. A machine neither honours the work to which

¹ ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἑλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἐξεῖ (Rep. 617e). The rendering is Professor Storey's.

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it is set nor does despite to it; it merely executes the task to which it is set. And, as I have just said, the "machine" which we have to employ in the moral shaping of our lives, the whole complex of our habitual tendencies of thought, speech, and deed, is one which we have to fashion for ourselves in the act of using it.

If we are to have an analogy from the mechanical arts at all, the work of developing a moral character is less like that of operating a machine already made than like that of building a house or a road with tools and engines which we have first to construct for ourselves. Clearly there would be a very serious limitation to our engineering operations if the human hand, like one of our machines, were only capable of executing one or other, according to circumstances, of a comparatively few exactly determined movements, and if it further depended on the character of the stimulus of the moment which of these movements should be performed. Our skill as technicians, our power to forge just the instruments we need for our indefinitely numerous purposes, is due to the indeterminate variety of the movements that human hand can execute and our ability to select from this indeterminate variety just those which are relevant to the purpose before us. Similarly, our ability to mould a character for ourselves is due to the indeterminate variety of the responses which we can make to a given situation and our power of selecting from all this variety that which answers to our conception of the right and good. In a word, we can make ourselves a character, for good or evil, only because intelligent purposive action is *not* an affair of "conditioned reflexes," but something wholly different in kind. What our situation (including under that head our own "past") "determines" for us is at most an indefinitely numerous aggregate of possible responses in action, $r_1, r_2, r_3 \dots r_n \dots$ from which the appropriate r_p has to be selected; the agent in the selection, the *facultas electiva*, or, to speak less mythologically, the person who makes the selection, determines that r_p in particular shall be the response made, but there is no one and nothing behind the scenes to determine that the agent shall make that determination and no other; if there were, the agent would not be an agent, but the instrument of another.

I do not mean in repeating this statement to deny by a mere *ipse dixit* the reality of such things as the "divine persuasion" of which Plato speaks, providence, "prevenient grace" putting into our hearts good desires, or even of diabolical seduction putting into them evil desires. I would only remark that when we come in sight of such conceptions we have left the "scientific" field of human life behind us and are commencing theologians of some kind. It is therefore to the point to remember that no theologian (and the theologians presumably know their own business) has supposed that

"grace" does violence to human nature or that diabolical instigation is irresistible.

"Grace," it was said, does not overpower nature but "co-operates with" it, though the rationale of such co-operation is a mystery to us. Is it, however, in kind more of a mystery than the undeniable "influence" of another man's personality, or even of external "nature" on my own character and action? Are not these also inexplicable mysteries, or rather patent impossibilities, on the principles of the thoroughgoing and consistent determinism which reduces morally significant action to "conditioned reflexes"?

It is because it seems to me that a really consistent determinism must make this reduction, and must therefore leave no place in human life for either real science or real morality, that, for all my disagreement with the "modern mechanists" approved of by Professor Hogben, I am cordially grateful to them, and to him as their prophet, for the candour with which they exhibit their picture of "our nature as agents" without disguise or trappings. Only I confess that the effect is, on myself, like that produced in a peculiarly revolting episode of the *Faerie Queene* by the despoiling of Duessa,

Such then (said Una) as she seemeth here,
Such is the face of falshood: such the sight
Of fowle Duessa, when her borrowed light
Is laid away, and counterfesaunce known.

And I cannot help thinking that the proper way for a moralist to treat determinism is to imitate Spenser's knights of whom we are told

When they had the witch disrobed quight . . .
They let her goe at will, and wander waies unknowne.

PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION

W. G. MACLAGAN, M.A.

I

THERE are many difficulties connected with the notion of punishment, but perhaps it is not disputed that it is at least a deliberate infliction of pain of one kind or another. Of course, that is not an adequate description of its nature, but so far as it goes it seems to be a true one.¹ And the idea that it could be morally right deliberately to inflict pain on another, unlike, for example, the idea that it is morally right to tell the truth, is so manifestly intolerable unless we look beyond the infliction of pain itself that we are tempted to leap forward to the question, "What is the justification of such action?" before making quite explicit to ourselves what it is, over and above its being the deliberate infliction of pain, that constitutes the action punishment at all. The questions "Why hurt?" and "Why punish?" are confused with one another. No doubt some distinction between them is present vaguely in everyone's mind and the confusion may not be in fact serious: but anyhow it is a defect and should be remedied.

It is immediately obvious on reflection that punishment consists not simply in the deliberate infliction of pain but in pain deliberately inflicted as a retort to some wrongful act done by the person on whom it is inflicted. This, of course, is what alone renders a retributive theory of the justification of punishment possible. The infliction of pain on any other occasion could, clearly, be justified only by reference to results, to the goodness of the consequences of its infliction, as, for example (to take an obvious case), where a surgeon was obliged to operate without anaesthetic.

But does the backward reference of punishment merely make possible, or perhaps plausible, the retributive theory of its justification? Is it not rather the case that only such retributive infliction of pain *is* punishment? It is admitted that the infliction of pain may be justified on utilitarian grounds where the sufferer has done no wrong. If only these utilitarian considerations are operative even where a wrong has been committed is not that as much as to say that the wrong done is irrelevant to our present action; and is it not plain that in that case our action cannot be a punishing? It seems then that it is legitimate to ask whether the retributive infliction of

¹ See, however, the concluding section of this discussion.

pain can be justified, or again whether punishment can be justified, and these will be simply two forms of the same question; but to ask whether punishment can be justified on retributive grounds is as absurd as to ask whether the reason lead weighs more than linseed is that it is heavier.

Yet whatever warrant from reason the retributive infliction of pain may possess, there seems no doubt that it remains strongly repugnant to our feelings, while at the same time common sense is offended at the suggestion that it is never right to punish. Will it help to propose a compromise, according to which the wrong done is relevant to our action as supplying the *occasion* of the infliction of pain while the *justification* of it resides simply in its consequences—whether deterrent or reformative or both need not here concern us? The nature and amount of the pain will also, of course, be determined by utilitarian considerations.

I am not sure that any one of those who have attempted to combine retributive with non-retributive elements in punishment has attempted the combination precisely in this form. But it is a conceivable one and one not clearly repudiated in such attempts, so that it is as well to mention it. It need not, however, delay us, for it is clear that it does not describe punishment in a way other than would serve equally well to describe the work of the surgeon and so has not really advanced us beyond the position already recognized as inadequate. The bodily state that the surgical operation is to alter is not without its causal conditions. There, too, the past provides the occasion for the present action, and there too one answer to the question, "Why operate?" will accordingly be given by reference to a situation that has arisen while another will be given by reference to a situation that, it is hoped, will result. (Strictly speaking, of course, the question, "Why operate?" is analysable into two questions corresponding to these two answers. The questions may be expressed in the forms, "What *need* is there to operate?" and "What *good* is there in operating?" respectively.) Obviously where the issue is that of the moral justification of the surgeon's conduct, the second of these aspects will be the one stressed. And if in the case of punishment the first also is made explicit, as it is not in the case of the surgical operation, the reason is precisely that when we punish we treat what we have been calling the *occasion* of the punishment as really also a *justification* of it.

In fact, the view we have been considering would be more precisely described as maintaining that while the wrongful act is what *justifies* the infliction of pain on the wrongdoer, the nature and amount of the pain will be determined by reference to consequences. This, I suppose, is what is always intended and sometimes expressly stated by those who assert a combination of retributive and non-

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retributive elements in punishment. Such a combination view does not, naturally, require that consequences should be the only determinant of the nature and amount of the punishment, nor is it so stated, for example, by Bradley.¹ It must take this form only in the case of those whose objection is really to the retributive element altogether. But whichever form it takes it is surely absurd, just as it would be absurd to say that when one man buys something from another the fact that he ought to pay for it is involved in the fact that the other man is transferring some property to him, but the amount of the payment is not to be determined by reference to what is being transferred but by reference to the good that will be done by paying this sum rather than that. If the offence constitutes the reason for punishing, the nature of the offence must also determine the nature of the punishment, that is, must determine the "how" and "what" of the infliction of pain so far as that pain is punishment. There may, of course, be other reasons not having to do with punishment for adding to or subtracting from that pain; and this admission is all that is really meant by the modification of the retributive theory in the popular view that Bradley was describing. But however lacking in practical importance the point may be, it is necessary for philosophy to insist that such "modification" gives us for result not the complex nature of a single action, but a relationship of cooperation or exclusion, as the case may be, between two actions only one of which is a punishing.²

Thus I see no reason for retracting the view that the retributive infliction of pain and only the retributive infliction of pain constitutes punishment. The questions that now confront us are two. First (which we have already raised) is punishment, i.e. pure retribution, justified? And second, can we throw any light on the objection that is apparently felt to facing the first question, over and above pointing out, as we have already done, that what is objected to is the necessity of having to answer either that retribution is justified or that punishment is not?

II

These questions will best be considered in the reverse order, and as regards the latter of them it may be conceded that there is a certain reasonableness and not simply the force of blind feeling on the side of the objection to the form of the first question. For, on the one hand, it is the case, though this is far from being immediately clear, that the retributive infliction of pain is not justified; we shall explain this later. And, on the other hand, we undoubtedly find it

¹ *Ethical Studies*, second edition, p. 27.

² Dr. Ewing, in his book, *The Morality of Punishment*, does not seem to me to recognize this.

natural to apply the term "punishment" to a certain type of action that is justified but is also not really retributive.

Taking this second point first, what we have to notice is that there are two sorts of context in which the notion of punishment is held to be applicable corresponding to two conceptions of wrongdoing. For wrongdoing may be viewed either as the breach of some rule of sound conduct without reference to the motives from which the wrongdoer acted, or as a moral failure on the part of the agent, a sinning against his own standards, without reference to the question whether or not these standards do, in fact, constitute a rule of sound conduct.¹

There can be no question that the infliction of pain on the wrongdoer in the first of these senses of wrongdoing is in principle justified. If it were not, if the State (for instance) had no right to take steps which to be effective might even amount to the infliction of pain in order to secure conformity with rules other than those that each individual might accept for himself, then in an imperfect world the State could not exist at all and would have no reason for existing. And if such infliction of pain is really, as usage leads us to suppose it is, punishment, then punishment is justified. Yet the justification does not seem to lie here in the performance of any retributive function; it must, therefore, lie in the fact that only by such action is it possible to preclude social chaos, injustice, and maleficence, and thus it looks not to the past but to the future. That it does not lie in the performance of a retributive function can perhaps be seen if we reflect that retribution has desert on the side of the patient as its correlative. For surely we should not say that a person who acted morally, that is, conformably to his own standards and *because* they were his standards, *deserved* the pain that the law annexed to his action? We should, I suppose, even feel a certain repugnance to the infliction of the penalty where we were convinced that the situation was of such a sort—perhaps the treason of Sir Roger Casement would be generally regarded as an instance of this. We should feel a repugnance that would not be felt if we could honestly say, "This is what he deserves," though some repugnance might be felt even then. And yet we should not regard this repugnance as a sufficient ground, or as evidence that there was a sufficient ground, for the non-infliction of the penalty. Considerations of desert, then, would not be what determined us to inflict or to abstain from inflicting it, or, in other words, the infliction would not be retributive.

¹ It will hardly be denied that action of the first sort is in some sense wrongdoing. But it may be objected that nobody would, in fact, regard an action that was a wrongdoing only in that sense as a case for punishment. Even if that objection is valid against the wording of the present paragraph, it will, I think, be met by the modification of this disjunction on p. 287.

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To say this is, I admit, to over-simplify. The term "desert" is used, undoubtedly, as a correlate of "moral guilt"; but its use is not confined to that context. I state the fact, and am not concerned here to explain it. It seems clear to me that we might say of a person performing an action, whatever his motive, in the knowledge that there was a penalty annexed to it (or even without that knowledge if the fact that there was such a penalty had been "sufficiently" published), that he "deserved" the penalty. "He must pay for it," we might say, treating the case as though it were one of purchase by the wrongdoer. But perhaps, so far as this goes, Captain Oates "deserved" to lose his life; and certainly the victim of blackmail "deserves" to lose his fortune as the price of silence. Yet surely no one would justify blackmail by this consideration; and correspondingly "desert" simply in this sense (even granting it to be a proper sense) would not justify punishment. It has been suggested indeed that it is precisely in this sense of "desert" that punishment *can* be said to be deserved. But, though it is true (if not actually tautological) that, when a sentence is being passed, the judge as such is not concerned with any other use of "desert," a judge as such is an abstraction and not a moral agent at all; and accordingly, for a moral justification of our action we must look beyond that function in terms of which he is defined. But when I step outside the standpoint of the judge as such I find it, I must confess, quite incredible that the publication, by whatever authority, that such-and-such a penalty will be visited on such-and-such an act does, simply by itself, morally justify the infliction of that penalty. When it is inflicted the victim may, indeed, have no "right" *to be surprised*; but it does not at all follow that he has no right *to protest*.

If this is clear, we can reiterate our previous conclusion that though punishment in such cases is justified it is in a non-retributive sense—only, I am committed to saying, it is then not really punishment. But it may be asked, "Who are you to decide that the ordinary use of a word is wrong? And how, if it is wrong, do you account for the error?"

In a sense, of course, the ordinary use of a word cannot be wrong, and to say that any given application of it is wrong is really only to say that it is not in conformity with ordinary use. But in order to maintain this position without qualification we have to assume that the ordinary use is self-consistent and unambiguous, and that is far from being always the case. When the use is not self-consistent we can say that even a popular application of a term is wrong if it contradicts what seems to be a yet more fundamental intention of popular usage. Now common sense does, I am sure, demand that not merely the occasion but the justification of what it would call punishment is to be found by looking to the past. Consequently it

is inconsistent with itself and contradicts what, in my view, is the more fundamental of its affirmations when it describes as punishment those penalties whose justification as conditions of social order and the "good life" we have admitted. In this sense, then, the term "punishment" is misapplied in ordinary speech: and the error arises precisely because in our ordinary thought we read into the penalties so described a backward reference that is not really there. This happens, I suggest, in two co-operating ways.

In the first place, the penalties in question are only *indirectly* forward-looking. Directly, the ground for penalizing is simply that a right has been infringed, and not (as in the case of a surgical operation) that such and such a state of affairs will result from this particular penalty. It is only when we ask why, in general, we penalize infringements of rights that we get the forward reference to the hoped-for state of affairs in which rights shall be, or shall continue to be, generally respected. We *need* to look beyond the particular context of our penalty to find its true justification; since (in so far as the question is one of maintaining rights) the penalty manifestly cannot be said to maintain the particular right that has been infringed,¹ and (in so far as we are concerned with the production of good) the great good involved is that which is mediated by the order and general security of society, in respect, e.g. of property, and this precludes us from allowing our action, in a case of theft, to be determined simply by the answer to the question whether the thief will make better use of the property than the legal owner. So, then, the real justification of our action is to be found in this indirect reference to the future; but though this is so, yet in the particular case we react directly to the infringement of the rule as such; and as it is natural not to carry our mind beyond this, it is natural to suppose that the ultimate justification of the penalty lies simply in the infringement of the rule.²

¹ Of course, as the Provost of Oriel has suggested (*The Right and the Good*, pp. 63-4), it may *inter alia* be the fulfilment of a promise "to the injured person and his friends, and to society" to which a *particular* right on the side of the injured person, etc., corresponds. But though (on an intuitionist view of the obligation to keep promises) the justification of the penalty will be found *pro tanto* really and not merely apparently by reference to the past, that in the past to which reference is made will be a promise-making and not a wrongdoing, and the penalty will accordingly also be *pro tanto* not a punishment but the keeping of a promise. Perhaps the legalistic retributive view just mentioned, which is Mr. Mabbott's (*Mind*, April 1939), confuses punishment with such a promise-keeping; though in this case the promise would be rather to the criminal himself than to society.

² No doubt the illusion is assisted by the use of the term "desert" mentioned on p. 285, as well as by the second consideration about to be discussed. Indeed, that use of "desert" may perhaps be regarded as a bridge between the two considerations here put forward.

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The second reason for which, I suggest, we come to think of the penalties inflicted by the State, and which are really forward-looking, as being in the strict sense punishment, is that we tend to interpret the act that constitutes an infringement of rights, the conduct that is, in fact, unsound, as also resulting from a bad motive. This is quite natural since so far as the right is recognized as a right the violation of it could only result from such a motive, and the recognition of it as a right by society in general is presupposed wherever a sanction is attached, with general approval, to the breach of it. Of course, on reflection we admit that the wrongdoer need not himself be viewing his act as the violation of a right (we are not, of course, talking of *legal* rights as such) but the natural unreflective presumption is that he shares the outlook of society in general. If this presumption were not natural we should not continually pass the moral judgments on one another that we do pass despite all our "cool hour" recognition that at least the heart of man is not a sense-datum. And this presumption imports into the situation the supposition that the wrongdoer in the first of our senses of wrongdoing is as such a wrongdoer also in the second sense (i.e. morally guilty), and therefore *deserves* the penalty in a strict sense of "desert"; for, *prima facie*, moral guilt does deserve retribution. What we have, as a result, however, is no clear theory of a relation between these two sorts of wrongdoing. What we have is only an inarticulate conflation of them, with a corresponding conflation of the conceptions of the appropriate retort to them, the notion of punishment that really does appear appropriate to the one case being extended to the other with which it has strictly nothing to do.

III

We can now at length turn to the question whether even where moral guilt is involved the retributive infliction of pain that is properly called punishment can be justified. This, of course, is not the same as to ask whether the State or any human individual is entitled to perform this punitive function; to that question, which I propose to ignore, we might answer "No," and yet hold that it is morally fitting that there should be, if possible, punishment by some agent or other.¹ But when I ask whether this *is* morally fitting I

¹ I cannot see that the conclusion that the essence of punishment is not retribution for moral guilt follows from the assertion (even if it be true) that no one, in fact, possesses the status that would entitle him to inflict such retribution. It might simply be the case that the word "punishment" names a kind of act no one could be right in performing; or, if the notion of punishment is supposed to include that of its practicability, that the word is a "vox nihili" in the same sense in which "square triangle" is.

find myself confronted with what, at first sight, seems to be an antinomy.

I shall state the difficulty in terms appropriate to my own general ethical position, though as will appear almost immediately it is not peculiar to such a standpoint; and the two sides of it may be put as follows. On the one hand, I am not at all inclined to deny the essential connection of obligation with value. It does not seem possible that I should be under an obligation to act in a way acting in which contributes nothing, or is not thought to contribute anything, valuable to the world ("contribution of value" covering here the elimination of evils). Nor does it seem possible that the value in question can be that of the frame of mind in which, or the motive from which, I act, for the reasons convincingly put forward in *The Right and the Good*.¹ But if this is so we are shut up to a forward-looking justification of all our actions, whether or not to such a forward-looking justification as would naturally be termed "utilitarian." On the other hand, punishment understood in the strict sense already explained excludes by its very nature any justification of this sort. Are we then to deny the propriety, in principle, of punishment in that strict sense of the word? This, I must repeat, is quite different from the denial that it falls to any human individual or institution to apply the principle. Are we to deny that moral guilt simply as such and without reference to consequences following from its treatment *deserves* treatment other than that deserved by innocence and virtue? Even if that is, in fact, the case, I cannot immediately see it to be so. And there is my dilemma.

Of course the difficulty is an unreal one on either of two suppositions. It is unreal if it is not true that what we are under obligation to do is invariably to set ourselves to bring about what is, or what we consider to be, the best state of affairs possible in the circumstances; and if, at the same time, the case of punishment is one of the cases in which we see the rightness of the act independently of any reference to the quality of its consequences. And, again, the problem is unreal for anyone who does not have the least feeling that guilt and innocence merit different treatments. I recognize that many people may resolve the whole issue in one or other of these ways. But I am assuming, in conformity with my own convictions, that neither mode of resolution is legitimate. If I deliberately wronged another person and he knew it, I should judge that he was failing in his duty if he took account of that wrong otherwise than as part of the conditions under which he was, so far as possible, to bring good into the world; but at the same time I should feel that I did not deserve that the wrong should be responded to only in that way.

Actually, though in my original statement of the dilemma one

¹ Pp. 4-6.

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side of it is the hypothesis of the value-basis of all obligation, the problem, as the italicized phrase in the previous paragraph indicates, does not require this. And this is important; for certainly even if what I may perhaps be permitted to call an "agathistic" interpretation of the treatment appropriate to guilt can be sustained, it would need a great deal more argument to show, if it can be shown at all, that such an interpretation can be given of all our particular duties. But the present problem remains even for those who are not in general "agathistic" so long as they shrink from offering a "non-agathistic" solution in this instance. Thus the Provost of Oriel himself¹ is not prepared to say either that guilt deserves the same treatment as innocence or that the justification for the infliction of pain on the guilty is to be found simply in the fact that their guilt deserves that pain. He accepts and applies in this connection Professor Moore's doctrine of organic unities and holds that the justification of punishment lies in the fact that a crime-punishment complex taken as a unity is *better*, apart from any consequences, than the crime left to itself.² This particular theory is a peculiarly tempting one, since it appears to effect a happy synthesis (though that, of course, was not the Provost's objective) between "agathism" and a serious regard for the concept of desert. But I find myself unable to adopt it. It is not that I have a quarrel with the doctrine of organic unities as such, but in this particular case I seem for once to be more "intuitionist" than the Provost. When I attend to an instance of punishment and think away all the good consequences that may result as after-effects of the guilty person's being punished, I have to confess that I cannot see any good left unless it be something that might be called by some such name as "fittingness." And to say that I can see that what justifies punishment is a "fittingness" inherent in the state of affairs constituted by the guilt and the punishment together seems really only to amount to saying that what I intuit is just that it is proper to punish.

There seems then to be no way of combining, as principles governing conduct in the face of moral guilt, the principle of retribution and the principle of production of good.³ But if at the same time neither principle is merely the expression of a prejudice, how can either give place to the other and, though rational, yet have no claim

¹ *The Right and the Good*, pp. 57-8.

² Naturally I here leave out of account the Provost's discussion of the considerations governing the State-action that is *called* punishment.

³ Dr. Ewing's theory of the sense in which punishment can be an end-in-itself (*The Morality of Punishment*, pp. 107 sqq.) is, as he himself says, not strictly a retributive one. Rather he seems to me to be doing in one way what the two following sections of this paper are doing in another. But I do not find his view very clear or convincing.

to be taken account of in our action? The only possible solution is to hold that, in the case of one of the two, though a rational intuition is indeed involved the expression given to it mistranslates its nature, and that when it is correctly expressed we see how, rational intuition though it is, it does not determine our conduct. The principle that requires this reinterpretation is the retributive principle. I wish first to insist that this principle is impossible of application, and then to show how, properly understood, it claims no application.

IV

The retributive principle is impossible of application unless in the act of retribution it is possible to secure an equivalence of guilt and punishment, and that is not the case. I do not mean by this simply that *we* are not in fact in a position to bring about an equivalence of which we can none the less form an idea; nor even that *we* are not in fact in a position to form a precise idea of an equivalence that is none the less in principle possible. I mean that the very notion of such an equivalence is an impossible one. The two things that are to be measured against each other are in their very nature incommensurable. In saying this I am, of course, only repeating what others have said;¹ but the repetition does not yet seem superfluous. Those who think that the difficulty is not one of principle but only of the practical application of a principle are, I suppose, using as the standard of measurement of the guilt the actual thing done. Certainly it seems in principle possible to weigh the gravity of one actual thing done (the crime) against that of another (the punishment). But we are no longer considering crime in the sense of the actual thing done, irrespective of motive; we are concerned now only with moral guilt which alone appears, I have argued, to deserve retribution, and the actual thing done by the guilty person is not the measure of this guilt and stands in no definite relation to it. The equivalence that retribution implies can be found, if at all, only for the overt act of the guilty person and not for the guilt to which it properly refers. And, I may add, though the determination of the point is not essential to my argument, that while nobody would suppose that the operation of a retributive principle would involve one and the same penalty in every case, but everyone would, on the contrary, suppose that the problem is one of affixing varying penalties to varying degrees of guilt, yet when I think of guilt in the strict sense of moral failure I find the idea of its having degrees at all a very puzzling (though I certainly cannot say an obviously absurd) one.

Of all the suggestions for determining the punishment that is

¹ E.g. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i, p. 289.

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appropriate to guilt, the most hopeful-looking is, I think, the view that "remorse is the penalty that fits the crime;"¹ for moral guilt and remorse at least belong to the same order of things as moral guilt and the old-time picking of oakum do not. On this view the act that is called "punishing" will deserve that name just so far as it is directed to generating remorse. And, of course, it will not lose its right to that name, however gentle and kindly it may appear when viewed in abstraction from this intention; the definition must certainly cover the activity known as "heaping coals of fire" on another's head. No doubt it will be practically exceedingly difficult to decide how one should act in order to stimulate remorse in another, but the difficulty now will be only a practical one and not one of principle.

Apart from practical difficulties, however, even this suggestion will not do. For one thing, if we take guilt in the strict sense of moral failure, it is at least problematic whether it could ever not be accompanied by remorse.² The point cannot be fully considered here;³ but suppose that the guilt is, by a necessity inherent in human nature, attended with remorse, it follows that the theory we are considering ceases to have any value as a guide to action. Nature will always have forestalled our retributive zeal, and all that will be left for us to do will be complacently to contemplate her operations. This will not matter to anyone who, like myself, does not suppose that the "retributive intuition" is, in fact, a guide to action and whose only interest is in the correct analysis of its nature. But in the theory under consideration it is certainly intended to provide a basis for some of our conduct.

In any case I cannot persuade myself that remorse really is the penalty that fits the crime. If it were, I ought in reason to feel not only (as I do) that it is proper that I should be remorseful but also (as I do not) that, when I am remorseful, I and the "moral order" are once more "quits." I am sure that my failure to think the latter is not due to any inadequate conception of the painfulness of remorse, as though I supposed remorse to be as perfunctory as a merely formal apology. But no doubt the acute painfulness of remorse is just what makes it seem to those who hold the view here criticized to be "as much as a man deserves"; and so I shall complete my criticism by suggesting that this painfulness is not simply not enough, but is not

¹ Carritt, *The Theory of Morals*, p. 110.

² On this view it seems that the more hardened a criminal is the less is he guilty. The position is not free from paradox, but neither is the denial of it.

³ The act must, of course, be attended by the consciousness that it is wrong, and I do not think that that consciousness can be other than in some degree painful. But is that enough to constitute remorse? Cf. *infra*, the distinction of "rational" and "pathological" remorse. Certainly the act cannot be accompanied and need not be followed by a renewal of moral resolution.

really relevant to the matter at all. For, if we consider remorse just in respect of its painfulness, is it in that respect after all *in pari materia* with the guilt it is alleged to punish? Yet it is only as being *in pari materia* with guilt that it has any claim over, for instance, the picking of oakum to be considered punishment at all. I would go further and suggest, with much hesitation, that we must draw a distinction between "rational" and "pathological" remorse, analogous to Kant's distinction between "rational" and "pathological" love. If we take a moral agony of what we may perhaps term "Augustinian" quality, do we not really think that these tears and groans and the like are, however inevitable they may be by psychological law, accidental and not essential to the situation in its moral significance? They are pathological accompaniments, the presence of which in a certain degree might even be deprecated as liable to hinder our moral development, and the absence of which would not, so far as I can judge, lead us to suppose that all was not morally well, except as we took it to indicate the absence also of "rational" remorse. How precisely to describe this "rational" remorse I do not know; but I suppose that it is at least on the one side a judgment of one's contemptibility and on the other a renewal of moral resolution. Now supposing there is such a distinction between "rational" and "pathological" remorse as I have suggested, may it not be that the notion that in remorse we have the penalty that fits the crime exists by a confusion of the two? "Rational" remorse, belonging to the same order of things as moral guilt, will appear to satisfy the postulate that crime and its punishment be commensurable; only a purely rational remorse would never strike anybody as being penalty enough, supposing, indeed, it could be regarded as penalty at all. "Pathological" remorse, on the other hand, though it can perhaps provide the appearance of an adequate punishment, is, being only "pathological," no more appropriate really as a retort to moral guilt, no more genuinely punishment, than would be a pain produced by any other means.

The foregoing discussion may be summed up as follows. If the principle of retribution is to have any claim to govern our action there must be meaning in the notion of an equivalence between guilt and penalty. But the notion is, in fact, meaningless since there is no penalty that is commensurable with guilt. The appearance of a meaning is greatest when the penalty is described as being the guilty person's remorse; but this appearance is due only to a confusion between "rational" and "pathological" remorse. Thus there can be no meaning in saying that we ought to act retributively; it must be true that in any infliction of pain—in the case of the guilty no less than of the innocent, and as a matter of principle and not simply of practical necessity—we ought to be governed wholly by

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forward-looking considerations. What we have now to see is how this can be true without the admission that what I have called the "retributive intuition" is a sheer prejudice.

V

What appears to deserve punishment is a wrongful act, but not a wrongful act simply as such. It is not ordinarily thought that a wrongful act merits punishment except in so far as it constitutes an infringement of the rights of other persons, and I shall not question this general belief. Now what we mean by a wrongful act if the notion of desert is taken seriously is, I have argued, always a moral failure. But a moral failure cannot in itself ever be an infringement of anyone's specific rights. Just as to say that a man has done his duty, or has acted dutifully (whether or not these are two distinct facts), is never to say what precisely he has done, so to say that a man has failed in his duty or has acted undutifully is never to say what precisely he has done. Consequently we are left in the dark as to whether or not what he has done is a violation of any particular right. But about one thing we are not left in the dark. Whatever else he did he has at least violated the *general* right (if it is properly called a right) to "consideration"; or, in other words, he has exemplified an *indifference to all particular rights*. Moreover, this indifference is exemplified just as much in a moral failure that has no overt expression as in one that has; so that there is no difficulty in understanding the guilty person's own sense that he deserves punishment even in the former case. The essential condition of his sense of ill desert is not a consciousness of having actually harmed others, but a consciousness merely of having been prepared to do so for his own satisfaction. A moral failure is precisely the subordination in practice of the principle of "I ought" to the principle of "I want," and to act on the principle of "I want" is to ignore the claims of other persons which, whether wholly or in part, determine what it is I ought to do. It is to repudiate the rule of "Do as you would be done by" in its categorical sense, the rule that we should treat others as ends also and not as means only, by acting on which we behave as members in a realm of ends. To deny this rule in our practice, which is what all moral failure in so far as it has social relevance does, is to behave not as members in such a realm but as inhabitants of a Hobbesian state of nature: *homo homini lupus*, the guilty towards us and we towards him. That is to say, the guilty person's principle implies that he is living in an order in which he cannot protest or appeal to the Caesar of Justice against *anything* that we might in retort do to him. What appears as the "retributive intuition" that he deserves punishment is really the intuition that he does not

fall under the essentially protective operation of a principle of desert at all. If we insist on applying the moral concept of desert to relationships in such a non-moral world, we can only do so in the form that "he deserves what's coming to him—*no matter what that may be.*"¹

Now if our intuition is really as I have stated it to be, it is at once obvious how it can be both a rational insight (as I think it is) and inoperative in respect of our conduct. For if we attempt to extract from it a rule for the practice of justice, what form will that rule take? To treat the guilty person in the manner to which the logic of his position exposes him would be to degrade ourselves to "wolves" so far as our relations with him were concerned, to treat *him* as a means only; and we can hardly have a moral obligation to act towards anyone as though there were no moral obligations. The so-called "retributive intuition" is rational as the recognition of how a guilty person would, without injustice, be treated in a world subject to the principle on which he himself has acted; but it is without moral authority since the very existence of a moral agent is the denial of such a world. And it is accordingly not merely practically but morally necessary to ignore the guilt except in so far as it is relevant, like any other fact, to our judgment of what conduct will now be for the best. For justice, unless justice means simply the satisfaction of the rights that are correlative to all our duties, there is here no place. There is place only for mercy, but (we must understand) mercy not as a splendid largess but as a difficult duty. This, then, is the resolution of my apparent antinomy. Let me repeat a remark I made earlier. "If I deliberately wronged another person and he knew it, I should judge that he was failing in his duty if he took account of that wrong otherwise than as part of the conditions under which he was, so far as possible, to bring good into the world; but at the same time I should feel that I did not deserve that the wrong should be responded to only in that way." Except that the word "deserve" here is open to question, we can now see how the attitude of mind expressed in both these statements is justified.

It is, of course, oddly incongruous with our immediate convictions to maintain, as I am doing, that there is in a sense no limit to the

¹ In regard to the foregoing argument it may be noted that some who would accept the view that it is only in virtue of its social reference that a moral failure breeds the sense that punishment is deserved would deny that a reference to a *natural* society is involved in all cases where this sense is felt. It is then inferred that, certainly in some cases and perhaps in all, the essential condition of the sense that punishment is deserved is an awareness, however obscure, of a relationship with God. Whether this is so cannot here be discussed: but even if the point were conceded, it would constitute a development and not a contradiction of what I have said.

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evil that could without injustice be done to any guilty person, no question of *degrees* of penalty for *degrees* of guilt.¹ Such an incongruity is fatal to a theory unless it can be shown that the immediate convictions are a confusion of thought. Naturally, I suppose that they are, and the sources of the confusion have to a large extent been indicated earlier in this paper; but I had better make them clear even at the cost of some repetition.

There is a social code that must be respected by the members of society in the general interest. To secure respect for this code penalties are attached to the breach of it, and these penalties will naturally vary according to the importance of this or that rule in the code and the difficulty of securing its observance. No doubt, we must add, since man is not wholly a rational creature, the determination of this scale of penalties may be affected also by purely emotional dislikes and repugnances felt by people in general towards this or that type of act. It cannot be denied that some (not always and for everyone the same) sorts of behaviour shock and disgust in a way that rational reflection cannot approve, and that we need to and can habituate ourselves to be shocked or disgusted "according to reason." Now in order that we should suppose that what is truly guilt deserves penalties varying in degree, it is only required that the application of the scale of penalties we have just described should be thought of as a retort to guilt proper or (put otherwise) that it corresponds to what is properly speaking desert on the part of the person penalized. Three factors co-operate to make us think this. First, our habit of taking for granted that unless there is striking abnormality in the criminal the breach of the code was in point of fact accompanied by moral guilt and our consequent failure to draw a clear distinction between the two. Second, the affinity between the rational "retributive intuition" and emotional reactions of the revengeful type, so that the degrees that characterize the latter are transferred to the object of the former. That there is this affinity is manifest from the plausibility of the ordinary and shallow attack on the concept of retribution. And thirdly, the fact that once a code with its penalties has been propounded, there is a sense in which the various breaches of the code *can* be said to deserve the varying penalties, namely, that the penalty is the stated "price" of the breach; though this is not at all the moral use of the term "desert" that is the correlate of the moral concept of retribution. If these factors are sufficient to explain why, to the extent that we do, we think that penalties of different severity are morally appropriate to different wrongful acts, then the view I have put forward

¹ It is, however, perfectly in keeping with the New Testament teaching that "whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all" (James ii, 10).

may stand. If not, I confess I do not at the moment see how either to justify it or to relinquish it.

VI

In conclusion, a word or two may be said on four special points on which any theory of punishment should have something to say. The first point is this. I have spoken throughout as though it were obvious that a punishment must be a certain sort of infliction of pain. But why pain and not just generally evil? Surely the answer is not to be found simply in a latent ethical hedonism? Possibly the explanation is that pain alone has utility, as (say) a deterrent. It is only as perceived by the victim, it may be said, and therefore only as painful that his being put in an evil condition can control his behaviour as a conscious agent. But pain is not the only sort of evil in one's condition that can be perceived; so the real point must be that it is only as it is painful that the perception enters as an element into the constitution of our motives. And then we seem committed to psychological hedonism. An alternative suggestion might be that the only morally neutral element in a man's evil condition is pain; so that if we inflict pain, but only if we inflict pain and not any other sort of evil, do we avoid the charge that we are making the individual on whom it is inflicted a worse individual. Whatever truth there may be in either of these suggestions, it is clear that they only render rational the restriction of punishment to the infliction of that sort of evil that is pain on the hypothesis that punishment is not purely retributive. On a retributive view of punishment, in order to defend the restriction it would be necessary to maintain either that pain is the only evil there is, or that, though other things are evil, pain is the whole nature of "a man's evil," just as though there are other goods than pleasure, pleasure or satisfaction is what we mean by "so-and-so's good."¹

Secondly, I wish to make quite clear the relation of the view taken in this paper to the doctrine of the "correlation of rights and duties." One aspect of this doctrine is that where A has a duty to B, B has a right against A, and conversely; and the view taken in the paper might easily be misunderstood as involving the denial of this. For I have said (it may be urged) that we have a duty not to act retributively towards the guilty person, and yet he has no right to protest against our so acting. But the solution lies in the ambiguous status of the guilty person. He lives, in fact (and nothing that he or anybody else can do can change this) in a moral order; but, on the other hand, if the principle on which he acted were the law of the order

¹ Cf. Mr. Carritt's British Academy lecture (1937), "An Ambiguity of the Word 'Good.'"

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in which he lives, it would not be a moral order. It is therefore inconsistent to treat the principle of the guilty action as a law of conduct and at the same time to judge that retributive action is unjustified; and that is the sense in which the guilty person has no right to protest against retribution. None the less in the moral order in which he, in fact, lives he has a perfect right to protest, corresponding precisely with our duty to refrain from such action.

In the third place, a word must be said about forgiveness. If forgiveness meant, as it does not, taking the line of "It doesn't matter" about guilt, it could never be right. On the other hand, it is always right, quite irrespective of the guilty person's frame of mind, if it means treating him with the consideration that is owed to all and not allowing his guilt to deflect us in the least degree from the application of that non-retributive principle. Of course the obligation so to treat the guilty person rests on each of us whether the guilty act was a wrong done to him or not; but naturally it possesses the character of forgiveness only as it is fulfilled by someone who has been wronged. There is, I think, a sense in which any guilty act is a wrong done to all; but even if that is true I doubt if it can be maintained that all are wronged equally and that the person we ordinarily think of as wronged is not still wronged in a special and additional way. Precisely how the admission that there are degrees of being wronged consists with the earlier suggestion that there are no degrees of guilt would, of course, require further discussion.

But if in the sense defined forgiveness is always and unconditionally obligatory, what are we to say of the view that it depends on the guilty person's repentance? Is that sheer error? I cannot think so. But perhaps when we maintain that view, what we really have in mind is this. Though we must always act on the principle of consideration the acts appropriate to express that consideration will vary according as the guilty person did or did not exhibit a renewed resolution to act morally. Being considerate is not being soft; and it is not humbug to speak of being cruel in order to be kind. And, moreover, we recognize that, on the side of the guilty person, the *experience* of forgiveness is conditioned by his own frame of mind. What is, or should be, there for the asking is not by that fact alone also appropriated. But we need not here pursue further the question of the nature and conditions of that experience.

Finally, what of reward? It is natural to suppose that a theory of reward will be precisely parallel to a theory of punishment; and I see no reason to deny the parallelism. Thus when some good or other is promised to the person who performs such and such an act, the performer may be said to deserve that good which, as deserved, may be called a reward. This corresponds to the sense in which a wrongdoer deserves to pay the price that has been fixed for the

luxury of his wrongdoing. But it is not true in the case of "reward" any more than in that of "punishment" that the promise itself is made on the principle of desert. In each case it is made for utilitarian reasons. It does not follow, and it does not, in fact, seem to be true, that the detail of the system of "reward" should precisely parallel the detail of the system of penalties. The parallelism is in respect of the principle that is being applied, not of the forms of its application; and the principle itself determines any divergences from correspondence in the application. When we turn from the overt act to the moral quality of the agent in doing it, the parallelism between the theories of reward and of punishment still holds. We ask whether all morally worthy actions deserve reward, or some, or none. And we answer in the first place that it must be either all or none. It cannot be true that in respect of their moral worth some deserve it and some do not. For to be morally worthy at all they must be dutiful, and how can there be degrees of dutifulness, as there surely must be if some dutiful actions as dutiful deserve reward and some do not? In fact, in order to maintain the answer "some" we must also hold that there really are duties of supererogation, that is, duties that we are not with the absolutest stringency bound to perform; and this contradicts itself, since a duty is by its nature as duty categorically binding. Are we then to say that all morally worthy actions deserve reward or that none do? We must say none. For we cannot as moral agents do more to produce good for an individual than can be justified on the principle of impartial beneficence towards all, and equally we cannot do less (as we have seen) even towards the morally guilty; but if we treat the morally evil and the morally good on the same principle, it is absurd to describe the act, however agreeable to the patient it may be, as a reward. It is, of course, compatible with this that the act appropriate to the case of the morally good is more likely to be agreeable to him than the act appropriate in the other case is to be agreeable to the morally evil. On the other hand, we said that the status of the guilty person is an ambiguous one, and that though as a member of a moral order he, in fact, deserves to be treated on the same principle as applies to the good, the principle on which he himself has acted would, if it were the law of the order in which he lives, exclude that desert. Consequently there is a sense in which he does not deserve the beneficent treatment that he should receive; and there is, correspondingly, a sense in which only the good deserve such treatment. This is the truth that is distorted into the false doctrine that virtue ought not to be left to be "its own reward." The same treatment relatively to the evil is one of mercy and relatively to the good is only what he merits; but that does not alter the fact that there is an absolute obligation to accord it to both alike.

RECENT TRENDS IN ETHICAL THOUGHT

DR. RUDOLF METZ

IN my book, *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*,¹ in connection with Cook Wilson and his Oxford followers I briefly mentioned a new line of ethical research that has made its mark within the last decade. Its representatives are differently labelled, as "Oxford Moralists," "Intuitionists," "Neo-Intuitionists," "Objectivists," and with other names as well. But I could not give more than a few very insufficient hints about the new school: a fuller treatment would have exceeded the compass of my book, and, further, at the time the book was written, things were not settled enough to be made the subject of a historical review. Even now the time has hardly come for a final appreciation. Nevertheless, the discussion is so far advanced that it may be worth while to take stock of it in order to exhibit not only the new tendency itself, but also the various cross-currents which have been called forth by its appearance. Such an attempt is greatly furthered by the fact that some preliminary work has already been done in this direction by writers who have taken part in the discussion.

It may serve to put the movement in its historical perspective if we remind ourselves that its chief representatives (Prichard, Ross, and Joseph) belonged to John Cook Wilson's circle in Oxford, and have been strongly influenced by that thinker. But Cook Wilson was not primarily interested in Ethics, his admirable energy being chiefly spent in logical discussions. It was different with G. E. Moore, whose name frequently occurs in the course of the discussion, and whose two books on ethics² are often quoted. In both thinkers, Cook Wilson as well as Moore, the direction of the new thought is negatively determined by the fact that it entered on the scene as a reaction against idealist ethics, while in its further course it has been characterized by a certain dialectical tension, arising from both internal differences and the intervention of writers belonging to a different school. But it is with its positive results that we are chiefly concerned.

By way of introduction the following may be said. In calling the view, as is frequently done, "intuitionist," we have not said much about it. For the term "intuitionism" conveys little, unless it is clearly stated what is meant by it, especially in ethics, as may be seen from the fact that it is applied to thinkers of very different

¹ 1935, English edition, 1938, p. 527 ff.

² *Principia Ethica* (1903) and *Ethics* (1912)

affinities. Among English moralists it is used of Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, Butler, Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith, Price, Martineau, Sidgwick, and Rashdall. Even Kant himself is frequently considered to be an intuitionist. As a matter of fact, the peculiarity of this movement seems to consist just in its not being committed to any definite standpoint, for it is not so much concerned with the inclusion of ethics within the framework of any philosophical system, as with plain and sober research into the problems and phenomena of the moral life as such. Its chief business is the clarification of moral concepts and the analysis of moral situations. So far as it is so, the movement (not throughout, it is true, but in many respects) signifies a return to the classical British moral philosophy of the eighteenth century, and represents a reaction against the ethics of idealism as the New Realism does against its epistemology.

Let me first emphasize a few general and ever-recurring features of the discussion. It is primarily analytic, and occupied with the dissection of situations. Occasionally it loses itself in ingenious subtleties, but, when applied in the careful and masterly way of the leading writers, it achieves much excellent work in clarifying the facts by keeping in close contact with experience, avoiding speculative flights and leaving no room for moralizing. Even the problem of the freedom of the will, so fundamental in most ethical systems, is hardly ever touched upon—presumably because the solution would involve metaphysical considerations and a wide departure from the analytic method.

Of the concepts submitted to analysis, two play the chief role, those of the Good and the Right. For the first time these two may be said to have been sharply and definitely opposed to each other, leading directly to the question, which of them possesses the stronger ethical relevance, which is more fundamental for judging moral actions. What emerges is that, in contrast to the prevalent view, the centre of gravity has been definitely shifted from the good to the right. There are even efforts to banish the idea of good altogether from the inner circle of ethics.

The question then arises, whether the "moral" (thus identified almost exclusively with the "right") is something original, ultimate, not further deducible from anything else, but on the contrary immediately apprehended. This question is answered in the affirmative. One of the main theses of the representatives of this movement is that the rightness of an action is based on the act itself, and is not dependent either on its motives or on its consequences or on any other factors. Right is right and that is all there is about it. This attempt to narrow to the utmost limit the basis of "moral" action is sufficient to bring into prominence some of the main questions which occupy the discussions which follow: In what does our "duty" really consist?

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Does it consist in attaining a definite result by actually producing an intended situation, or is it sufficient to do all that is likely to bring a situation about? Can intermediary actions of other agents, that slip in between what has been intended by us and what is really achieved, be put to our account or not? What is decisive for the morality of a deed? Is it the success or the intention, the deed itself or its motives or its consequences?

Beyond these lies the question of value and the attempt is made to determine the nature of the moral, as distinguished from the other forms of value, involving the setting up of a scale of these and the possibility of conflict among the several kinds. Finally there is the question whether ethics is a discipline *sui generis*, whether it stands on its own bottom and can solve its own problems, or whether there are certain problems which transcend its powers. After what has been said it is clear that the movement tends to consider ethics to be a closely limited field to be explored by means of analysis and description, and to be competent to solve its own problems without committing itself to the uncertainties of metaphysical speculation.

Turning now to individual thinkers, the fundamental question was set by H. A. Prichard in the title of an article: "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?"¹ To put the question is to answer it in the affirmative, and the writer goes on to show wherein the mistake consists, namely in overlooking the sense of obligation as fundamental in all moral action and as something entirely immediate and underivable—just in the same way as the sense of the truth of a simple mathematical or logical proposition is so. This means that we do not recognize an obligation on account of any rational arguments, or as the result of a more or less complicated process of thinking. The sentiment that we act rightly in a given case, e.g. in keeping a promise or returning a kindness, does not rest on a reflexion about the possible consequences of our acting, nor on its being determined by a moral standard or by the idea of good. It is true that we are led by certain motives, but we do not act with a view to a definite object. From this follows a sharp distinction between morality and virtue as two species of goodness which are independent of each other. A virtuous action is one that is done willingly and with pleasure from a motive which is intrinsically good, but not from a sense of obligation. An obligation can be as little based on a virtue or be deduced from it, as can a virtue be based on an obligation.

This argument is in full agreement with that of Cook Wilson with regard to the basis of knowledge. What Prichard has done is nothing else than to transfer it to the moral sphere. Applied to ethics, it means that the obligation we feel to perform a moral deed springs from a

¹ Published in *Mind*, 1912.

consciousness uncontrolled by any reflexion. It is an activity of moral thinking that is immediately called forth by the concrete situations with which we are confronted. Should we, however, doubt whether an obligation is really obligatory and not illusory, in that case we should want a proof, and such a proof could only be furnished by a rational deliberation, essentially different from that infallible and unreflected original consciousness. But moral philosophy cannot satisfy such a demand, and every attempt at satisfying it is bound to fail from the very beginning, seeing that we cannot prove by rational means what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking. Ethics is dominated from first to last by intuitive allogical judgments of the form "this is right" or "this concrete situation obliges us to this or to that way of acting."

Though Prichard's article may be said to have the same significance for Ethics as Moore's famous "Refutation of Idealism"¹ had for Epistemology, it remained at the time almost unnoticed. Only after a new advance in the same direction had been made in his Inaugural Lecture on *Duty and Interest* in 1928 did the discussion start on its course. We may deal more shortly with the moral theory of E. F. Carritt,² a writer immediately inspired by Prichard, seeing that it is (in spite of a curious disclaimer on the part of his master) in essential agreement with the latter's doctrines, though differing in single points. Even more sharply than Prichard, Carritt takes to task earlier theories, hedonist, evolutionist, utilitarian, Kantian and idealist alike, as all deluded by that "*ignis fatuus* of moral philosophy"—the idea of a *summum bonum*. As against all these he asserts, like Prichard, the ultimacy of moral obligation and its utter irreducibility to a conception or standard lying outside itself, and the absolute impossibility of proving to anybody that he should fulfil his duty or that he has any duties to fulfil. That duties exist is just as self-evident as that beautiful things and true judgments exist. He further draws a sharp division between "right" as applying to acts and "good" as applying to states or events, and between the "rightness" and the "morality" of an act—the latter applying to it only so far as the agent believes it to be right and does it because of this belief. Finally he insists that the consequences of an action are accidental to its moral worth, though not its motives.

Of more weight than Carritt's book and at the same time more original is W. D. Ross's *The Right and the Good* (1930), which immediately on its appearance attracted wide attention. To-day the author passes as the most prominent representative of neo-intuitionist moral philosophy. In his teaching the influence of Prichard (and therefore of Cook Wilson) and of Moore unite—a union from which there results a rejection of idealist and teleological admixtures,

¹ Published in *Mind*, 1903.

² *The Theory of Morals* (1928).

though this rejection is more latent than openly expressed (perhaps owing to the influence of Aristotle, to whom Ross has devoted so much fine research work). It is further characteristic of him that, though, like the remaining thinkers of this group, he carefully avoids in his ethical discussions all excursions into metaphysics, he refuses to draw any sharp line of demarcation between the two disciplines.

In his discussion of the nature of "right" and its relation to the "good," there are three points of importance: (1) the sharp distinction between the two concepts, leading to an almost entire separation; (2) the greater ethical relevance of the "right"; and (3) resulting from this its primacy over the "good." As to the first point, he holds that neither right nor good is capable of further definition or derivation. As to the second, that "right" is synonymous with "what is my duty" or "What I ought to do," and thus lies at the very centre of ethics. As to the third that "good" as a moral predicate stands in a rather loose connection with "right," owing to the circumstance that what it is our duty to do depends only to a certain extent on the goodness of the things we bring about by our actions.

After distinguishing between "act" as the change originated by my acting and "action" as the doing which originates a change, and which is always the result of a definite motive, Ross explains that "right" always refers to the act, i.e. to the thing done; whereas "morally good" always refers to the action as motivated, and that "A motive never forms part of the content of our duty; if anything is certain about morals, that, I think, is certain." Whence then does the obligation arise to perform any act (for instance to fulfil a promise)? The answer can only be as follows, from the nature of the act itself: the fulfilment, e.g. of a promise, springs from no other reason than the fact that a promise has been given and that a promise is a promise. It is this that constitutes the "intrinsic rightness" of an act. From this follows a consequence which is logically unavoidable, but ethically very contestable (and has often been contested), namely that right acting (performance of duty) may be a morally bad action, wrong acting (neglect of duty) a morally good one. Ross goes even so far as to assert that "nothing that ought to be done is ever morally good."

If the motive does not constitute a criterion for right acting, in what does this criterion consist? Ross answers: merely in the success (or failure) of my action. "Success and failure are the only test . . . of the performance of duty." Does this not mean that the consequences of an action are after all decisive for its valuation as right or wrong? On his own premise of the "intrinsicness" of rightness Ross is bound to deny this, and he finds his way out of the dilemma by refusing to separate success and act from each other (as the representatives of the consequential theory do) on the ground that an act

does not consist in merely *aiming at* a change in the state of affairs, but in bringing about the change *de facto*. The consequences are thus drawn, or rather smuggled into the act, and only by this *legerdemain* does he succeed in making them the criterion of right acting. Is the consequential theory refuted by this? I do not think so. Ross only circumvents it by a logical artifice, instead of facing it with new moral insight.

A similar difficulty attaches to the intuitional factor in Ross's doctrine. If I fulfil a given promise and in doing so perform my duty, I do something which appears to me right at first sight. But this does not mean that there is, as the older intuitionism assumed, something like an inborn moral sense on the strength of which we recognize certain moral axioms as evident in themselves, but merely that we find these axioms evident without any further proof, provided we have reached a certain moral maturity. Such propositions are not susceptible of rational proof, nor do they stand in need of it. They are just as self-evident as mathematical axioms or logical inferences, and are reached not by logical deduction, but by intuitive induction. "The moral order expressed in these propositions is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic." This moral self-evidence, however, does not extend to all right acts or duties, but only to those which Ross calls "*prima facie* right," i.e. general as contrasted with particular duties. The former are self-evident, and therefore known with absolute certainty, whilst the latter, as far as they occur in concrete situations, have only probable knowledge-value; they are a matter of mere opinion. But even in the case of *prima facie* duties, there may be a conflict, in which case there is no general principle by which we can decide which of the conflicting duties is the more obligatory. Our duty consists in choosing the one which seems to be more "urgent."

In a long discussion of the problem of Value Ross agrees with Moore in holding that value is a simple quality that cannot be further analysed, but that it differs from those qualities which inhere in substances inasmuch as it inheres in "objectives"—entities of a much more complex character than substances—as good in themselves. Ross here aligns himself against all subjectivism. Coming to the question what things are thus intrinsically or by themselves good, Ross holds that there are only four things to which this character belongs, i.e. (1) virtue, (2) pleasure, (3) the right apportionment of pleasure with regard to virtue, and (4) knowledge (and in a minor degree also right opinion). All the other goods are reducible to these four or to some combination of them. If looked at more closely, they do not prove intrinsic, but purely instrumental, as for instance the value which inheres in material things.

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We now leave what we might call the inner circle of the discussion. With Prichard, Carritt and Ross, British ethics entered a new phase of its development, connected, it is true, by many a link with the traditional British moral philosophy, but standing out clearly against anything in the past as something independent and original. From them, ethics has certainly received a new impulse, calling forth vigorous reactions which are likely to continue in spite of the internal instability of the whole position. In what follows we leave the inner circle of the school and deal with some attempts that have come to light in the course of a critical examination of neo-intuitionist ethics, without pretending to exhaust them.

To the counter-movement belongs, first of all, H. W. B. Joseph in his book *Some Problems in Ethics* (1931) which, however, is not so much a blow dealt to the new intuitionism from without as an explosion of it from within, seeing that Joseph belongs to Cook Wilson's school of thought, an allegiance that betrays itself even when he passes beyond the position of his master and goes his own way. This leads in an idealistic direction, and to the explicit demand for a metaphysical foundation, involving refutation of all naturalistic as well as utilitarian theories of morals, including Moore's "ideal utilitarianism." In this way he restores once more the close connection between the ideas of rightness and goodness, re-establishing against Ross the value-character of the "right," as founded ultimately on the idea of the "good," and thus bringing the two ideas once more into organic relations. The synthetic character of Joseph's thinking thus breaks through in contrast with the analytical dissection which characterizes the new movement. The same may be seen in the way he discusses the relation between act and motive. If you detach the act from the motive, nothing remains that is ethically relevant. You leave nothing but a physical relation between the act and all that has gone before. If we want to find out the reason of an obligation, we can neither stop at the act itself nor can we look for it in its consequences. Goodness lies beyond the particular act in the general form of life, as it manifests itself in some community, or, as Joseph puts it, in a system or "structural whole" that is good. The good is an element in such an organic whole; it is not a quality of an act, but a system or a member of a system. As against Moore's thesis that goodness is a simple, undefinable quality, Joseph tries to show that it is the realization of the very nature of the thing to which this predicate is attached. In this way moral theory approaches once more the idea of self-realization expounded by Green and Bradley as the ultimate standard of moral judgment—the very idea against which the whole force of the new movement had been chiefly directed.

Intermediate between Joseph and the fifth writer whose contri-

bution to this symposium took book-form, several others took part in it in articles contributed to various journals and from various points of view. In a series of articles "On Right and Good,"¹ W. G. de Burgh maintained a view strongly reminiscent both of Kant and Bradley while making certain concessions to intuitionism. His blow differs from Joseph's in coming definitely from outside the movement. Yet in the emphasis de Burgh places on the ideas of "right" and "duty," as more fundamental than that of "good," he approaches the position of the intuitionists, as is further shown by his readiness to declare with Kant the autonomy of the moral life. To the question why we ought to do what we ought to do, we can answer only "because we ought to do it." We are guided throughout by a self-evident intuition, altogether apart from rational reflection. In support of this view, de Burgh is ready further to appeal to Richard Price, the eighteenth-century moralist, who is considered one of the earliest representatives of intuitionist ethics. As regards the "good," while it is theoretically sharply distinguished from the right, it does not become clear whether it is ethically as relevant as the right, nor even whether it belongs to the ethical sphere at all. We hear little or nothing of good actions, but only of those that are conducive to good. According to this view goodness does not inhere in the act itself, but is only an attendant or consequential phenomenon of acting—the subject of a *post facto* judgment. "The judgment of moral goodness," we are told, "is passed from the standpoint not of the man acting, but of himself theoretically reviewing the action, as an impartial spectator after the event. The strict and concrete moral judgment is that of right."

But this is only one side of de Burgh's theory. We are driven beyond it by the tension between what we really do (and necessarily do imperfectly) and the ideal claim of what we ought to do and what it would be the really right to do. This tension grows out of the antagonism between the pure form of rightness and its material fulfilment in a particular concrete situation. We know, it is true, that, under any circumstances, it is right to do what we intuitively conceive to be right. But moral life moves in a continual sense of the gulf between the ideal claim of the moral law and what it is possible to fulfil, between the "ought" and the "is." We thus become entangled in an antinomy which morality itself cannot solve, and recourse has to be had to metaphysics and religion as is indicated by the title of de Burgh's Gifford Lectures.² His standpoint thus approaches that of A. E. Taylor as developed in his book *The Faith of a Moralist*, with which de Burgh has declared himself in substantial agreement.³

¹ Published in *Philosophy*, vols. v and vi (1930 and 1931).

² Recently published *From Morality to Religion* (1938), which appeared too late for me to make use of it.

³ Vide *Philosophy*, vol. vi, p. 232.

But is not this to throw intuitionism overboard? For if that which we intuitively recognize to be right is yet not ultimately right, what becomes of our intuitions? This departure is further confirmed by the aim throughout, which is a synthesis of the factors into which analysis has resolved the concrete whole to which in the end we must return, and shows that the writer's concessions to the new movement are merely apparent, and that he is separated from it by his own idealist position.

W. A. Pickard-Cambridge's contribution entitled "Two Problems about Duty"¹ is of wholly different tenor. He calls his standpoint "ideal Utilitarianism" and expounds it in sharp contrast to the new doctrines, suggesting the intention of going back to the point in Moore's position at which it parts company with them. So far his attack is from within, but just this circumstance increases the interest of his contribution. From the side of method, with Pickard-Cambridge analysis reaches its high-water mark and exhausts its last possibilities. He himself strikingly characterizes his procedure as "microscopic analysis." Everything is here looked at as through a magnifying glass so that things become visible which remain concealed to the normal eye. Fortunately, we are concerned with no complex or problematic matters, but with the simplest things of daily life, for instance, the question of returning a borrowed book. Nevertheless, the writer is very skilful in complicating by microscopy so apparently simple a matter, splitting up this single action into so many partial actions of calculation, execution, and reflexion that in the end one hardly knows whether and how far the agent has done (or neglected) his duty in returning the book. We have here in fact a new form of the utilitarians' calculus with a new ethical algebra to correspond, for which Moore's method of dissection has clearly stood sponsor. It is further clear that such a method, if strictly carried out, is bound to come into conflict with the principle of intuition. With the intuitionists, too, analysis plays by no means a small part, but in them the incompatibility of the two elements has not openly broken out. With Pickard-Cambridge intuition is overgrown by analysis and almost stifled.

Coming to the contents of the theory, duty is identified with right action, but the problem of the relation between "right" and "good" does not become acute. The two notions stand from the very beginning in the definite connexion prescribed by the ideal-utilitarian view: the performance of duty being taken as synonymous with the promotion of the highest good, which thus comes to be the criterion for right acting. The tables are turned, the standard of moral value being shifted from rightness to goodness. In the place of Ross's "unprincipled intuition," directing our judgment in a given situation,

¹ Published in *Mind*, vol. 41 (1932).

Pickard-Cambridge sets up a general and constant moral principle by which every action can be judged. This is the principle, "that we ought always to do what is reasonably calculated to do the most good." Seeing, however, that we are not masters of the success of our actions, it can never be our duty to produce a definite result. All we can do is to intend with all our power to bring something about. The case, frequent enough in ordinary practice, of effecting immediately what we intend to effect, has little interest for this writer, and is treated as an exception. He is only interested in cases where there is the tension between right action and the prospective situation at which the action aims. Thus the following curious situation arises. I do this or that. Whether something good or something bad will come of it lies beyond me and cannot be put to my account. The outcome may, as matters stand, be so far separated from my act that I cannot be made responsible for it. The goal pursued may even not be reached at all owing to the interactions of other agents. What, then, we ask is ethically relevant? Pickard-Cambridge would answer: neither the right act, nor the consequences, but merely the careful review of all the circumstances and, founded thereon, the reasonable expectation of realizing the good intended. But is this a broad enough basis for moral judgment? Is the theory in agreement with common sense or with ordinary moral experience, as the author would like to make us believe? Does it really concern the man who in a concrete situation is called upon to decide? I think we may answer all these questions in the negative. In active life where quick decisions have to be made this elaborate apparatus will only become effective in very rare cases. It is not even the procedure of the moral judgment, but at the most that of the analytical observer who examines what has been done with all its effects, dissects it into its parts and makes it the subject of a logical exercise. Ordinary moral experience of the agent as well as of the judge has nothing to do with it. Surely Ross's intuitionist theory reveals a keener ethical insight and stands in closer agreement with ordinary experience.

Space forbids me to do more than mention the contributions to the discussion of J. Gallie in an article on "Oxford Moralists"¹ and P. Leon in one on "Rightness and Goodness,"² both of whom, without committing themselves to metaphysical theory, seek to reassert the organic connection between good and right and through it between motive and conduct, and, so far as they do so, definitely break with the new intuitionism.

G. C. Field, in an article on "Kant's Moral Principle,"³ makes the question of the nature of rightness and its relation to the good the

¹ *Philosophy*, vol. vii (1932).

² *Mind*, vol. 42 (1933).

³ *Mind*, vol. 41 (1932).

sole object of study, connecting it with Ross's doctrine of "*prima facie* rightness." An action is not right or wrong because it is this particular, unique, individual action, but because it is the expression of a universal moral law by which the quality of rightness is bestowed on it. Thus universality is so essential a feature of right acting that we may say: all right actions are capable of universalization, and, *vice versa*, all actions capable of universalization are right. Only when I can wish that somebody else should do the same in similar circumstances do I call the action right. In other words: To the intuitionist point of view Field opposes Kant's idealist one, as it has found expression in the so-called "principle of pure practical reason": "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This means that an action is not something wholly isolated, or something entirely self-dependent, but that *qua* action it must be placed from the very beginning in a wider context. In his polemic against Ross the author points out that nothing is explained by conceiving *prima facie* rightness as an ultimate original datum of our moral experience. The real problem only begins where Ross considers it to be already solved. We cannot simply accept this ultimate datum as a matter of faith; we must show whence the moral quality claimed for the act comes. Because it cannot inhere in the action as such, and because the consequences of an action cannot be taken as the test of its rightness, Field argues that the real bearer of the moral quality is the general state of mind of man as a self-conscious being. He tries to show that certain states of mind from which actions arise are under all circumstances and necessarily good; others, on the contrary, bad, thus establishing a natural relation between good and right. *Prima facie* rightness is a derivative from the goodness of that state of mind from which the action we call right immediately issues. But we are not told wherein this state of mind positively consists. We are merely told that "motive" is too narrow a term for it. "Character" seems to be meant, but oddly enough Field does not say so; and even if he had said so, the problem would not seem to be finally solved. For character is a highly complex and (because of its complexity) a highly problematic structure, that cannot be claimed without further proof, and certainly not *in toto*, as the source of the moral quality. This notion, no less than Ross's *prima facie* rightness, calls for further explanation. Yet it brings us much nearer the real meaning of the "moral" than does the placing of it simply in the action itself (with the intuitionists) or in the consequences (with utilitarians and others). So far as it goes, it allies Field with Joseph rather than with Ross. The inspiration comes from the side of idealism.

The same may be said of J. H. Muirhead, with whom this account of the chief contributors to the controversy may be brought to a

close. In his book *Rule and End in Morals* (1932) Muirhead subjects the whole movement to an acute critical examination from his own idealist point of view. But his criticism is combined, it may be said at once, with a very sympathetic understanding of the intuitionist contentions. He takes the movement as a reaction against idealist ethics, and the various attacks upon the movement as the counter-reaction coming from that quarter. He regards the counter-movement as "a cautious return to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the idealist tradition." The support it has met with from several of the writers already mentioned clearly shows that the report of the death of British idealism has been very much exaggerated. It shows further that idealism, so far as it is alive, has not degenerated into barren dogmatism, but that it is ready to make concessions and to assimilate modern trends of thought, without abandoning its true character. Of this tendency Muirhead's attitude is perhaps the best example. With certain reservations he is willing "to recognize with Prichard and those who have followed him the 'self-evidence' and the 'immediate apprehension' of our obligations." He is very well aware that in difficult situations we cannot appeal to moral philosophy to prove by rational means what we ought to do in order to fulfil our duty. In such cases we must follow our moral instinct. So far the intuitive factor in ethics is certainly justified. Furthermore, he is ready—again with certain provisos—to accept Ross's idea of "*prima facie* rightness," nor does he shut his eyes to the significance of several of the numerous distinctions and clarifications brought to light by microscopic analysis. After all these and other concessions to intuitionism, however, the "great but" is forthcoming. This is the necessity of a revision of the intuitionist position on the basis of an ethics that is rooted in a teleological metaphysics, and that has grown out of the unity of a philosophical system. What is the use of all these minute distinctions, oppositions, comparisons, etc., if "their ends hang so to speak loose," and are not fastened together in a tight knot? Ethics is too serious a business to be satisfied with loose ends. Instead of or besides analysis and description we want unity and system; instead of forgoing all consideration of value we want a general theory of values. The ultimate tearing asunder of good and right would be the end of ethics altogether. We must seek the missing link by which these two fundamental notions are organically connected and welded together into unity. It would be just as absurd to break off the idea of right from its roots in a general system of objective values as to separate truth from the objective reality to which it refers. Ethics cannot get on without metaphysics, and frequently enough it will also have to appeal to religion. Whenever we dig deeper, we come up against more comprehensive systematic relationships, of which account has to be

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taken if our analysis is to lead anywhere but to mere confusion. Is it not surprising that the problem of the freedom of the will, for instance, has never been seriously grappled with by the new theories?

Thus Muirhead's revision tends in the direction of a universal theory of values or a comprehensive axiology, from which alone an answer may be expected to those numerous questions which intuitionist moralists have raised, but not solved. And with this all the great problems of ethics, which *philosophia perennis* has placed before the world in the systems of Plato and Aristotle, of Kant and Hegel, of Green and Bradley, come anew into sight and will press ever hardly upon us, however different the solutions may be which they will find in the present or in future time.

The necessity of some such conclusion to the whole discussion may be further illustrated from the aftermath of it, as represented by a paper, published, three years after the appearance of the last-mentioned contribution, by C. A. Campbell under the title "Moral and non-Moral Values."¹ Among thinkers of the new movement the problem of value had been dealt with chiefly by Moore and Ross, and it is these with whom Campbell enters into direct controversy. He distinguishes two main doctrines in recent theories of value: the objectivist and the subjectivist. According to the former, which may be said to have been started by Moore, value (i.e. goodness) is determined as a simple, unanalysable and indefinable quality that inheres in the things we call valuable; according to the latter value consists in a relation between valuable things and a mind recognizing them to be so. Campbell then proceeds to distinguish two groups of values: moral values, the leading member of which appears to be virtue, and the entire group of the non-moral values such as truth, beauty, friendship, health, pleasure. He tries in some detail to show that our reactions to the specifically moral value of virtue is quite different from our reactions to the others, inasmuch as it alone is unrelated to interest or liking, and from this difference he derives his main thesis, namely that the subjectivist conception is valid for the whole domain of the non-moral values, but fails as regards the moral sphere of values. This not only does not represent a higher rank in a general order but belongs to an altogether different category from all the others. However great the measure of truth or knowledge that may be attained, it cannot be set against the smallest measure of virtue—an opinion the truth of which may justly be doubted—seeing that it is impossible thus to split up the realm of values into two parts severed by an impassable gulf from each other. The realm of values, however we define it, must constitute a continuous whole. However different may be the character of the separate

¹ *Mind*, vol. 44 (1935).

members, they are one and all dominated by a single synthetic principle in virtue of which they are what they are. No value can step out of this order without losing its value-character: moral value least of all, if, as I think we must, we are to continue to assign to it the highest rank. Failing, as it does, of such a synthesis, Campbell's theory remains, to say the least, incomplete and merely again illustrates the necessity of returning to the highway of the idealist tradition and reorientating our ethical theory in the direction to which more and more clearly this tradition is seen to point.

KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS—I

W. H. WALSH, M.A.

WHAT is the *Critique of Pure Reason* about? The terminology of the work is so perplexing, its argument so obscurely expressed, that the ordinary reader may be forgiven if he puts it down at the end very much in the dark as to what it all means. He will have seen that in it Kant has attempted to establish certain conclusions: the subjectivity of space and time, the existence and objective validity of a number of *a priori* concepts or categories, the falsity of the arguments used to defend the metaphysical system most widely favoured in German learned circles in the eighteenth century; but though he has grasped all this he may yet have failed to make sense of the work as a whole. It is the old story of not seeing the wood for trees; and in this case the fault is more excusable than in most, for the individual trees each demand so much attention and are so difficult to get round that it is all too easy to forget the very existence of the wood. At the worst, one may think that there is no wood at all; only a miscellaneous aggregate of individual trees which have nothing to do with each other.

Yet this conclusion, if true, would be a strange one, contradicting not only common expectation (for it is reasonable to expect that a work on which its author spent so much trouble would have a unitary theme), but also the implications of explicit statements of Kant himself. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is presumably itself a product of pure reason, and pure reason, as Kant is constantly telling us,² is a unity; or again, the *Critique* is a piece of (immanent) metaphysics,³ and metaphysics, as Kant understands it, is nothing if not *systematic*. It is true that Kant says that the *Critique* is not itself the system of reformed metaphysics which his philosophy is to make possible;⁴ but there is little doubt that the contents of the first part of the latter (the metaphysic of nature as opposed to the metaphysic of morals) would, if it had ever been written, have

¹ The present paper only deals with Kant's views as expressed in the inaugural *Dissertation* and the first half of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is hoped to follow it with discussions of the Dialectic and the relevant parts of the other two *Critiques*. The writer is much indebted to Professor Paton for help over points of detail.

² E.g. B xxiii, B 766 = A 738.

³ Cf. letter to Herz, later than May 11, 1781 (Berlin edition, X, 252), where the *Critique* is said to contain the "metaphysic of metaphysics" (reference in Vleeschauwer, *La déduction transcendentale*, I, 61).

⁴ B 869 = A 814.

consisted of little but the conclusions established in its so-called "propaedeutic."¹

It is the least we can do, then, to assume that the *Critique* is the answer to a single question or set of questions. The problem next arises: what is this question to which Kant's work is the answer? Kant himself says in a passage in the second edition Introduction (B 19): "The proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?" In the first edition Preface (A xvii) he says: "The chief question is always simply this: what and how much can understanding and reason know apart from all experience?" These two statements are not quite alternative formulations of the same problem. The second puts a general question, which the first particularizes; and the particularization is at the same time a beginning of a solution of the difficulty. The general question concerns the extent of our *a priori* knowledge: it asks what knowledge human beings can acquire independently of sense-experience or introspection.² Many philosophers, and particularly in the eighteenth century, have believed that there are certain propositions which we can know to be true independently of the evidence of the senses: the propositions of mathematics and many metaphysical propositions were alleged to be of this type. Clearly it is important for any philosopher who accepts this general position (as Kant does) to ask after the extent and nature of our knowledge of these propositions. It is this problem which Kant has before him throughout the *Critique*, and if we go through the work with some such formula in our minds as "What can we know by simply thinking?" or better, "What can we know by other means than sense-experience?" we should be able to see what it is about. But we shall find that Kant himself is more apt to use the other formula, "How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?"³ and this should be explained. In the famous passage in the Introduction to the *Critique* (B 10 = A 6 ff.) Kant distinguishes between two types of judgment, analytic and synthetic. Analytic judgments are all *a priori*; they are what we can conclude from the judgments we know already by analysing their subject-concepts in accordance with the principle of contradiction. No analytic judgment, therefore, gives us new or what might be called "positive" knowledge. "Positive" knowledge is always expressed in synthetic judgments. Now it is clear that the sort of knowledge acquired

¹ Compare the handbook of metaphysics outlined in the latter to Jacob, September 11 (?), 1787 (X, 471). Of course there would also have been analyses setting out derivative concepts in such a system (cf. B 107 = A 82, B 249 = A 204), but the general framework would have been set by the results of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

² In the rest of this paper the term "sense-experience" must be taken to include introspection.

³ E.g. in *Prolegomena*, § 5.

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independently of sense-experience which interests Kant is that expressed in synthetic judgments; so that for him the question whether we know anything independently of sense-experience is simply the question whether we know any true synthetic *a priori* propositions, since *a priori* means acquired independently of sense-experience. Kant believes that the answer to this question is "yes"; that we know propositions of this sort in mathematics and even in physics, the fundamental presuppositions of which are not drawn, as are the propositions making up the body of the science, from sense-experience; and that metaphysicians claim to know propositions of this nature also. He therefore proposes to set about answering his general question, "What can we know independently of sense-experience?" by asking another question, "What are the conditions of our knowing synthetic *a priori* propositions?" For it seems to him clear (and it is surely not an unreasonable position) that an investigation of the synthetic *a priori* knowledge we undoubtedly have will throw light on the nature and extent of synthetic *a priori* knowledge in general.

From all this it should be clear that the subject of the *Critique* is the same as that of so many other philosophical treatises: an investigation of the sources of knowledge open to human beings. Only Kant is particularly interested in the suggestion that reason or intelligence is a source of propositions which are both true and "positive"; and his main aim is to estimate the value of this suggestion. That is why his work is a "critique of pure reason"—a critical estimation of the powers of pure reason, i.e. of the intellect by itself. The object is to say what pure reason both can and cannot do. The existence of certain propositions whose apriority, synthetic character, and objective validity are all regarded as certain by Kant shows that reason (in a wide, non-technical sense) has some powers; the existence of metaphysics shows that some philosophers claimed other, apparently more significant, powers for it. As a result of the *Critique*, Kant will be in a position to pronounce on the claim. And indeed it is to make this pronouncement that the whole inquiry is undertaken: the object of the work is to determine the possibility of metaphysics, a science the very concept of which, as we are told in the *Prolegomena* (§ 1), implies that its sources cannot be empirical. Metaphysical knowledge, if such a thing is possible, is the supreme example of non-empirical knowledge: is there any metaphysical knowledge?

This question of the possibility of metaphysics is one which had a particularly strong interest for Kant. It interested him both as a technical philosopher and as an ordinary man. In technical philosophy his chief aim, from the 'sixties onwards, seems to have been to determine whether metaphysics in the traditional sense is pos-

sible, and, if not, what sort of metaphysics could be legitimate. Again and again he discussed points connected with this subject, treating of it particularly in the *Traüm* and the inaugural *Dissertation*. His pronouncements in the *Critique* and the *Prolegomena* show that he thought that metaphysics occupied a quite peculiar position among the sciences. It was a science which "could never cease to be in demand,"¹ a science which responded to a natural want in human beings. To eliminate metaphysics altogether would be impossible; the most that could be done would be to abolish certain illegitimate types of metaphysics, making room for a new "scientific" doctrine. Is not the aim of the celebrated "Copernican" revolution in philosophy declared to be the setting of metaphysics on the sure path of science?² For a philosopher holding these views the question of the possibility of metaphysics could not help but be important. But quite apart from this professional interest, Kant felt as an ordinary man an interest in the fate of metaphysics. He was convinced that there were certain truths or dogmas which it was important to maintain: the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will. Now these dogmas were traditionally thought to be the proper province of metaphysics; and in it reason, in its capacity as speculative, brought forward arguments for or against them. In neither case did it do much good to the dogmas in question. Quite apart from the positive opposition of materialist philosophies, the support lent them by rationalist systems of the Leibnizian type was of dubious benefit. For the rationalists were never able to confute their opponents completely; and by claiming as they did that our acceptance of the propositions argued for depended on the maintenance of their positions they tended to cast doubt on our confidence in the truth of those propositions. If, as the traditional metaphysics claimed, these matters *were* within the competence of the theoretical intellect, then it was difficult to maintain without fear of contradiction the existence of God and the remaining dogmas. It remained, then, for anyone convinced of the truth of the dogmas to argue that their acceptance did not stand or fall with the success of the intellect in defending them. And to maintain this point is the aim of Kant's philosophy as a whole. For Kant's philosophy, in its exaltation of the moral over the

¹ *Prolegomena*, Introduction; cf. B 24.

² In all this Kant seems to be speaking rather loosely. What we are all interested in are the questions which metaphysics traditionally asks about the existence of God, the soul, and so forth. But the reformed metaphysics which the critical philosophy is to make possible does not treat of such subjects; to speak roughly, it is the sum of our synthetic *a priori* knowledge so far as that is not mathematical. Its only mention of the traditional topics is to show that they involve questions which from the state of our intellectual make-up we are unable to answer.

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intellectual nature of man, is a philosophy which claims spiritual worth for all human beings. Because of this, and because Kant thinks that our moral nature is such that we can see that it necessitates our belief in the dogmas in question (for practical purposes they are unquestionably true), pretensions to knowledge in this sphere must be rejected and room be left for a faith we can all share. But in order that this position may be established, metaphysics in its traditional form, as a science claiming to give us knowledge of an intelligible world, must be shown to be bogus; and not until that has been effected can we rest secure in the possession of our dogmas. Hence the interest to the plain man of the result, if not the details, of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The *Critique* is really a vindication of the plain man: as Kant says, the schools have to recognize that "they can lay no claim to higher and fuller insight in a matter of universal human concern than that which is equally within the reach of the great mass of men (ever to be held by us in the highest esteem)."¹

That the determination of the possibility of metaphysics is the principal object of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is made plain enough in the prefaces to the first two editions, but it is not so obvious how this is so when we move on to the main body of the text. In the *Analytic* especially the argument is so difficult that one tends to lose sight of its connection with the rest of the book, and this tendency is increased by the interest of the doctrine of the *Analytic* in itself. Thus Kant's attempt to establish the synthetic *a priori* character of the general law of causality is treated by most philosophers as a possible refutation of Hume; yet though this aspect of his doctrine was plain enough to Kant himself, it is only an incidental thing about it. From the point of view of the whole work the main thing Kant has to say about the general law of causality is something over which he is in agreement with Hume: that it is only valid in the co-ordination of sense-data,² and that therefore the concept of cause could not be applied to the determination of objects in general, as it was by the traditional metaphysics. Again, in the *Transcendental Deduction*, the working out of the argument from the unitary character of the self to the necessary applicability of the categories distracts attention from the all-important conclusion which Kant is seeking to establish: that the categories,

¹ B xxxiii. Kant's position is obviously closely analogous to that of theologians and Christian philosophers who have sought to discredit intellectual proofs of the dogmas of religion so that they may fall back on the (intellectually impregnable) evidence of revelation to maintain them. But no one would claim that Kant's is a religious philosophy except in a very wide sense.

² Cf. Hume, *Treatise*, p. 212 (Selby-Bigge).

though objectively valid, i.e. related to an object, are related only to a *phenomenal* object and are valid solely in reference to sense-experience. It would of course be wrong to say that Kant does not emphasize this conclusion;¹ but one is apt, in one's concentration on the details of the argument, to lose sight of it, or at least to assign to it less importance than it deserves.

For these reasons it seems worth while to re-state the doctrine of the Aesthetic and Analytic from the point of view of the work as a whole, keeping in mind Kant's preoccupation with the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. A re-statement of this kind should be of interest not only historically (from the point of view of Kantian exegesis) but also (more important) philosophically. For Kant's theory is one which philosophers must at least take seriously; and the question of the possibility of metaphysics remains a living issue in philosophy, as recent discussions have shown. A good case can be made out for the view that Kant's position over the synthetic *a priori* propositions of "pure physics" is a sounder one than that adopted by contemporary positivists; though it is possible to accept it without rejecting the positivist view of "transcendent" metaphysics, provided that, in addition to accepting Kant's contentions in the Analytic, we are in general agreement with his conclusions in the Dialectic and over the nature of the implications of moral experience.² But even if we differ from Kant here and argue for the existence of a faculty of reason which can legitimately metaphysicize, as Hegel does, the results of the Analytic, showing that understanding at least is not a metaphysical faculty, will none the less be important.

Perhaps the best means of approach to the *Critique* is to see it as at once an elaboration of and contrast with the inaugural *Dissertation* "on the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world" of 1770.³ The *Dissertation* is particularly instructive if we see in the *Critique* an examination of the possibility of metaphysics in the sense of a science professing to give us information about a reality not knowable in sense-experience, since the possibility of a metaphysics of this kind is explicitly argued for in it. Moreover, the main argument used to support this position is that we are undoubtedly

¹ E.g. B 178 = A 139.

² Provided, that is, that we do not interpret moral and religious experience as a source of metaphysical *knowledge*.

³ A letter of Kant's to Herz, May 1, 1781 (X, 249), announces the impending publication of the *Critique* and says that it brings to completion the series of meditations undertaken in common since the defence of the *Dissertation* (reference in Vleeschauwer, *op. cit.*, I, 154).

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in possession of certain *a priori* concepts, and these are just the later categories. When we remember that the main point of the *Analytic* is to show that these concepts, though without question *a priori* and in our possession, nevertheless are only concepts of a (phenomenal) "object in general" and are without meaning except in reference to sense-experience, we are not likely to under-estimate the importance of the *Dissertation*.

In the *Dissertation* Kant combines the view that the senses only give us knowledge of appearances (since what we know through the senses is characterized by the form(s) of time (and space), and time and space are subjective ways of our perceiving,¹ with the contention that metaphysics, in the traditional sense, is possible. Thus we have in the *Dissertation* an assertion of what was later to be the substance of the *Aesthetic*, but there is nothing directly corresponding to the *Analytic* and *Dialectic*; or rather, though there are passages from which these sections plainly developed, their content is strikingly different from the parallel chapters in the *Critique*. Yet Kant is already convinced of two points which were to be fundamental in the later work: (i) that metaphysics, if there is such a thing, is a non-empirical science;² and (ii) that the only world with which we can be *directly* acquainted (which we can "intuit") is that we know through the senses.³ In the *Critique* itself these propositions are combined with one other—that *all* knowledge contains a sense element (an element of "intuition")—to demonstrate the impossibility of transcendent metaphysics; but in the *Dissertation* this third proposition is not accepted and the conclusion not drawn. The reason for this, already referred to, is that we are in possession of certain purely *a priori* concepts;⁴ and by means of these we can have, not indeed an "intuition" of things intellectual but a "symbolic knowledge" of them.⁵ Hence we do have some means (though not the best we could wish for) of getting beyond the evidence of the senses, and metaphysics is, in principle at least, possible.

The position argued for here is one familiar enough in the history of philosophy. Its affinity with views like those of Plato, for example, is obvious; so much so that one commentator has seen in a study of Plato in the years immediately preceding 1770 the inspiration of the *Dissertation*.⁶ It amounts to a denial of empiricism on the ground that the first premise of empiricism is false. Not all our knowledge

¹ Cf. especially §§ 13 ff.

² § 8: "No empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics."

³ § 10 *init.*

⁴ § 8.

⁵ § 10. Presumably the meaning is that though we cannot know an intelligible world (a world of things in themselves: § 4) in its individual detail, we can know it through "universal concepts in the abstract," i.e. have insight into its general nature.

⁶ M. Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker*, quoted by Vleeschauwer, I, 66, 148.

is drawn from sense-experience: besides the "way of the senses" there is a "way of the intellect," and the suggestion with Kant, as with other philosophers, is that the "way of the intellect" is the true road to knowledge (or rather, the road to true knowledge). Metaphysics gives us knowledge of a non-sensible world, its sole instrument being the intellect; and metaphysics is "queen of the sciences." This is surely a respectable position, even if we think it false, and its details should be worth investigation.

Unfortunately, the details as put forward by Kant in the *Dissertation* are disappointingly vague, and it is here that the superiority of the more carefully worked-out position of the *Critique* is most evident. Kant begins (§ 5) by remarking that the "intellect"¹ has a twofold use: logical and real. The *logical* use of the intellect is concerned with the subordination and comparison of concepts and principles according to the law of contradiction. This is an activity common to all sciences. What seems to be referred to is (i) the formation of concepts; (ii) the grouping of subordinate and coordinate concepts; (iii) the grouping of principles. The result, at any rate in the sphere of phenomena, is that out of *apparentia* comes *experientia*, i.e. (presumably) an orderly world.² For these operations something given is a prerequisite, and the intellect operates on these data. But in its real use the intellect does not operate upon but itself *originates* concepts. There are in the intellect, according to this view, certain pure concepts of "things or relations" (§§ 5, 6, 23), and these the intellect can discover by reflection on its own operations on the occasion of experience (§ 8). Kant gives as instances of such concepts (*ibid.*): "possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc., with their opposites or correlatives."

¹ *Intellectus*. This is the word equated by Baumgarten (*Met.*, § 402) with *Verstand*, whilst *ratio* is *Vernunft* (§ 640). But neither in Baumgarten nor in Kant's inaugural *Dissertation* is the critical distinction between the two faculties to be found. "Intellect" in the *Dissertation*, as in normal English, covers both *Verstand* and *Vernunft*.

² Vleeschauwer (*op. cit.*, I, 157, 204-6), agreeing with Riehl and Wundt, sees in the *usus logicus* of the intellect in the *Dissertation* the nucleus of the mature transcendental deduction. If this means that the procedure of the intellect so far as it operates logically is conceived in 1770 as analogous to that of the understanding as a "transcendental" faculty in the doctrine of the *Critique*, that does not seem to be true. The logical use of the intellect is nearer the logical use of understanding in 1781: something which holds good in all sciences (and therefore presumably in metaphysics itself). It is doubtful whether Vleeschauwer is right in saying (p. 157) that the concepts on which the intellect operates in its logical use are all drawn from the senses. Kant does not say this, but merely that all the concepts must be given; the source need not be specified. The *real* use of the intellect seems to be the source of the categories; but to all appearances Kant had not yet realized the need of a transcendental deduction of pure concepts.

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Now already in 1770 Kant had come to realize that to grant the existence of certain *a priori* concepts or (to use a more general word) representations did not necessarily mean that we have insight into an intelligible world. For non-empirical representations can fulfil one of two possible parts. They may give us genuine knowledge of a reality other than that we know in sense-experience or they may be merely *a priori* forms for the co-ordination of sense-data. This second alternative is that which Kant adopted in the *Dissertation* over the *a priori* representations of time and space. Our knowledge of space and time in general (as opposed to our knowledge of particular spatial and temporal situations) is not drawn from experience; space and time are *a priori* representations with which we are endowed. But that does not mean that we possess in them a source of knowledge other than sense-experience. For space and time, though *a priori*, are only *a priori* forms of human sensibility, i.e. subjective ways of our perceiving. We group all phenomena in time and all the data of the outer senses in space, and in this operation time and space are presupposed. But they are only presupposed as subjective forms; apart from data which must always come from the senses they are empty. Thus neither time and space, nor the science of mathematics, which is "about" time and space, have any metaphysical value.¹

There remain the purely intellectual concepts. In the *Dissertation* Kant unhesitatingly plumps for the view that these have what might be called, following Vleeschauwer, an "ontological" function—that is to say, that they are a source of knowledge other than sense-experience and in fact give us insight into an intelligible world of things in themselves. The pure intellectual concepts are declared (§ 9) to play a dual part. First they serve to expose the shortcomings of sensible concepts: they show that the senses only give us knowledge of appearances and thus prevent our making the sensible the measure of true reality. But they are only able to perform this *critical* function because of their other, *dogmatic* use. For, secondly, the pure intellectual concepts "issue in some pattern, which is conceivable only by the pure intellect and is the common measure of all things so far as real. This pattern—*perfectio noumenon*—is perfection either in the theoretical or in the practical sense. In the former case it is the supreme being, God; in the latter, moral

¹ The concept of number, the basis of arithmetic, is declared in *Dissertation*, § 12, to be intellectual (though cf. § 23), but to "demand for its actualization in the concrete the auxiliary notions of time and space (in the successive addition and juxtaposition of a plurality)." On the connection of time and arithmetic, see Kemp Smith's commentary to the *Critique*, pp. 128–34. Kant does not mention algebra in the *Dissertation*. For his view of it in the *Critique* see Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, I, pp. 157–8.

perfection" (§ 9). It is not altogether easy to say how much is meant by this (to us) curious language, but it must mean at least that our intellect gives us some sort of knowledge of what later philosophy would call an Absolute, and that this implies that the pure intellectual concepts constitute a source of knowledge distinct from sense-experience. The dogmatic use of the pure intellectual concepts is, presumably, metaphysics, though that science is defined (§ 8) as "that part of philosophy which contains the first principles of the use of the pure intellect." There is a science propaedeutic to this whose aim it is to bring out the distinction between sensible and intellectual knowledge; and Kant says that the *Dissertation* itself is a specimen of (rather, an essay in) that science (*ibid.*).

If we ask what all this amounts to, the answer is quite simple. We know in sense-experience a world which is investigated (*a*) as to its matter, in the empirical sciences; (*b*) as to its form, in mathematics. But over and above this we are possessed of a distinct source of knowledge in certain intellectual concepts which are part of our mental equipment. These give us insight into another world, a world not of appearances but of reality (§ 4); and because of this another science is possible. This science is metaphysics, the culminating point of which is the attaining of a conception of God.¹

Both the most interesting and the least satisfactory thing about the inaugural *Dissertation* is the doctrine of the real use of the intellect. Two things about the work immediately strike readers familiar with the *Critique*: the "ontological" function of the pure intellectual concepts, and the lack of anything to correspond to the critical distinction between understanding and reason. The pure concepts cited in § 8 are all concepts of the understanding in the later sense, and unless Kant's saying that the intellect originates concepts of "*things or relations*"² points to it, there seems to be no hint of the future faculty of reason.³ Again, unless the *usus logicus* of the intellect foreshadows it, there is no anticipation of the necessary co-operation of sense and thought in knowledge. Instead of these doctrines we have simply a crude affirmation of the distinction between the senses and the intellect and a theory, by no means worked out in detail, of how the one gives us knowledge of appearances, the other of things in themselves.

¹ We are also said to know moral concepts through the pure intellect (§ 7). The likeness of the general theory to the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas is striking.

² "*Vel rerum vel respectuum*" (§ 5).

³ On the other hand, since the "intellect" of the *Dissertation* is essentially metaphysical, it is precisely what reason pretends to be in the *Critique*. As already said, "intellect" covers both reason and understanding.

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In the *Critique* all this is changed, and it is with the working out of one part of the change—that affecting the concepts of the understanding—that we are chiefly concerned at present. The teaching of the *Critique* is that the existence of *a priori* concepts cannot be used to prove the conclusions they are alleged to prove in the *Dissertation*, with the result that metaphysics must be declared to be impossible. Thus the *Critique* supplies, as it were, a commentary on and a refutation of the most striking contention of the *Dissertation*. But because of the all-important distinction between understanding and reason, the overthrow of metaphysics in the *Critique* is accomplished in two parts: in the Analytic, where the concepts of the understanding are treated of, and in the Dialectic, where the ideas of reason are dealt with. As it turns out, the claims of reason to be a metaphysical faculty are thought by Kant to be greater than those of understanding; but there is always a suggestion, as the existence of the *Dissertation* shows, that the concepts of the understanding have metaphysical value.¹ Since at present our object is to trace the development of the discussion of the possibility of metaphysics in the first half of the *Critique*, consideration of the ideas will here be omitted.

It will not be necessary to spend any great time over the Aesthetic, since the arguments there used by Kant are virtually identical with those put forward in corresponding sections of the inaugural *Dissertation*. Once more we have a theory which asserts both the apriority and subjectivity of time and space. Space and time are *a priori* representations: they are the presuppositions of the sort of experience we have rather than something we learn from experience; but they are also forms of our sensibility, ways in which we necessarily perceive the data of the senses. It follows not only that space and time have no metaphysical value, but that anything connected with space and time cannot have metaphysical importance. For metaphysics, if there is such a thing, must be non-empirical, i.e. must have some other source than sense-experience. We shall see that the point about the fatal nature of a connection with space and time is important in relation to Kant's doctrine of *a priori* concepts.

It must be confessed that the argument of the Aesthetic has only a minor philosophical importance nowadays. The doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time remains important, but the position that space and time might be both *a priori* and of metaphysical value can hardly be taken seriously. Thus so far as the Aesthetic argues against a metaphysical conception of space and time, it is

¹ Cf. also e.g. B 87-8 = A 63 and *Prolegomena*, § 33.

not likely to be confuted. On the other hand, so far as in the Aesthetic Kant is concerned to put forward a philosophy of mathematics (as he does for geometry at least in the "transcendental exposition of the concept of space"), his theory is based on what seems to be an antiquated view of the nature of that science. Philosophical theories of the nature of mathematics which start, as Kant's does, from the view that the science has some special connection with space and time cannot be valid, since it is now reasonably clear that mathematics is not "about" space and time at all.

Nevertheless, there is a point about Kant's theory of mathematical propositions which remains instructive. Mathematics is held to concern itself with the "pure manifolds" of space and time. That is to say, mathematics describe the essential nature of space and time when abstraction is made from all concrete spatial and temporal situations. But because of this element of abstraction mathematical propositions do not say anything about the world of fact, even the sensible world of fact. They merely enunciate laws which anything which falls within that world must obey. They may therefore be described as propositions which prescribe to experience; apart from this reference to experience they are empty of real significance. It is true that the pure mathematician continues to be interested in them; but then he is not specially concerned, as a pure mathematician, with the question of whether mathematical propositions give us *knowledge*.

This theory of the prescriptive¹ character of mathematical propositions has a merit which raises it above the rest of the Aesthetic. It not only gives what seems to be a true account of the nature of mathematical propositions, but is also suggestive in connection with the rest of our synthetic *a priori* knowledge.² For it shows that a

¹ It must not be thought that the use of this word here and later implies agreement with Professor C. I. Lewis's view of the arbitrary character of *a priori* propositions.

² Of course it is widely held that mathematical propositions are not synthetic but analytic. The reason for this is that all the propositions of a given mathematical system can be deduced from a number of primary propositions, together with the definitions of a number of primary concepts, by aid of the law of contradiction alone. But this does not prove that the primary propositions and definitions are not themselves synthetic, and if they are, so is the body of the science. That they are seems to be a reasonable view, since otherwise it is hard to see what internal significance the system could have, or what would differentiate it from any other similar system. It would be like a set of trucks without anything to set it in motion. Cf. Kant, *Prolegomena*, § 2: "A synthetic proposition can indeed be comprehended according to the law of contradiction, but only by presupposing another synthetic proposition from which it follows." Kant himself, of course, believes that mathematical propositions are not only thus synthetic by derivation but also in their own right; but in this he seems to be mistaken.

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body of propositions which are both *a priori* and synthetic may nevertheless be only a body of prescriptive propositions, and thus, while not drawn from, may be in relation to, sense-experience. Kant no doubt errs in thinking that there is a special connection between mathematics and space-time experience, i.e. in thinking that, in terminology which will be explained later, mathematical propositions are specially rather than generally prescriptive. Mathematics, in fact, does have some sort of metaphysical significance, since, in Leibniz's language, it is true for all possible worlds. But that does not mean that by itself mathematics is any adequate basis for metaphysics; you cannot say anything very significant about an intelligible world by knowing that mathematical propositions are true of it. All this, as we shall see, throws light on the metaphysical value of another set of prescriptive propositions.

(To be concluded)

PLATO'S PRESENTATION OF INTUITIVE MIND IN HIS PORTRAIT OF SOCRATES

K. W. WILD

It has been said that in Plato the intuitive mode of receiving knowledge is accepted implicitly, and that it is left to Aristotle to make a clear-cut distinction between Intuition and Reason.

This may be true and yet leave Plato as the great classic exponent of an intuitional doctrine, since a clear-cut distinction must (as far as experience has yet taken us), be largely theoretical. Plato (outside politics) always, or nearly always, makes experience the foundation of his theories, and is willing to face its limitations, even though such an attitude puts clear-cut distinctions beyond his reach.

But that the distinction was not explicit in Plato's own mind I find hard to believe; and I suggest that, in his portrait of Socrates, Plato deliberately attempts to show us a mind eminently reasonable, pre-eminently noble, and fundamentally intuitive. He, it seems to me, does this partly because of the fascination that Socrates' mind had for him; partly because he himself was profoundly puzzled; and partly out of sympathetic fellow feeling.

However we may understand the theories of the early dialogues: as being those of Socrates as distinct from those of Plato, as showing the development of Plato's own views, as giving the various points of view of various philosophers and schools of philosophy, or even as isolated attacks on isolated problems, we must come away from a reading of them with our minds full of the personality of Socrates. When we arrive at the later dialogues and the Laws the case is different. We can see that their author is a man who can sympathize with his own Socrates and has points in common with him, but the Socratic personality disappears with the Socratic figure, and, perhaps, even a little before; and, along with it go the 'Ideas' and most of the emotion that gives a great part of their charm to the early dialogues; for, as Plato grows less and less intuitive so he gets less and less feeling into his writing, and, in the end (perhaps) less and less value from his pure reason.

Socrates, then, may be regarded as an artistic creation whose inspiration may have been an actual living being, or, perhaps, a glimpse into the very essence of man's psyche, or a metaphysical puzzle, or, as in so many of the greater works of art, a union of the three. There is no doubt, however, that Plato meant his portrait

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of Socrates to be taken seriously, and, to my mind, little doubt that his work of art was used by Plato himself to portray a mind whose nature was intuitive and whose aspirations were rationalistic: one, therefore, logical enough to resent a mixture it could not understand and, consequently, could not acknowledge.

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It is, of course, a vexed question whether any mind is intuitive, as distinct from rational, and, in calling Socrates intuitive I do not mean to assume the solution of that problem, but rather to indicate the type of mind which has given rise to it. The most outstanding examples are the mystic and the artist, and Socrates is interesting in both these aspects. His inclusion among the great mystics of the world is superficially easy to justify by illustration, though the psychological meaning of the term is difficult to explain. His attitude to art is far more controversial, but, perhaps, ultimately easier of understanding.

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First then: Is Socrates a mystic? And if so, does he realize his own nature and accept, or approve of it? And what does Plato think on the matter?

There is no doubt at all that Socrates had many of the external signs common to mystics. Rationalists suggest that his 'daemon' was, perhaps, just an exhibition of Socratic humour, a ruse adopted by him and understood by his friends when he wished to avoid an explanation or was unable to give one. This theory, however, seems to me quite untenable. His 'sign' is mentioned over and over again from the earliest to the latest of the Socratic dialogues: in the *Euthydemus*, the *Euthyphro*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Apology* and the *Theaetetus*; and sometimes with the greatest seriousness, as in the last three cases and especially in the *Apology*, where Socrates explains the negative nature of the warning occasionally given to him, yet not given to him when he entered the judgment hall where he was to be condemned to death: "Hitherto the familiar oracle within me has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error about anything; and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, either as I was leaving my house and going out in the morning, or when I was going up into this court, or while I was speaking, at anything I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching this matter has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this? I will

tell you. I regard this as a proof that what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. This is a great proof to me of what I am saying, for the customary sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good."¹

His irony does not, indeed, fail him during his trial: this, however, is not Socratic humour but Socratic earnestness.

Earlier in the *Apology* he describes his 'oracle' as a 'voice,' and his admission here of its habit of interference on trifling occasions adds to our conviction that he is speaking, to the best of his ability, with scientific accuracy, and that he is describing a psychological phenomenon emanating from imagery of the auditory type, occurring in a highly imaginative mind. Such sudden decisions that the whole conglomeration of circumstances renders any particular action undesirable often go by the name of intuition, whatever their real nature may be, and have a more or less miraculous aura to those who experience them, as well as to others.

Socrates was subject to trances, another common feature of mystical experience. It is true that only in the *Symposium* does Plato tell us this, but, on the other hand, this very fact seems to show us that Plato is deliberately drawing a portrait, for not only do the circumstances of the *Symposium* itself provide an actual example of a trance, but the fact is mentioned that Socrates' familiars are accustomed to them, and that they do not, as a rule, last long. The same dialogue records (through the mouth of Alcibiades) a more prolonged instance.

"One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve, and he would not give up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumour ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer) brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood all night as well as all day and the following morning; and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun and went his way."²

In neither of the cases recorded does Socrates' 'fit of abstraction' seem to be relevant to the matter in hand. In the first case it is not he but Eryximachus who suggests the subject of conversation after Socrates has come to himself, and, in the latter, the business in hand is a military campaign, not a philosophical discussion.

The abstraction, then, is not necessarily an attempt of the mind

¹ *Apol.*, 40a.

² *Symp.*, 220c.

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to isolate itself while solving a mental or moral problem, though this is a possible explanation. It may, of course, be cataleptic in nature, but, whether or no, it is a typical mystical experience, deliberately recorded and vividly described by Plato in the dialogue which best of all, better even than the *Phaedo* or the *Crito* or the *Apology*, gives us our notion of Socrates.

It may even be surmised that Plato wrote the *Symposium* with the intention of emphasizing this mystical tendency in Socrates: the whole dialogue is less logical, more aesthetically and morally emotional in its appeal than the others. The person and wisdom of Diotima, the prophetess (Taylor thinks probably a real person), the reverence paid to her by Socrates, the mythical trend of nearly all the speeches on Love, and the gradual rise in their spiritual level, leading up, in spite of the artistic break made by the entrance of Alcibiades, to the apotheosis of Socrates, give the impression that Plato, while maintaining and even amplifying the idea he has already given us of his master, deliberately designs, once at least, to emphasize this particular side of his character.

While noting the personal and physical ways and habits of Socrates it may be well to remember the kind of people with whom he liked to be and with whose ideas he was in sympathy. He tells us, as do his friends, over and over again, that it was the young and the fair that attracted him and were attracted by him, and this seems true enough, though how seriously we must take his account of his emotion at the first sight of Charmides, that so beautiful boy, is questionable. It is more than possible that he is describing (as he frequently does) in his own person the emotions he observes in others. His kindly raillery of the foppish Phaedrus is obvious, but there is genuine emotion when his fingers linger in Phaedo's 'fair locks.'¹

While attaching a certain value to these assertions, we must remember that twice he deliberately repudiates the idea that it is physical beauty that he admires. His rejection of the beautiful Alcibiades is amusing: "You have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true, and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better; truly you must see in me (Mem. high-stomached, goggle-eyed, snub-nosed) some rare beauty of a kind infinitely higher than that I see in you. And if, seeing this, you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty, you will have greatly the advantage of me; you will gain real beauty in exchange for appearance—gold in exchange for brass."²

In the *Theaetetus*, presumably written many years later, Socrates is made to evaluate in the same style though from the opposite standpoint: "You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly as Theo-

¹ *Phaedo*, 89b.

² *Symp.*, 218d.

dorus was saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good."¹

Plato was young himself when he walked and talked with Socrates, and himself experienced the kindness, generosity, and sympathy of the older man towards the young, and, probably, also remembered his own contemporaries in a manner not quite proportionate to their value in the eyes of Socrates, or to the time he spent on them. The names of the dialogues, however, indicate that Socrates found greater interest in men more nearly his own contemporaries or in his elders: Critias, Laches, Protagoras, Crito, Parmenides; and in those named after younger men the interest in the boys or their opinions is rarely prolonged but turns to some more mature philosopher, or to Socrates' own theories. In the *Theaetetus*, for example, where the youth in question is particularly noble and gifted, Theodorus, the elderly mathematician, takes as big a part in the actual conversation, and it is largely the theories of Protagoras and those of a still earlier generation of philosophers that are discussed.

I emphasize this not because I am blind to the charm of Socrates' connection with the "young and noble and fair," but because his connection with older men and their ideas brings out more clearly the mystical side of his nature. He seems to take particular pleasure in the company of the Pythagoreans, and to examine with respect and attraction their philosophy or the philosophy of those even distantly connected with them: some of the younger men present at his death and who had, therefore, the privilege of his latest ideas and speculations, were Pythagoreans; he recounted myths or made up mythical stories in the Pythagorean style; his tendency to a belief in the transmigration of the soul—a Pythagorean doctrine—is obvious. Now Pythagoras was himself a mystical figure, and his school with its doctrines and initiations and strong religious bent, was highly mystical in character.

Then again, of nobody except Diotima the prophetess does Socrates speak with such reverence as he does of "Parmenides, venerable and awful . . .; him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind."² Now Parmenides taught the reality of the absolute and the mere appearance of the particular, groping towards the 'One' while disregarding the 'Many.' Socrates, I think, never quite gave himself up to this view, but he revered Parmenides as he detested the materialists:

SOCRATES: Now, by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can hold fast in their hands and who

¹ *Theaet.*, 185c.

² *Ibid.*, 183e.

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will not allow that action and generation and all that is invisible can have any real existence.

THEÆTETUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very stubborn and repulsive mortals.

SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, outer barbarians.¹

A longer passage in the *Sophist*² confirms this view as does the attack on the relativist philosophy of Protagoras in the *Theætetus*, and Socrates' sympathetic description of the practical inability of the philosopher to make a material success of the world—a description twice given.³

All these preferences emphasize rather than prove the mystical leanings of Socrates.

The same is true of the many and various indications throughout the early dialogues of Socrates' interest in the apparently supernatural, at the one extreme, and the purely spiritual at the other. The vision of the woman 'fair and comely'⁴ which appeared to him in a dream the night before his death; his trouble at the neglect of a dream that bade him 'make music';⁵ the 'gifts of prophecy'⁶ which he claims, and his own prophecies which Euclides noted, after his death, as having been fulfilled;⁷ his claim to being a diviner, "though not a very good one";⁸ and, most important of all his practical (though not theoretical) certainty of the existence of a soul.

All these clearly add to the claims of those who consider Socrates to be a typical mystic, and we may add quite a number of minor attributes as, for instance, his mistrust of the senses and the body generally;⁹ his feeling of having received a special call or mission; his conviction of his unworthiness and of the necessity for purification; his wavering vision; all of which are abundantly clear throughout the *Apology* where we may well compare him with one of the Hebrew prophets.

Nevertheless, Socrates does not seem to me to be a mystic in any thorough sense of the term, any more than is Spinoza. A mystic must surely have supreme faith in his revelation and hold the findings of reason in relative contempt. Though it is true, as the references above have made clear, that practically Socrates does sometimes give so great weight to his unreasoned convictions as to follow their counsel even when unsupported by reason, yet his life's work was to apply reason to the notions that men commonly accept unexamined, and to teach his followers that only with the sanction of reason were they to be accepted. Indeed, this is what he

¹ *Theæt.*, 155e.

² *Sophist*, 246-8.

³ *Gorgias*, 521-2, and *Theæt.*, 173d-175b.

⁴ *Crit.*, 44a.

⁵ *Phaedo*, 61a.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 85b.

⁷ *Theæt.*, 142c.

⁸ *Phaedrus*, 242c.

⁹ *Republic*, Bk. II, 476; *Theæt.*, 155-8.

has taught the thinking world ever since. If he has a divine mission, it is to act as the gad-fly, reason, forcing men to clarify their ideas. This is clear throughout the *Republic* as well as the *Apology*. "Ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule?"¹

Socrates, then, seems to have appeared to Plato as a thinker influenced to a quite extraordinary degree by non-rational conviction, yet giving his personal devotion to reason. In one domain at least he seems conscious of the antagonism, revolts from it, and takes quite violent partisanship with reason against 'inspiration,' as he calls it, though 'intuition' is more customary to our ears.

That domain is art, and it is in his theories on knowledge as recollection, and on art that we have most clearly presented to us Plato's study of this interesting antagonism.

We will take the less important first: his doctrine of recollection. This appears in the *Euthydemus*, the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, and is most fully worked out in the *Meno*. In the first it is perhaps ridiculed; in the *Phaedo* it is mentioned, not by Socrates himself, but by Cebes as an additional justification of Socrates' belief in the soul's existence independent of the body: "Your favourite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we learnt that which we now recollect."² The reference in the *Phaedrus*³ is incidental and runs along the same lines, for Socrates finds that our ideas of justice, nobility, etc., are already in our minds—reminiscences. The conversation Socrates has with Meno illustrates the same theory, but this time much more fully. The famous scene between Socrates and Meno's slave boy who, in response to Socrates' skilful questioning 'recollects' that the square of the diagonal of a square is twice the square of the side, is less interesting than the remark which follows: less interesting because, first, it is doubtful, in spite of his protestations and Meno's agreement, whether Socrates does not actually tell as well as elicit; and secondly because, if Socrates is right and the boy really 'recollects,' then 'reasoning' becomes 'recollection' and there is no difference between reason and intuition.

The subsequent remark runs: "Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long and therefore they are not of much value *until they are fastened by the tie of the cause*; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as has been already agreed by us. But when

¹ *Rep.* IV, 441e.

² *Phaedo*, 72e.

³ *Phaedrus*, 278a.

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they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain."¹

This is exceedingly interesting. 'The tie of the cause' is recollection. True opinion may be the result of argument, reasoning, thought, but it remains 'opinion,' and may 'run away,' and is 'not of much value' until, in addition to being reasonably deduced it is also 'recollected.' Surely this means that all knowledge is, in the last resort, intuited; and that intuition means not only absolute and unshakable fact, but that fact realized with equally absolute and unshakable conviction.

Socrates here reconciles three primary forms of intuition: a good many of our perceptions or mental interpretations of our sensations are received with this very conviction: we *do* see colour, smell odours, hear sounds.

The results of a good many of our reasoning processes bring conviction: the square of the diagonal *is* twice the square of the side; nothing will shake our conviction that this is and must be so.

On the other hand, we are not firmly convinced of all that our perception tells us: we hear a scream and discover that it was a laugh; we see a sheet of water and discover it to be a mirage; and are not necessarily disbelieving; nor do we, in consequence, give up all hope of understanding reality. But add intuition, i.e. the realization (or, Socrates would say, recollection), that this perception corresponds with unalterable fact and we have knowledge indeed which nothing will shake, or which, once shaken, can give rise only to universal scepticism. He describes notably this form of intuition in the *Philebus* as² "the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and emotion."

And so with reasoning: the reasons which lead to solipsism, to determinism, to materialism, are cogent indeed, almost impossible to gainsay, and sometimes are convincing enough to alter men's outlook on life, and so even their actions. But nobody is surprised when they fail to bring conviction; many people who hold them would rather not, and seek a way by which, without forfeiting their intellectual honesty, they may avoid their conclusions. Something essential separates the reasoning which leads to our knowing that the square of the diagonal is twice the square of the side, and the reasoning that leads to solipsism. Socrates would say that the first is knowledge because it is not only reasoned but recollected, i.e. understood to correspond with absolute truth, and the second merely reasoned and not (in addition) recollected and therefore 'not of much value.'

¹ *Meno*, 98a.

² *Philebus*, 34a.

The third kind of intuition is that which emanates from neither perception nor reason but comes as an independent conviction, and would seem not to be common to every type of mind, and to be unverifiable. In the *Philebus* Socrates (perhaps) calls it "a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called art and is brought to perfection by pains and practice."¹ I think that Socrates himself had such convictions and knew that others had them; but he resented the idea that anything could escape the toils of reasonable inquiry, and so, except when he was in great straits, he always strove to support such intuitive convictions by other methods. Such, I think, was his conviction of the soul and its (at least comparative) immortality, and such certainly was his conviction of the superiority of justice over injustice, for, he says, "the knowledge which is stable and pure and true and unalloyed is that which has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or at least with that which is most akin to them."²

'Revelation' is a term that does not bring conviction to us nowadays, but 'correspondence with eternal realities' still means something to some of us, and must to all who have any intuitional faith, and, in this short but so pregnant passage Socrates does seem to shed light on a most confusing problem of human mentality.

The doctrine of recollection disappears from Plato with the personality of Socrates. Plato does not pursue it, or, perhaps, finds it not quite in harmony with his later views on ideas, or, possibly, grows less and less to have faith in any truth that is not eminently rational, but he depicts this, as he does so many other enlightening ideas, as dwelling with Socrates to his last day.

Then comes the fascinating problem of what Jowett calls 'Plato's quarrel with poetry,' and, although I do not think that Socrates had an intrinsic quarrel, it must be confessed that to those of us who come near Mathew Arnold's feeling that poetry is so close to the spiritual life as to be capable of taking the place of religion in men's minds, there is much sour reading in the *Republic*, and still more in the shorter dialogues.

Nevertheless, the truth of the matter seems to be that Socrates felt so deeply the aesthetic appeal of the sensible world that he feared for the supremacy of his darling Reason, and, while too fundamentally honest in his mind to deny its effect on him, was at least anxious to show its limitations and its dangers.

Any close examination (or so it seems to me) of the dialogues makes it clear not only that Socrates had no quarrel with the arts

¹ *Philebus*, 55e.

² *Ibid.*, 59c.

except in words, but that they played quite as big a part in his life as did discursive thought.

He was obviously familiar with Homer to such an extent that almost any subject of deep interest to him recalled a passage from the poet, a great deal more familiar than the modern man of culture is with his Shakespeare; a parallel with the Puritans and the Bible would be closer. Homer, maybe, was to the educated fourth-century Greek what the Bible was to our forefathers; but I reckon that no less than seventeen different poets are referred to, mostly by quotation and some of them over and over again, particularly Hesiod and Pindar, upon the former of whom Socrates makes the sharpest attacks in the *Republic*. Arithmetical proof is not applicable to matters of taste, but human nature does not seem to have altered fundamentally since Greek times, and we know that men and women do not quote poetry with readiness and delight unless they are aesthetically gifted to feel the power of artistic form.

And Socrates does more than show his familiarity with the poets by reference and quotation: he is very ready to enter into a critical examination of their works and of that of prose writers, as to both meaning and form. Certainly he uses the dispute over a passage of Simonides for his own ends,¹ and perhaps without any vivid interest in the actual theme, but his very language and method of attack show how frequently he has assisted at such discussions. His understanding of Ion's views² with regard to Homer points to the same thing, and his destruction of a thesis by the admired Lysias,³ a critical ridiculing of its form as well as its matter, shows his knowledge and skill. Scholars tell us that his own rival discourse has a recognized rhetoric form.

The *Symposium* makes it clear that his love of conversation is not only a love of the food for thought it provides, but an appreciation of the artistic form in which it can clothe itself; and when every other partaker of that famous feast of reason and beauty had succumbed to wine or fatigue, Socrates was still heard elaborating his views on the relationship of comedy and tragedy.

How deeply he felt on the subject of poetry may be judged by the inadvertent remark in the *Apology*, when, after the death sentence, he is comforting himself with the thought of an after life: "What would a man not give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again."⁴ The names that spring to his mind are not Parmenides or Zeno, not even Pythagoras, but those of the poets.

Socrates himself was a great maker of myths as well as an appreciator of the allegories and tales of other philosophers, and this is

¹ *Protagoras*, 339-47a.

³ *Phaedrus*.

² *Ion*.

⁴ *Apol.*, 41a.

surely one of the most notable forms of poetic imagination. Neither must it be forgotten that his father was an image maker or that his last creative efforts after his condemnation were the putting of Aesop into verse and composing a hymn in honour of Apollo.

These concrete instances of Socrates' inclination towards and familiarity with the aesthetic world are not, however, so interesting as is his theoretical attitude. The condemnatory passages in the *Republic* are well known and there it is quite evident that (1) Socrates was disapproving of the matter of the poetry he wished, for the good of his citizens, to banish from the educational curriculum, because he found it, if taken literally, not to coincide with or help his own ethical teaching. It is quite equally evident that (2) he so fully realized the claims and power of poetry (in the larger as well as the narrower sense) as to dread its influence. Indirectly and practically he understood Shelley's defence of all real poetry from a moral standpoint: that its power to develop the imagination makes it one of the greatest of ethical forces; but he had not formulated the theory, and was, intellectually, paralysed by his conception of the arts as essentially mimetic on the one hand, and explanatory on the other; that is, imitative of the bad in man and god and so, especially in the latter instance, offering an evil example in an alluring form; at the same time interpreting the weakness and failure of men as the result of divine will: in short, often imitative of the bad and sometimes falsely interpretative of the good; or else again, that the poets were creators of what did not correspond with reality, and consequently lied.

As a result practice and theory were at war. He himself read the poets and loved them, but forbade them, except conditionally, to others.

Yet Socrates was obviously puzzled. This can be seen most clearly in the *Ion*: "God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know that they speak not of themselves who utter those priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us."¹

This is certainly an intuitional aesthetic theory in an extreme form. The poet has the vision, that is he sees the world, or part of the world, as beautiful, or at least as having aesthetic form; and, as Socrates points out, he also has the power of making other men, gifted in this direction, share his vision and be moved by it.

It is quite true that one can read the *Ion* as an example of Socrates' raillery and come to the conclusion that he is mocking Ion and all men of aesthetic sensibility; for he begins with "but the truth is

¹ *Ion*, 534c.

that you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing, are wise; and I am a common man who only speaks the truth,"¹ and ends by offering Ion the choice between being dishonest and being inspired. And no doubt there is a good deal of mockery in the dialogue. But Socrates seldom holds converse without some definite end in view. Here it certainly was not an attempt to make Ion 'know himself' more thoroughly, for the self-satisfied rhapsode remains to the end quite unconscious that Socrates is speaking with anything but the utmost seriousness. I think that the aim of the discourse was to clear up a problem that was a problem to Socrates himself, or, at least, to set it in order. He cannot understand the power of poetry over himself and others; he suspects the persuasions of any mental force but reason; and he mistrusts the emotions. Yet Homer moves him, even to rapture. He has no difficulty whatever in understanding Ion's experiences, though he has little enough respect for Ion himself. He tries to convince himself of the unworthiness of the poetic charm by showing up the necessary ignorance of the poet, who cannot be the specialist in whom alone Socrates has faith. But I think Socrates remains, and realizes that he remains, unconvinced. 'Inspired then,' he says; perhaps with a sigh over yet another puzzle unsolved.

This idea is borne out by passages in a good many of the other dialogues.

In the *Euthydemus*, considering 'the art of making speeches,' the same aesthetic puzzle confronts him, and he solves, or puts it aside, in the same way.

"Their art is a part of the great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it: and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art acts upon dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men."²

In the *Lysis*, having failed to come to a satisfactory conclusion on the subject of Friendship, he refers his young hearers to the poets: "Let us proceed no further in this direction (for the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other in which the poets will be our guides; for they are to us, in a manner, the fathers and authors of wisdom."³ And, if he utters a verbal contradiction of this in the *Apology*, the meaning is the same: "not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them."⁴

Talking to Phaedrus Socrates is more emphatic. "There is also a third kind of madness, which is a possession of the Muses; this

¹ *Ion*, 532d.

³ *Lysis*, 213e.

² *Euthyd.*, 290a.

⁴ *Apol.*, 22b.

enters into a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyric and all other numbers; with those adorning the mythical actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, not being inspired and having no touch of madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the same man is nowhere at all when he enters into rivalry with the madman.”¹

The distaste for the whole inexplicable business is as plain in these passages as the realization of the charm.

But in the *Symposium* it is the power and wisdom of the creative artist that are predominant in his mind: “All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of art are all poets,”² and with a touch of such aesthetic yearning as he expresses in the *Apology*: “Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not rather emulate them in the creation of Children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory?”³

In the *Republic* Socrates suggests a way of acknowledging the enchantment of the aesthetic world while yet despising it, and refers it to his intellectual scheme by distinguishing between concrete beautiful things and absolute beauty—in ‘idea’:

SOCRATES: The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or hearing absolute beauty. . . . And he who, having a sense of beautiful things, has no sense of absolute beauty . . . of such a one I ask Is he awake or in a dream only?

GLAUCON: I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.

SOCRATES: But take the case of the other who recognizes the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer or is he awake?

GLAUCON: He is the reverse of a dreamer.⁴

Direct aesthetic inspiration is no surer sign of an intuitional mental mode than is a constant reference to an absolute; particu-

¹ *Phaedo*, 245a.

³ *Ibid.*, 205-9.

² *Symp.*, 205b.

⁴ *Rep.*, V, 476b-d.

PLATO'S PRESENTATION OF INTUITIVE MIND

larly if that absolute takes the form of what we should now call 'values.' The term was unknown to Plato, but Socrates' consciousness, as well as his often unconscious acceptance, of them is one of the most characteristic features of his mind.

It is hard to say how far general abstract notions at all were common to Greek thinkers before his day. The *Republic* shows clearly how difficult it was for even an intelligent young man to discriminate between 'justice' and just acts, as does the *Euthyphro* between 'piety' and pious deeds, and the *Charmides* between 'Temperance' (sophrosyne) and instances or characteristics of the virtue, and the same difficulty comes when Theaetetus attempts to define 'knowledge.' Many scholars think that the Platonic 'idea' was not originated by either Plato or Socrates, but, even if that be so, the constant harping on and hunting after such notions as 'beauty,' 'truth,' the 'good' as well as the tacit acceptance of other values such as the 'holy,' the 'useful,' is obviously presented by Plato as characteristic of Socrates. He might be said to have an intuition for an ultimate value: "The highest and noblest class . . . of goods, which he who is happy desires for their own sakes as well as for their results."¹ Such an intuition combined with his forceful intellect to cause his life-work to be the making explicit of what had always been implicitly accepted by his own mind and the minds of men generally.

It is evident that the matter was not, even in the end, set out clearly and precisely in Socrates' own mind. He never seems quite to have distinguished between the Good, the Beautiful, and the True, and the conscious seeking after or recognition of the value of any of them seems often to be called 'wisdom.' His method is sometimes to entrap his companion into an acknowledgment of one of the values, and to base his subsequent argument on that acknowledgment; and the very fact that the plan was in the nature of a trap indicates that there was not a very widespread explicit knowledge of the idea of 'value.' Socrates follows this plan in the *Gorgias*, where the unwary and modest accept his preconceptions, but the intelligent, experienced, and bold Callicles questions them, and even then is involved.

The whole extended argument that runs through the *Protagoras* and the *Euthydemus* and the *Meno* as to whether virtue can be taught, i.e. as to whether it is a branch of Knowledge, is an indication of the suspicion, almost the fear, Socrates had, lest after all it could not be taught and that, if evil were always ignorance, it was not always a remediable ignorance, but an ignorance of the soul, an inability to understand, a spiritual blindness to the 'values.' Socrates, I think, never acknowledged this, but he seems sometimes

¹ *Rep.*, II, 358a.

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to fear it. Such a suspicion would account for some of the myths where he depicts the soul as incapable of redemption and so suffering eternal torment.¹

When he raises the subject specifically in the *Protagoras* he raises it only to put it aside: "If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of anyone; but if not then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance."² The conclusion of the *Meno* is more definite: "Virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason unless . . . ;"³ but even here Socrates will not accept the verdict as certain until he has thoroughly mastered the meaning of the problem: before asking how virtue is given he inquires into the actual nature of virtue.⁴

By then, deliberately and with circumstance, depicting Socrates as possessing a marked mystical tendency, marked aesthetic leanings, and a divine curiosity into the values, none of which is he able to reconcile with the pure exercise of reason, Plato has, I think, justified us in believing that he has set out to make the portrait, not only of a man he loved and honoured, but of a mind with a distinctively intuitive bent.

¹ *Phaedo*, 113e.

³ *Meno*, 99e.

² *Protag.*, 313e.

⁴ *Meno*, 99.

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PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

THE works to be mentioned in the present survey are in the main concerned with problems of conduct, history, and social theory. In some of them metaphysics and the theory of knowledge are not discussed at all, and in the others the importance of these subjects is seen to emerge from topics seemingly remote from them. There is nothing to be surprised at in this direction of interest. In France there has of late years been a strong tendency for philosophy and sociology to be pursued together. When so much attention has been devoted to studying the methodology of the sciences of living and inanimate matter, a time was bound to come when the methods of history and the social sciences should receive a closer examination. It is only to be expected, during our present times of political and social transformations, that the minds of those who can still concern themselves with philosophy should be turned increasingly towards problems of social thinking. Nor, again, is it at all surprising that the first four books to be mentioned arise, directly or indirectly, out of discussions which we associate primarily with German thinkers. For a long time now Germany has been the intellectual as well as the political cockpit of European civilization, and it is a good sign that French thinkers are taking notice of the struggles there. It is to be hoped that they will avoid contributing to the fog that is usually created in these German encounters.

Dr. Raymond Aron's *Essay on the Theory of History in Contemporary Germany*¹ is an exposition and assessment of the theories about the methods and presuppositions of history advanced by Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel, and Max Weber. Dr. Aron holds that, among the various discussions of these authors, four main problems emerge. There is first the problem of what the principles are which govern the historian's choice, from among a limitless body of facts, of those which should find place in an historical work. There is next the problem of the kind of knowledge which the historian can achieve of the people, events, and institutions with which he is concerned. This is closely connected with the philosophical problem of our knowledge of other minds. Thirdly, there are questions concerned with the relations among the facts which the historian records. Can he claim to show objective connections among them? In what sense can it be shown that historical events are related causally? The fourth problem, in Dr. Aron's own words, is concerned with "the historical character of the person who writes history." How can someone whose present experience is part of a process of becoming succeed in reaching an objective knowledge of the past? To these questions the philosophers under discussion give different answers which Dr. Aron discusses critically. He concludes that "the method employed and the concepts used vary with the philosophies to which the historians adhere," and agrees with Weber that the proper question to ask is not "How can historical science be universally valid?" but rather "What parts of historical science can be universally valid?"

¹ *Essai sur la Théorie de l'Histoire dans l'Allemagne Contemporaine*. Par Raymond Aron. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1938.

This question brings us to Dr. Aron's second book, to which the first may be regarded as an introduction. In his *Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Essay on the limits of historical objectivity*,¹ Dr. Aron undertakes an independent examination of the questions which were raised in the first. He holds that historical knowledge is different in kind from knowledge of physical events, that the time which concerns the historian is not the time which enters into the calculations of the physicists, and that "history is for man, not something external to him, but the essence of his being." From this brief summary it will be seen that what commences as a study of the method of history concludes with observations on the nature of man and his destiny. We may see how this development and extension of the subject takes place by first considering an attitude of mind which a preoccupation with history and sociology has created and encouraged, particularly in Germany. The exponents of this view show how principles of conduct may vary from one period to another, how moral codes depend upon social structures, and how political and social revolutions are associated with transformations of moral codes. They also show how philosophies vary in conjunction with the movements of history, and how the social circumstances and historical position of the historian inevitably determine the sort of history that he writes and knows. Hence they conclude that it is simple-minded for the historian to judge other men and other epochs in terms of his own historically determined moral conceptions. They may even go so far as to say that since every present epoch writes history for itself, it is chimerical to hope for or to attempt any objective history at all. The desire for objectivity belongs only to a particular type of man, the man who, preferring contemplation to action, feels safe in his society. How does Dr. Aron deal with this fashionable form of scepticism? It should be noted first that he does not meet the sceptics with an equally incredible dogmatism. In so far as I understand his position, he meets the moral arguments by agreeing that there is no fixed code of morals or ready-made set of duties, and by holding that nevertheless men have real duties which depend upon their immediate circumstances and upon their historical situation. No rules and no codes can relieve the individual from the necessity of making his own decisions in the light of the situation as he sees it. This notion of personal decision is important also in the theoretical sphere. Dr. Aron admits that each period must rewrite history for itself, and he shows why. Events which at their occurrence might seem unimportant may later be seen, because of the subsequent course of events, to be important. There is a subtle and instructive discussion of revaluations of this sort. The author concludes that all attempts to understand the past are necessarily bound up with what we will for the future. Once again the importance of decision is emphasized.

From the account here given it might be thought that Aron's work is only another form of historical and moral scepticism without the courage to confess itself for what it is. That would not be a fair description of the book. Aron tries to show that any history which is more than a record of unrelated "facts" is linked up with a philosophy, which in its turn looks to the future as well as the past, and is a matter of the will *as well as* of the understanding. Finding himself dissatisfied with a naïve and reactionary adherence to established ethical rules, he also sees the practical and theoretical objections to moral and historical relativism. I tend to regard philosophical problems from a different angle, and to use a different philosophical vocabulary from that of Dr. Aron, but I recognize the very great philosophical ability dis-

¹ *Introduction à la Philosophie de l'Histoire. Essai sur les limites de l'objectivité historique.* Par Raymond Aron. Nouvelle Revue Française. Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1938.

played in this book, and am interested in an attempt which few contemporary philosophers make—to bring rational reflection to bear, not upon the hypothetical duties of hypothetical and uncomplicated persons, but upon the duties of men in this unique and present juncture. It is to be hoped that Dr. Aron will pursue and elaborate the view of morality which, in this book, is suggested and hinted at but still remains fragmentary.

Dr. Marcel Weinreich's excellent book, *Max Weber, The Man and the Scholar*,¹ is also to be welcomed. Very little has been written in English about this important sociologist, apart from some articles in the *Sociological Review*. This book, therefore, should be of great use in England as well as in France. Dr. Weinreich, I think, succeeds rather better than Dr. Aron in translating the formidable German terms into readily intelligible French. The book consists of a biography of Max Weber, which succeeds admirably in displaying the qualities of the best type of German scholar of the last generation, an account of his views on the methods of sociology, and a summary of his direct contributions to history and sociology. The author concludes that Weber was "the last truly encyclopedic genius of our time." A good bibliography closes a clearly written and well-arranged book.

A book which is of interest now that theories of racial superiority are so prominent is *The Philosophy of Race of the Count de Gobineau and its Bearing To-day*,² by Dr. Andrée Combris. The author shows that privileged classes in France have defended their position by claiming to belong to a superior conquering race even as far back as the sixteenth century, and that the famous Abbé Sieyès had to meet this argument during the French Revolution. Gobineau's argument in his *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* was that with race mixture came race decline, that civilization was mainly the work of a superior Aryan race which was becoming obliterated through admixture with inferior peoples, and that therefore civilization was heading for an inevitable decline. Comparison is made between Gobineau's views and the theories of National Socialism. There is agreement on the effects of race mixture, upon the superiority of the Aryan race, and upon the value of a system of castes (although, on this matter, the author points out, the leading National Socialists do not widely publish their opinion of the masses). But Gobineau did not think that the Germans were of particularly pure Aryan race—they were less Aryan than the English—he was not anti-Semitic, and he had not conceived of the notion, introduced by H. S. Chamberlain, of *improving* the racial composition of a nation. Gobineau was on terms of personal friendship with Wagner and some of his associates; his views clearly influenced Nietzsche; and in 1894 a Gobineau Society was founded in Germany. Thus a view which originated in the brain of a French reactionary noble, and was not, in its native form, favourable to the racial claims of the German people, nevertheless had its chief influence in Germany, where it was turned to the service of pan-Germanism by the special pleading of H. S. Chamberlain. It may now be found, with an admixture of eugenics, in the pages of *Mein Kampf*. Dr. Combris, although he exposes the weaknesses in Gobineau's arguments, appears to be much impressed by the theories of Vacher de Lapouge, whose conclusions he considers scientific. There is no attempt to consider whether the conception of race is of value in interpreting historical events.

The invention of machines has brought men new benefits, but it has also brought new maladies and set new problems. Why did the Greeks, with

¹ *Max Weber, L'Homme et le Savant. Étude sur ses idées directrices*. Par Marcel Weinreich. Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. Paris, 1938.

² *La Philosophie des Races du Comte de Gobineau et sa Portée Actuelle*. Par Andrée Combris. Félix Alcan. Paris, 1937.

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their knowledge of mathematics and mechanics, fail to make use of the possibilities of machines? When were the uses to which machines might be put first foreseen? What caused the development of modern machine production? When were the social dangers and difficulties inherent in machine production first enumerated, and what means of combating them have been suggested? These are some of the questions discussed in a somewhat summary fashion by Professor Pierre-Maxime Schuhl in his *Machinisme et Philosophie*,¹ a new volume in the useful series of works making up the *Nouvelle Encyclopédie Philosophique*. It is a book mainly to be read for the problems it raises and for the useful lists of books it provides. The discussion of the Greeks' failure to utilize machines is along lines already made familiar in this country by Professor Farrington's *Science in Antiquity*. The advantages of machines were not seen because, owing to the supply of slaves (called by Aristotle "living tools"), there was no need to economize labour. The existence of slavery was also responsible for the scale of values, clearly expressed in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, according to which productive work was ignoble, and contemplation superior to activity. Hence the neglect of applied science. Leonardo, Bacon, and Descartes saw the possibilities of deliberate invention, and various economic factors connected with the state of the market for certain goods hastened the progress of mechanical improvement. Leonardo refused to publish an invention for moving about under water "because of the wickedness of men, who would use it for assassinating at the bottom of the sea, making breaches in ships and sinking them with their crews." But the classical economists were mainly impressed by the benefits of machines. Early in the nineteenth century, however, the despotism which might accompany the ownership of large factories and concentrations of capital was foreseen by some. Constantin Pecqueur argued that employers might be tempted to establish a form of industrial feudalism with distinct and fixed orders and ranks. To-day, the possibility of using the machine to increase the leisure at the disposal of mankind is being apprehended, and with it the other possibility that machines might desecrate the leisure which they themselves have created.

H. B. ACTON.

¹ Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1938.

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METAPHYSICS

WE have confined our previous surveys to "Philosophy of Nature," "Philosophy of History," and "Theory of Value." If we head our remarks to-day "Metaphysics" the possibility of our task may be disputed. If someone varying an eighteenth-century question should ask: "What is the real progress made by metaphysics in Germany since the war?" he may feel inclined to answer: the proof that metaphysics are impossible. But it is the same with metaphysics as with religion. You may prove a thousand times that religion is impossible, that it is based on a misconception and that it ought not to exist, but no spiritual or political dictator is able to suppress the religious need of human nature. And so with metaphysics. You can prove that certain problems are wrongly put, that other concepts are meaningless, etc. But you never can prevent the

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reappearance of unresolved problems in new forms, you never will be able to persuade man that language, given to him as a means for communication and for knowledge, is an end in itself; and a real philosopher never can agree to a mere verbalistic standpoint. And even regarded from this standpoint it would be a question of the use of words. If we use the word "metaphysics" as meaning the science of principles which underlie either any specific science or the system of sciences, or our knowledge, there can be no doubt, I think, that problems of this kind are necessary even if human solutions of it are condemned to be preliminary and one-sided.

Devoting to-day a very few remarks to this wide theme, I think we should start with a recommendation for the second number of the new *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (ed. Jean Lameere, Université libre de Bruxelles). For it contains an unpublished paper of Husserl's: "The question of the origin of geometry,"¹ the best Husserl bibliography yet published (by Jan Patocka) and quite a few interesting articles devoted to this thinker. If we say some words about Husserl's own contribution, we wish also in this Journal to pay tribute to this man, who, gifted with an extraordinary power of penetrating analysis, an astonishingly rich flow of reflection, and very strong self-criticism, devoted his life to basic philosophical problems. His real intention was to establish philosophy as an exact science, to develop a *scientia universalis* and to explore its basis in human consciousness. This alone accounts for his extraordinary influence in Germany where he started a philosophical movement. If he had scarcely any influence in the Anglo-Saxon world this is partly due to the fact that his most important work, *Logische Untersuchungen*, is not translated, and because his problem is somewhat different from those treated in this country. The short unpublished paper, written in 1936 as part of an intended *summa* of H.'s work and a continuation of another chapter published in Vol. I of Professor Liebert's *Philosophia*, makes it clear enough.

German philosophers have been much more impressed than the English by the fact that life, art, and science have lost their original meaning, that they become more and more meaningless. The whole of Husserl's philosophy is devoted to the problem of meaning, to the meaning of meaning, to the analysis of meaning, to the distinguishing of meanings, but above all to the origin of meaning and the principles of its constitution. In this paper H. returns to his original subject, mathematics. He rightly sees in the fact that mathematics, in its highly developed symbolic form, becomes meaningless, an expression of to-day's crisis. His question is: how is it possible that mathematics although progressing in logical form and technical application, lost connection with their original meaning? He asks, what are the original materials and the basic evidences which constitute geometry? All human activities have the tendency to become mechanized, and to lose their original organic significance. H. demands that every science ought to maintain the connection with its original intentions. A real progress in science leading to true propositions is only possible if the basis of the deductive construction is founded in original evidence. Those people are right who say that H. intended a new metaphysics and that he wished to give a new basis to philosophy. But here in any case he understands, following Neo-Kantian tradition, the metaphysical question in an epistemological manner. He asks, how is it possible that certain propositions formed by a subject become universally valid? What is the connection between subjectivity and what it creates? How is the meaning of these "objective" creations such as mathematical propositions constituted in consciousness? He contends that "genetic" and "epistemological" origin are identical and that in the original discovery of a geometrical proposition its meaning

¹ *Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem.*

became evident. We must therefore go back to this original meaning if we wish to understand geometry even in its most abstract form.

H.'s problem is interesting and important. I am even inclined to think that his manner of going back to the source is noteworthy although I do not think he is right in identifying genetic and epistemological origin. But if we ask, what progress has metaphysics made in H.'s work, I think we must answer: his fundamental principle is a variation of Descartes' *Cogito, sum*. He takes it (as, I think, it ought to be taken) as expressing a relation not between my thought and my existence but between thought and being in general. It is a methodic principle which makes consciousness and thought a presupposition to our knowledge of being. H.'s *cogito* differs from Descartes' *cogito* chiefly by including Brentano's "intentionality." Furthermore the object, the *cogitatum*, is understood as "meaning," the relation between *cogito* and *cogitatum* as an act of meaning. Therefore the chief problem is the constitution of meaning in the *cogito*, which again as in Descartes comprises the whole sphere of consciousness and includes especially a specific form of intuition. So H. continues the Continental Cartesian tradition, which is unbroken in the idealistic trend of German philosophy, in Kant and all his followers, in Fichte and Hegel as well as in the Neo-Kantian school. Only one famous idealist declined to follow suit, Leibniz, who declared the *Cogito, sum*, to be true, but only as a *vérité de fait*, not as a proposition following *ex terminis*, nor as an axiom, and therefore unable to be the principle of philosophy.

I think there can be no better method of understanding as well as criticizing any philosophy than to get down to the axioms or at least the most fundamental principles which are taken as evident. For every philosophy must start somewhere and take some propositions for granted. Opposed to the rationalist starting-point, the *Cogito, sum*, the irrationalist philosophies protesting against the suppression of the non-rational sides in man and nature, the so-called "philosophies of life" began with life and with the evidence *Vivo, sum*. This movement, represented by Nietzsche, Dilthey, Scheler, Bergson, Wildon Carr, and others, is interesting from different points of view. But we do not wish to speak here about it, but about a new book, *System of Philosophy of Life* by R. Junge.¹ The reviewer very much regrets not to be living in Leibniz's age, who was able to say "yes" to all books he read. Yet there is one point where I am in complete agreement with the author. That is his sub-title, "A comprehensive science as basis of all specific sciences of life." This is identical with our idea first published in a paper *Vivo, sum* (*Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*, 1933). We meant by this that (as so often in the history of philosophy) the so-called philosophy of life is a kind of inexact anticipation of an exact "science of life." That is to say, if we review all those sciences concerned with life (i.e. biology, psychology, and history) it would be useful to ask: are there in the living units forming the subjects of those sciences identical modes of actions and reactions and therefore identical modes of behaviour, identical functions, identical orders and laws common to all these different spheres? The discovery of identical elements would enable us to develop a basic science of life which would (without encroaching on the diversity of the different regions) reveal the inner relation between them. I expected to find a development of this idea in the book. But the promise of the sub-title is not fulfilled. Its fulfilment would demand the abandonment of what the title promises a "philosophy of life" and to transform it into a "science of life." But the author is not content with the modest task of analysing the phenomena of life and the basis of the sciences of life; he desires to undertake the somewhat gigantic task of giving in seven volumes the basis of what he calls *die totale Kulturwende*, a phrase which cannot be

¹ *System der Lebensphilosophie*. Junker u. Duennhaupt, Berlin, 1937. Bd. I u. II.

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translated but means a total change of culture (and in the logical sense of the word could only mean the transformation of culture into non-culture). The author is filled with a great amount of philosophic enthusiasm and his thought is fresh. But I am afraid his means are in no proportion to his aims and the result is a fantastic variation of the vitalistic theory of *entelechy*. This book is mainly based on Driesch's vitalism. But the author does not see that Driesch himself in the later editions of his *Philosophy of Organism* has deprived the *entelechy* of its metaphysical meaning, transforming it into a holistic concept and preferring the term "related to the whole" (*ganzheitsbezogen*) to the teleological characters contained in it. Moreover, this concept is one of those superfluous notions which do not explain anything but bar, on the contrary, the way to a true inquiry into the phenomena. The book reminds the reader of the pre-Kantian speculative philosophy of nature. Scientific basis, clearness of thought, and logical analysis are missing.

But it would not be fair to take this book as standard of German philosophy of life which has produced works of an incomparably higher level. Even then, I think, there can be no doubt that the first axiom of this philosophy, the *Vivo, sum*, happens to be quite true, but is an expression of a contingent fact. It cannot be developed into a methodical principle (as the *Cogito, sum*) and therefore does not lead very far.

Yet German metaphysics of the last decades is not only characterized by having produced certain forms of rationalistic philosophies, based ultimately on variations of the *Cogito, sum*, and strongly influenced by Kant, and, as an antithesis to this, irrationalist philosophies of life, founded on the *Vivo, sum*, but it has tried to overcome both in a synthesis, the so-called "philosophy of existence" or, in a shorter phrase, "existentialism" (if it is allowed to introduce this word). This term existence is somewhat awkward. It means in medieval philosophy the contingent being in time and space, whereas "essence" designated necessary being. But now this term comes back to philosophy from theology. Its meaning is based on Kierkegaard's reaction to Hegel's philosophy. What Kierkegaard resented most in Hegel's philosophy was the fact that in it the impersonal Logos embraced and dissolved all personal facts, that the human soul was only a moment in an impersonal intellect. In him protested the simple Christian soul which amidst its pains and sorrows was unwilling to accept the Logos as mediator between itself and God, and which believed "existence" to be of more importance than objective thought. Kierkegaard meant by existence the single, finite, irrational, suffering, sinful creature, which is forced to make a decision, to which consequently only ethical reality is real, which cares more for happiness than for the abstract speculations of the philosophers. As after the war K.'s influence on German theology and philosophy became stronger and stronger; strangely enough his religious opposition to philosophy became a philosophic antithesis to modern rationalism and positivism. Thus K. Jaspers in his book *Reason and Existence*¹ starts from a comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. He finds a similarity of views in them; both see the problematic position of human reason, both are suspicious of the scholar and of the philosophical system; furthermore their existence and the mode of their self-understanding are similar. Here, as later on in his *Nietzsche* (Cp. *Philosophy*, vol. xiii, No. 49, p. 89), he tries to interpret him as a kind of philosopher of existence. But it must be remembered that Nietzsche neither knows the term in Jaspers's sense nor are his ideas compatible with it (Cp. ed. C. G. Naumann, vol. xiii, 222, 221; xi, 74; vi, 68; xi, 74; iii, 199).

To give a résumé of J.'s philosophy as contained in this book or in his *Philosophy of Existence*² is quite impossible because it wishes to avoid any

¹ *Vernunft und Existenz*. J. B. Wolters, Groningen, 1935.

² *Existenzphilosophie*. Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1938.

decision or to arrive at results, it simply desires to awaken existence. It lives in the pure movement of reflection. If Heidegger gives the ontology of existence, so Jaspers gives the indefinite self-reflection of it. Therefore J. cannot be judged by his results but only by his tendencies. He is always interesting if he is pursuing his original work, psychological or psychopathological analysis. He possesses a very fine philosophical sense. Moreover, his central problem, the problem of transcendence, is important. The nineteenth century has so wonderfully succeeded in restricting itself to mere immanence that this immanence itself became meaningless. "Existence," by meaning the hidden ground in man by which he is related to the Transcendent, is nothing else but a means to reopen the way to the Transcendent. Jaspers's philosophy tries to secure a new transcendence. If this task fails in its chief aim (not without giving much light to the human sphere) because the Transcendent itself remains unmoved, it is not Jaspers's fault but a consequence of the present crisis of man.

Whether the highest axiom of this philosophy *Existo, sum* is of any consequence remains to be seen. Paradoxically, just because it may be transformed into an analytic proposition, it may be more than a mere expression of a matter of fact. Perhaps this philosophy may be important in developing categories of the specific ways in which man exists, and in giving means for a special analysis of this field; in other words, it may be an anticipation of a science of man, just as philosophy of life is an anticipation of a science of life. But I do not think that it is able to develop a new philosophy because existence remains contingent and an obstacle in the way to even that transcendence which it promises to make accessible.

But if we were to answer the question about the progress of metaphysics in Germany thus—there have been some philosophies based on the principle of rationality, others on that of life, others on that of existence, and all these are derivations from the principle of subjectivity—this would not be the whole story. For there is a tendency corresponding to Neo-Realism in this country, but very different from it, that attempts to reinstall real metaphysics, that is "ontology." The leader of this movement is Nicolai Hartmann, who has just published a new book about "Possibility and Reality."¹

Hartmann's chief problem is man, being, knowing, and acting in this world. He thinks that if we really want to know something, this "something" must pre-exist; from his point of view the relation of the knowing subject to the known object is a relation of being (surely a misunderstanding of the meaning of knowledge). But H. not only presupposes the existence of the world, he believes that it is constructed in different layers which are ontologically differentiated. Correspondingly, being exists as real and as ideal being. The new book, which is a kind of sequel to his *On the Foundations of Ontology*, is concerned with the problem of "modality" and its aim is to show that the categories of modality occupy a kind of central position in the sphere of ontology. Such a point of view is possible. It is, for instance, possible to give an analysis and description of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* by starting with the categories of modality. (We have done this in our thesis *The Structure of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Problem of Time*, Giessen 1913.) For Kant presupposes from the beginning a specific concept of possibility which determines already his very questions. He says: "What is in accordance with the formal conditions of experience (regarding intuition and concepts) is possible." But this concept is epistemological, for it fixes the conditions under which knowledge is possible. Consequently Kant does not develop metaphysics

¹ *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*. Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1938.

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but epistemology. Yet in ontology (if there is any problem like this at all) the question is different.

H.'s book is very good from a technical point of view. It is the book of a philosopher who since his studies in the Marburg school of H. Cohen and P. Natorp is in closest touch with European tradition and with the problems. Good are the historical remarks, interesting the "aporetic" method of developing the difficulties of a problem (which is influenced by Aristotle) and the method of analysing the categories (*Kategorialanalyse*). But the difficulties start with the declaration that it is impossible to define the "modi" directly and that they must therefore be defined indirectly by relations existing between them. These relations are determined by a so-called fundamental law of modality: "Impossibility, possibility, and necessity are relative to reality and irreality; therefore reality and irreality are the basic modi." Now this law, formulated as it is, as a general law valid for all the regions, is surely wrong. For possibility depends not on reality, though it is quite true that every new realization opens new possibilities. If I say "something is possible," this statement is relative to a set of conditions which may be formulated in propositions, and if these propositions are taken in relation to the set of axioms on which they are based, then we may say: "A proposition *P* is possible in relation to this system of axioms *A*, if the negation of *P* is not valid in relation to *A*." Hartmann's fundamental mistake is that he does not start from the sphere of logic, that he does not see that a definition of the modal concepts is not only possible but necessary. If he had started from logic, his research would have taken quite a different turn and probably he would never have written this book. Even if he wishes to reinstate ontology (what I think is a mistake) he should remember that the great ontologists of the past began with logic and then applied it to metaphysics. If H. admires Chr. Wolff, greater than Wolff was his master Leibniz. And Leibniz not only starts always from logic and then applies it to metaphysics, but (though he chooses for this purpose the old Aristotelian logic and arrives at very paradoxical results, the individual, so to speak, the integral of all the analytic propositions which may be pronounced about it) he nevertheless is the inaugurator of a new logic, namely symbolic logic, which is of the highest importance to mathematics and logic itself. Therefore our new "ontologists" are put in a very awkward position. They can either overlook the existence of the new logic, but then their own work is antiquated from the beginning; or they must try to refute the new logic or to apply it to their ontology, both of which tasks seem to be impossible.

This neglect of logic is by no means a personal mistake of Hartmann's, but a general failure of German philosophy and therefore very instructive. It would not be unjust to speak of treason against the true spirit of Leibniz's philosophy (corresponding to the maltreatment of Leibniz by the early Berlin Academy of Science, his creation, during the last few years of his life). For since Kant, all the great German philosophers (with a few exceptions like Bolzano) have tried to develop their own "personal" logic—e.g. Kant his "transcendental" and Hegel his "dialectic" logic. But neither is logic in the proper sense of the word, the first being epistemology and the second metaphysics. So the logic of Hartmann's teachers, Cohen and Natorp, was theory of science or of the logical foundations of mathematics and physics. These problems are necessary and important, but they are not "the" logic. Because every philosopher tried to develop his own logic, the problem of "the" logic was lost.

The future of philosophy does not depend on the application or non-application of an antiquated logic to a chimeric "ontology" but on the development of logic proper, as it has been done in our time by Russell, Whitehead, and Lukasiewicz.

F. H. HEINEMANN.

NEW BOOKS

The Philosophy of Plato. By RAPHAEL DEMOS. (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1939. Price \$3. Pp. xiv, 406.)

Before I attempt any critical remarks about this substantial and handsome volume, let me call attention to a few matters that have escaped the proof-reader, and might be put right in a erratum-slip. There is little actual citation of Greek throughout the book—in fact less than is pleasant to a reader who does not relish having to take down the volumes of Burnet's or Herrmann's text for the purpose of checking Mr. Demos's references several times in the course of a page—but the printer (for one hopes it must be he) has contrived more than once to perpetrate horrors (*ἀποδίδειν*, *φασκοῦν*) which are surprising in a volume written by a member of Harvard University. (The ungrammatical writing of *μή* in a phrase on p. 8, where Greek idiom demands *οὐ* is presumably an oversight of the author's own.) More serious, if less distressing to the eye, are two or three cases in which the writer's sense has been perverted by misprints that might deceive an unwary reader. (E.g. p. 236, "the inspired poet knows *now* (l. *not*) that he is writing"; p. 278, "the soul 'perceives the hardness of the hand (l. *hard*) through touch"; p. 383, "as though wickedness were *involuntary*" (l. *voluntary*). In general, Mr. Demos prefers to give his quotations from Plato in English, and often abbreviated English. To this there can, of course, be no objection, but once or twice, in my judgment, he relies for his interpretations on a corrupt text, or a rendering of a sound text which is at the least dubious. Thus the turn given at p. 290 to the words quoted there from *Ep.* VII gives to *τὸ συζῆν*, which obviously has its regular meaning of "a companionate life," the impossible sense of "intercourse with" the study of dialectic, and thus destroys Plato's point that the "dialectical man" is only to be developed by the *personal* intercourse and friction of one mind with another. The exegesis of *Rep.* 488 d-e, given at p. 352-52, is based entirely on accepting Sidwick's conjectural change of the very idiomatic *οἰόμενοι* p. 488 e 2 to *οἰομένω*, a change that, though unfortunately recently adopted by Shorey, gives, as Adam said, a false sense to the whole passage. It may be true (p. 345) that among average men "weakness of head is taken for kindness of heart," but Plato is not asserting this in the passage appealed to (*Rep.* 400e). He is merely saying that at the moment he is using the word *εὐθύθεια* in its etymological sense, and not in that current in everyday speech, in which it is a euphemism for "silliness." To say (p. 372) that "philosophy is *meditation* upon death" involves serious misrendering of the well-known phrase of the *Phaedo*, in which *μελέτη* does not mean "meditation," but the actor's or public speaker's private *rehearsal* of his "lines" (répétition in the French sense). The philosopher prepares himself against the "great change" not by eternally thinking about his dissolution, but by "dying daily," training himself to deny the imperious "lusts of the flesh." *πορεία* does not mean "*running* in a course" (p. 293)—no poet ever used *πορεύεσθαι* in such a sense, but *march*, advance, and though the movement of the mind called *διαλεκτική πορεία* at *Rep.* 532b is, as Plato explains, a movement "up and down," this could never have been discovered from the use of the word *πορεία* to describe it. If Mr. Demos will consider the rendering

he gives at p. 287 of Plato's description of truly scientific astronomy, I think he will discover that it is a travesty of the simple and correct Platonic statement due, in this case, to the unfortunate whimsies of Adam. In the references to Plato's discussion (*Laws*, I) of convivial drinking there seems to be a quaint exaggeration of the meaning of the name he gives to it ($\mu\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta$). "By learning how to keep their heads *while drunk*, they will be trained to withstand the intoxicating effects of pleasure and glory in real life" (p. 357, cf. p. 229). Obviously a man can't both "keep his head" and "be drunk" at once, though he may be "drinking" and yet "keeping his head." Plato clearly means by $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta$ not "being drunk," but "being warmed with wine," "mellowed by the bottle." What his citizens are to learn is precisely how to be festive without letting themselves "get drunk" (they might, no doubt, be sometimes "overtaken" while the lesson was being learned, and this is why their drinking-parties must always be presided over by a senior and sober man, who takes care that "they do not go too far;" but the very thing they are to learn is how to "carry their liquor" without being "drunk"). At p. 117, and elsewhere there is an attempted exegesis of the well-known passage of *Laws*, X (896 ff.), which amounts to accepting the thesis of Plutarch and Atticus of an evil "world-soul." (It is even described on p. 99 as p. 116 in language which Plutarch would certainly have repudiated, as the bad "*god*.".) But as Mr. Demos's own citation shows, Plato says nothing at all about an evil world-soul (still less about an evil "god"). He says merely that since there are "disorderly motions" as well as "orderly" in things, all motions cannot be due to a single "best soul;" there must be more souls involved than one, and one of them at least must be more or less "bad." (Even so, traditional Christianity has ascribed certain visible effects in the world to Satan, an evil being, but no Christian ever supposed that Satan is either an evil *anima mundi* or an evil Deity.) The words taken at p. 80 from *Laws* 966a are a highly dubious rendering (R. G. Bury's) of a difficult text, and appear (I would invite Mr. Demos to re-examine Dr. England's discussion of the passage) to involve an erroneous grammatical "construe." How can there be a "motion" which, "*when developed into becoming*," provides an ever-flowing fount of being"? The "motion" is already a "becoming," and a "fount of being," and does not require to be "developed" into one.

These are, however, only incidental matters, and even on the most favourable supposition for myself—that my objections are one and all sound—they do not seriously affect the value of the author's book as a whole. I am not sure how far the same thing can be said about certain more general features of his method of exegesis. Anyone who sets himself the task of the systematic exposition of Plato's philosophy has notoriously several grave difficulties to confront. He has to decide for himself how far a view expounded in a Platonic dialogue by Socrates or another can be presumed to be wholly acceptable to Plato himself even at the date of writing. Whatever may be our view about the "historicity" of the "Platonic Socrates" (or of the minor outstanding figures of the dialogues), it seems extravagant to ignore the strongly dramatic character of Plato's art, and the possibility that Socrates and other historical personages are made in Plato, from time to time, to say things with which Plato may never have been in full sympathy because these things do faithfully reproduce the sentiments of the *dramatis persona*. (It may, for example, fairly be doubted whether the personal judgment of Plato on Athenian democracy can ever have been as harsh as that ascribed in the *Gorgias* and *Republic* to Socrates, a man of the Periclean age who had presumably shared the high hopes which find expression, for example, in the *Eumenides* and in well-known passages of Herodotus, and had lived to see

them so cruelly disappointed.) Then there is the much graver difficulty of being certain, when we compare the latest with the earlier dialogues, how far it is permissible to extract a single body of doctrine from all of them, and how far utterances of the later works must be understood as correcting or abandoning positions taken up in the earlier. (Are we, for example, at liberty to construct a social philosophy for Plato by trying to "integrate"—a favourite word with Mr. Demos—*Republic*, *Politicus*, and *Laws*, as though all three taught much the same thing?)

Mr. Demos is, I think, a little insensitive to the first and less dangerous of these two sources of possible misinterpretation. I remark that, for instance, he tends at times to set down to Plato remarks made in the *Republic* by Glaucon, or personal avowals put into the mouth of Socrates. (Thus Plato is made to say *of himself*, "I am no poet," merely because Socrates says this of himself in the *Republic*, which may be as dangerous as it could be to infer that Shakespeare was a halting speaker because he made his Antony say—ironically by the way—"I am no orator." We need, in reading the disclaimers of Socrates, never to forget that Socrates was an eminently "ironical" man not to be understood by a dull literalist, and still more that what Socrates says about himself is "not evidence" about Plato. In one place Mr. Demos goes even further and speculates (p. 381) on the possibility that Parmenides had been to Socrates all that Socrates was to Plato, "for he called the latter 'father.' " This is, of course, a mere error, as is immediately acknowledged in a footnote, since it is not Socrates who is made to speak of "my father Parmenides," but an Eleatic visitor, who also mentions that he had in boyhood been a personal disciple of Parmenides. But the odd thing is that discovery of the oversight should not have induced Mr. Demos to qualify the language of his text.)

It is about the second source of possible misinterpretation that I feel more serious misgivings. Mr. Demos's interpretation of Plato's philosophy is based throughout on an elaborate exposition of the *Timaeus* and *Philebus*. But to make the interpretation work out, it is essential to "integrate" those dialogues with the account of the *ιδέα τῶν ἀγαθῶν* in the *Republic*, the account of "divine madness" in the *Phaedrus*, and the speech of Diotima in the *Symposium*. And this raises the awkward question whether the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* can really, without doing violence to their plain sense, be so satisfactorily "integrated" even with each other, to say nothing of the two later dialogues. On the assumption that the thing can be done, you get a certain rendering of the Platonic philosophy which is, no doubt, interesting and suggestive, but one may still harbour awkward doubts (which the Preface would suggest that Mr. Demos himself at times feels) whether this Platonism after all is the Platonism of Plato.

One is intrigued also by the unmistakable persistence throughout the exposition of the technical language of a later philosophy which is rightly held in high esteem at Harvard. The principles of Platonic metaphysics, in fact, turn out to be down to details curiously identical with the principles of Professor Whitehead. All the technicalities of Dr. Whitehead's highly personal vocabulary, "space-time," "ingredience," "concrecence," "concern," the "lure" of the ideal, the "primordial nature" of God, and the rest, are successively discovered to afford the key to the meaning of the Athenian. (Of course one would expect striking analogies and coincidences, since Whitehead's thought has assuredly been so deeply influenced by Plato, but this all but complete identity has at least a considerable initial probability against it.) The result is a book of high interest, but analogous in a way to a certain type of musical composition. When we are invited to listen to "variations of

Brahms on a theme of Handel," we expect that though the theme may be Handel's, the development of it will be definitely characteristic of Brahms; if Handel had composed variations on his own theme, they would have been a different set. What we are listening to is not Handel, but Brahms inspired by Handel. I cannot help feeling that in reading Mr. Demos, I have similarly been hearing a kind of *fantasia* in the manner of Whitehead on Platonic themes. And this is a thing which any man may legitimately propose to give us, but it is not quite the same thing as an exposition of Plato. The more so that the "themes" do not seem to be all wholly Platonic; Mr. Demos's strain is crossed at times by reminiscences of Alexander's "restlessness of space-time," and Bergson's *élan vital* and even where these are absent there is a turn given to the conception of *εἶδη* as a "realm of essences" which seems to me to be Santayana rather than Plato. (The very selection of the word "essence" to translate Plato's *οὐσία* is perhaps not quite happy; the English word comes to us so coloured by associations with the medieval discussions about *essentia* and *existentia* that the bald "being" is probably a more desirable rendering from its very colourlessness.)

The result of all these influences is that Mr. Demos has produced a highly-interesting book, full of matter which I could desire the fairly advanced student who already knows the text of Plato pretty well to ponder, but I am not by any means equally sure that I should desire the beginner in Platonic studies to read the Platonic text for the first time with Mr. Demos as his expositor, and indeed I am not certain whether Mr. Demos himself would wish him to do so, since in his Preface he shows himself so fully aware that his own interpretations are so open to dispute. Of not a few of them I should myself have been tempted to say that they are not only disputable, but mistaken if it were not for the generous disregard for rigid consistency which leads the writer, after developing an interpretation fully on one page, to set down something which seems a fatal objection to it fairly on the next. Mr. Demos indeed resembles Plato as described by himself in the multiplicity and wealth of his "insights," and of him I doubt, as he himself doubts about Plato, whether this variety of "insights" is really brought into a harmony.

For one such "insight" I am profoundly thankful. Mr. Demos is fully alive to the significance of Aristotle's reference to certain principles on which "we" (Platonists) lay even more stress than "we" do upon the *εἶδη*. The account of Platonic metaphysics (Part I, *The Creative Factors*) upon which the whole of the rest of the work is built has little to say of the *εἶδη*; they come in in Parts II and III (Reality, Appearance). I am quite at one with the pronouncement of the author in justification of this arrangement, that in Plato the "forms" are, after all, something secondary, though it may have required some courage to say this so openly in the country of Professor Shorey. My chief personal difficulties with the exposition of the "Creative Factors" arise from doubts about the success of the author's "integration" of the *Philebus* quartet, Unlimited, Limit, The Mixture, The Cause of the Mixture, with the triad taken from the *Timaeus*, Démiurge, Receptacle (*ὑποδοχή*), World. Mr. Demos's reading of Plato requires him to identify the *ὑποδοχή* of the *Timaeus* (which seems to the mere reader of the text to be simply Euclidean space) with the *ἄπειρον* of the *Philebus*. On the strength of this identification the *ὑποδοχή* is then declared to be really not space but space-time—in spite of the fact that in the *Timaeus*, where the *ὑποδοχή* is presupposed as eternally there, God is expressly described as *making* time—and, so far as I can see, the "restlessness" which is ascribed by Plato to the incessantly shifting contents of this "receptacle" is then silently taken to be a character of the "receptacle" itself. It is a further development of this line of thinking that

it is then repeatedly assumed that the "receptacle" is a "creative factor" not merely in sensible things but in *ψυχαι*, and the presence of irrationality and evil in our souls is taken to be explained in the last resort by this presence in them of an element derived from the non-rational "receptacle." I offer no opinion on the intrinsic merits of the speculation, but as an exegesis of Plato it seems to me to depend on what is pretty clearly a misinterpretation of the difficult and perhaps corrupt statement of *Timaeus* 35a about the creation of the soul. Mr. Demos more than once shows that he takes the words to mean that the soul is a compound of the "indivisible" and the "divisible," and therefore actually contains a bodily element in its own composition. To me it appears fairly plain, especially in the light of Mr. Cornford's admirable discussion of the passage in a work to which Mr. Demos makes more than one reference, that what Plato says is something quite different, viz., that the being (*οὐσία*) of the soul is of a kind intermediate between the "being which is indivisible and always self-same" and that which "becomes and is divisible in bodies." If this is the true verbal interpretation, the words will not sufficiently bear the weight of the conclusion that the soul actually contains a bodily "factor," and, in view of the notorious obscurity of the whole passage and the variety of interpretations which we know to have been put upon it ever since Plato's own day, I think Mr. Demos should have at least offered some argument in defence of his own exegesis. As it is, all through the subsequent developments of his work I find the alleged presence of the "receptacle" in the composition of our minds themselves recurring to give me uncertainty and trouble. It is true that, as the *Timaeus* says, there is too much of the "random" in our thinking, and I should have had no difficulty with the statement that the effects of "randomness"—what the *Timaeus* calls the *πλανωμένη αἰτία*—are discernible in human mental processes. But where is the warrant for the implied identification of the *πλανωμένη αἰτία* with the "receptacle" which Plato names as *χώρα*? I am, I hope, open to conviction on the matter, but the presumption is, I feel, that the *Timaeus* is not quite so much like the cosmology of Alexander as it is here made to appear.

I could wish equally that the "integration" of the *Timaeus* and *Philebus* with the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* had been undertaken more cautiously. In more than one passage Mr. Demos seems to me to end by making Plato more of a mystic and individualist than we have warrant to do, and perhaps than he himself really intended to do. His language about the apprehension of the "good" by the philosopher-kings would seem to mean, if it means what it appears to do, that the "good" is apprehended in a state of super-rational *raptus*. But all that the *Republic* entitles us to say about the matter is what Mr. Demos also says, that the knowledge of "the good," when it comes, does not come as the conclusion of a train of deductive reasoning. Obviously it does not, if the "good" is a genuine "first principle," and precisely the same thing might be said about any novel "idea" which is a genuine *ἀρχή* in its *οἰκεῖον γένος*, such as the conception of an electromagnetic "field," or the thought of the universality of gravitational attraction. Newton's extension of gravitation to the solar system at large, for example, was not a deduction; yet it would never have come to him without long and continuous practice of preliminary "discursive" thinking, and when the idea came to him it was not in a state of quasi-mystical *raptus*. And so with the knowledge of "the good" expected of the philosopher-kings. It comes, if not as a deduction from, yet as a consequence of several years of hard thinking given to the "synoptic" study of the several sciences, and I do not think it too much to say that there is not a word in the *Republic* to suggest that the apprehension is "super-rational."

In fact, the evidence for such a view has to be got by reading into the

Republic things taken from the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, and hence there is an inevitable question about the legitimacy of such an "integration." From the *Symposium* it takes the reference to the speech of Diotima to the suddenness with which the vision of the supreme and universal beauty dawns upon the devotee who has hitherto followed the quest of beauty upwards through the ascending series of beautiful bodies, beautiful characters, beautiful "laws and institutions." But apart from the consideration already mentioned, that the freshness and novelty of the crowning "insight" does not of itself prove its "super-rational" character, there is the further disquieting reflection that it may be quite unsafe to treat *Symposium* and *Republic* as being quite so much "of one piece." It may be—of course I do not say that we know it to be so, but it is a possibility to be considered—that in Socrates, whose life presents us with marked examples of the temperament of the visionary, there really was a strain of what is commonly known as mysticism which was foreign to his great successor. In that case it will be dramatically right that the path marked out by Diotima for the spiritual pilgrimage of Socrates should not be identical in all respects with the which Plato regards as typical of the philosopher-king.

The use of the *Phaedrus* is still more open to question. Mr. Demos throws a good deal of light on his reasons for calling the philosopher's vision of the good "super-rational" when he remarks more than once that Plato regards the philosopher as a kind of "madman," and appeals for proof of this to the doctrine of the "good" or "right-hand" *μαρτα* expounded in the great central myth of the *Phaedrus*. But must he not have forgotten that the various forms of the "right-hand" *μαρτα* are carefully listed for us in the *Phaedrus* itself, "prophecy," the "fine frenzy of the poet," the "inspiration" of the founders of "initiations," the exaltation of the "lover"? Philosophy has no place in the list, and the deficiency cannot fairly be made up by quoting from other dialogues (e.g. the *Theaetetus*) passages which only say that *in the judgment of the "practical" men of the world* the philosopher looks to be a fool.

Per contra, there is an excellent opportunity for an "integration" of the *Phaedo* with the later dialogues which seems to me to have been unduly neglected. In the interesting chapter of Part I on *God*, Mr. Demos does full justice to the central importance of the conception of God in Plato, but, as the reader who has proceeded so far would expect, Plato's God turns out to be a little too remarkably like Whitehead's; if they are not the same being, they are, at least, plainly "identical twins." And the result is, I think, to make Platonism a good deal more of an "immanence" philosophy than it really is. Admittedly Plato's God has not to the full what Christian theologians have meant by divine omnipotence (though it must be remembered that omnipotence has never meant to the greatest theologians what it perhaps means to the unthinking, ability to "do any old thing"). Mr. Demos is well aware that there is another side to Plato's Theism, yet I can't but think that in respect of the divine omnipotence his anxiety to make Plato speak with Whitehead has led him to lower the key unduly. Since there is no doubt that Plato expressly says that evils can never vanish from the course of history, or that he habitually assumes eternal "cyclical recurrence" as the scheme of the historical world, Mr. Demos tells us that God's fate is to be eternally defeated in his providential control of things by the inherent intractability of the "receptacle." Now, to say nothing of the apparent clash between such a theory and the rhetoric with which *Laws*, X dwells on the impossibility of escape from the righteous order established by "our King," has not Mr. Demos forgotten that in the *Phaedo* at any rate, "eternal recurrence" is not the last word? The "cycle of birth and death" may go on without end, and there may

be no complete deliverance from evil for the souls who are immersed in it. But the final destiny of the "saints" there is to escape from the "wheel of birth" and "live for ever *without bodies*." This is never said again, as far as I remember, in any other dialogue, but neither is it ever denied. It is at least possible that Plato's real thought is represented not by the later Neoplatonists like Proclus, but by Plotinus in his doctrine of the possibility of a final "ascent" of the soul to the "intelligible," to be followed by no descent. If this should be Plato's thought, and especially if he cherished the hope of such a final "salvation" for all souls, or all but a few "incurables," the endlessness of the "cycles" will entail no defeat of the purpose of "our King." It may not be attained, to speak with Plotinus, "here," but it is fulfilled "yonder."

I am conscious that I have only touched in these pages on a very few of the topics which are raised by Mr. Demos's book. I trust it will be understood that it is the very variety of his "insights" into fundamental Platonic themes which has necessarily compelled me to this unsatisfactory procedure. If I should hesitate to recommend his book as an introduction to Plato for the undergraduate, I should desire all who have to teach Plato to undergraduates to read it and meditate it with care.

A. E. TAYLOR.

George Santayana. By G. W. HOWGATE. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. viii + 363. Price 16s.)

Here Santayana is paid the compliment while still alive of being made the subject of a full-length study. The book is brilliantly written, tempting the reader to linger at almost every other paragraph to savour its fine thought and phrasing; but though it takes much reading, it may be reviewed here briefly, since it is not intended for students of philosophy. It treats Santayana as a man of letters, and his many volumes provide almost an excess of beauty for such a study. Like all true men of letters he is a master of ideas as well as of style, but although his ideas are philosophical he produced no philosophy in the technical sense because he followed the logic not of the ideas themselves but of the moods they sprang from or evoked. The author admits that the lack of system, indeed, of any interest in system, is what accounts for the relative neglect in technically philosophical circles of so indubitably talented a man. Santayana's works are a luxuriant medley of penetrating insights marvellously expressed. To attempt a technical exposition and evaluation of such a writer would be to murder him. Mr. Howgate has accordingly adopted the standpoint of a broad literary humanism in both appreciation and criticism.

It would have been convenient if the main facts of Santayana's life had been given less fugitively, for the biographical (as distinct from the psychological) interest could have been satisfied in a few bald pages. He was born in Madrid in 1863 of Spanish parents who emigrated to the States when he was nine years of age, old enough to have been deeply moulded, unconsciously, by the most intimate influences of his native land, yet young enough to assimilate, within those predetermined limits, the culture of his new country. The result, as Mr. Howgate shows, was that he became neither a Spaniard nor an American. At nineteen he went to Harvard, when Palmer, Royce, and James were teaching with immense power, spent two post-graduate years in Germany, and in 1889 joined the staff of the Department of Philosophy in his own university. Mr. Howgate records that his courses "tended gradually away from

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the centre of philosophy to the outskirts where philosophy borders on life and letters." For him teaching, however, was little more than a way of making a living, and when at long last—in 1912—he became financially independent, he resigned, left America, and has since lived in retirement in Europe, in Oxford almost throughout the war and since then in Italy, where, we gather, he is likely to remain.

He made his literary début as a poet, and turned to aesthetics and literary criticism before producing his chief work, *The Life of Reason* (1905-6), five volumes in which a philosophical wilderness blossoms as the rose. Of his numerous subsequent writings which, whatever the subject, are usually really in the form of essays (a novel excepted), only those in which he intervened in the post-war dispute between idealists and realists have brought him any recognition in British philosophical circles—his chapter in *Essays in Critical Realism* (1920), and the two books *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923), and *The Realm of Essence* (1928). Mr. Howgate treats him in successive chapters as poet, moral philosopher, critic and essayist, and metaphysician, and finally summarizes and examines his attitude to America, always with a personal knowledge of the man as well as a close and competent knowledge of his writings. There are some purely literary appendices, and a list of writings on Santayana; for a list of his own writings we are referred to his *Obiter Scripta* (1936).

Although the book neither was nor need have been written for philosophers, any strictly philosophical study of Santayana would be rash without a careful study of it. It is the fullest document we have, and is exquisitely sympathetic without any loss of critical independence. Santayana is most obviously a thinker who has to be understood in the light of his temperament and character, which means that the literary approach is the right one, being the most concrete. Otherwise his curious combination of Platonism and Naturalism, his vindication of the spiritual life against a background of materialistic metaphysics, would be unintelligible. His very face, as I remember it, invites that approach—a smooth imperturbable forehead, and dark eyes that occasionally shared a faint half-smile with his lips, but for the rest a countenance that hid its owner. He is a detached, often ironical, spectator of life, commenting on it with artistic vision and artistic genius of expression. It is this unabashed aloofness that makes his undeniable insights and irresistible beauties remote, fragile, and just a little "sweet." He has passions, but so perfectly controlled that he can deny them any but literary expression. When beneath the sillinesses of human life he detects a tragedy, he can feel it, but only from afar, as we feel the burden of Orestes or Electra or King Lear. This is his Achilles' heel. If the gods had endowed him with active sympathy, making him an eager teacher instead of a soliloquist, and sending him to share joy and succour sorrow instead of merely limning it to perfection, he would almost certainly have been received into the pantheon of great men. T. E. JESSOP.

The Journals of Kierkegaard, 1834-54. Translated and edited by ALEXANDER DRU. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. lxii + 603. Price 25s. net.)

Fear and Trembling. By SØREN KIERKEGAARD. Translated by Robert Payne. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xvi + 192. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

"Anyone who wishes to deal with Søren Kierkegaard's life must take care not to burn his fingers" says a contemporary in his recollections, and the

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reviewer of Kierkegaard's *Journals* is only too conscious of this danger. I have read them with alternating emotions of admiration and exasperation, and certainly do not feel competent to give any confident estimate of his thinking. If I try to do so, I at once find myself imagining some devastating witticism with which Kierkegaard would demolish such an "estimate"—particularly coming from a paid philosopher. For Kierkegaard, like Socrates, had a shrewd suspicion that those who teach philosophy or religion "for hire" do so at their peril, and much of his most biting satire is directed against what might be described as the philosophical and religious "civil service" (e.g. p. 70). "It seems as though the philosophers in their account of modern philosophy since Descartes have modelled themselves on the form sometimes found in fairy stories in which by always repeating everything that has gone before and adding a new bit, one finally has an interminable series of things: stick beat dog, dog bite cat, cat scratch man . . ." and (p. 39), "At every step philosophy sloughs a skin into which creep its worthless hangers-on". His quarrel was, however, not with philosophy so much as with the pretentiousness of philosophy as represented in the contemporary Hegelianism of the academies of Germany and Denmark, taught, apparently, authoritatively as a final form of thought. Here is an imaginary conversation between Socrates and Hegel (p. 148):

Socrates: "Shall we begin by being in complete disagreement, or in agreement upon something which we will call an assumption?"

Hegel: — — — —

Socrates: "With what assumptions do you begin?"

Hegel: "From none at all."

Socrates: "That is quite possible: perhaps you do not begin at all."

Hegel: "I not begin! I who have written twenty-one volumes?" (and so on).

Kierkegaard was not a philosopher or theologian; he was a poet and a satirist who took Christianity *au pied de la lettre*. Someone has said that he made a *reductio ad absurdum* of Christianity; I suspect that Kierkegaard would have agreed, but gone on to say that he accepted the absurdity. Consequently he hovers between profundity and morbidity. The morbid element is perhaps due to his strange upbringing—he was, he tells us, an old man as a child, and obsessed with a sense of a curse hanging over his family. His profundity came from his concentrating his whole nature—his natural melancholy, his wit, his eccentricity, his imagination, his dangerous knowledge that he was a trout among minnows ("the fate of being a genius in a provincial town")—into his religious consciousness of submission to God. Yet in the end a jotting in the *Journals* is surely a piece of autobiography: "A new book which needs to be written: A Poet's Confession. The cause of his suffering is that he wants to be religious and always goes the wrong way about it and remains a poet; consequently he is unhappily in love with God." Again—a most revealing remark—"How many men have any idea how exhausting life is with a real relation to God"! He suffered from isolation from others with whom his mind could really communicate (what a small place friends take in the *Journals*!), from an abnormal family background, and from the drastic step of his broken engagement. Such a man can see a few things with a penetration not given to ordinary people who are naturally more extraverted—but heaven save us from taking his exceptional insights, won perhaps at the very cost of one-sidedness, and making them into an exclusive philosophy or theology (after the manner of some of Kierkegaard's continental followers). At least we can be sure that Kierkegaard himself would have repudiated such an attempt.

Mr. Dru has certainly done a real service in making the *Journals* available to English readers. The edition is made the more valuable by an introduction and admirable index, which in effect does service as a table of contents, and

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is most necessary in using a large book consisting of disjointed jottings. (One minor point. Should not the date of Kierkegaard's examination be 1840, and not 1841, as in the footnote on p. 81?)

The little volume *Fear and Trembling* is a good sample of Kierkegaard's writings. It is a meditation on the meaning of faith and its distinction from resignation, illustrated from the story of Abraham and Isaac. (Kierkegaard's idea is that it was not Abraham's being prepared to sacrifice Isaac which constituted faith—that could have been merely an act of heroic renunciation—but his faith lay in accepting the inspiration at the crucial moment which gave him the courage *not* to sacrifice Isaac.)

Whether the publishers are over-bold in their claim that the *Journals* of Kierkegaard will command an interest as wide and as lasting as the *Confessions* of St. Augustine, the *Pensées* of Pascal, and the *Apologia* of Newman, I hesitate to say. They certainly deserve a unique place among religious autobiographies; but do they reveal that maturity of growth as well as insight into sin and suffering which lifts the individual struggles of an Augustine, a Pascal, and a Newman into a universality which is the rare privilege of a few? Or have we rather, after all, "the book which ought to be written"—the confessions of a poet "unhappily in love with God"?

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

La filosofia moderna. II. L'età dell'illuminismo. By GUIDO DE RUGGIERO. (Bari: Laterza & Figli. 1939. 2 vols. Pp. 277, 320. Price, Lire 45.)

These are the ninth and tenth volumes of Professor de Ruggiero's *History of Philosophy*, which is likely to be the largest work of its kind outside Germany. Among its remarkable features are the lightness with which its erudition is conveyed and the felicity with which the minor names and movements are illuminatingly brought in. Its aim is well expressed in the preface to the two new volumes: "I have tried to harmonize the close monographic study of the great philosophical personalities with a panoramic view of the great collective movements of ideas." The aim is being pursued with undiminished freshness, suggestiveness and lucidity.

Professor de Ruggiero boldly extends the Age of Enlightenment by beginning with Hobbes. Since he defines the Age as that in which the levelling, decomposing and recomposing methods of the natural sciences were applied in the study of mental and social life, there is certainly a strong case for putting Hobbes at the head of it, despite his undoubted Cartesian affiliations. The drawback is that the Cambridge Platonists, falling chronologically within the period, are apparently brought also within the Age; but all periodization by characteristics meets with such exceptions. On the British side the story is carried down continuously to Reid, on the Continental side it is confined to the French Enlightenment except for a long preceding section on Leibniz (a reprint of the author's introduction to his Italian translation of the *Monadology*, 1937). This separation of Leibniz from the history of the German *Aufklärung* is defended on the ground that he was a European rather than a purely German figure. This is surely right; and one may add the further justification that to interpolate Leibniz between Locke and the French thinkers of the eighteenth century is a valuable correction of the usual view that these last owed everything to Locke. The account of the *Aufklärung*, and of the corresponding movement in Italy (beginning with Vico), is to occupy the eleventh volume.

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Since it is impossible to accompany the author step by step through this rich century and a quarter, I need only draw attention to some of the features of his treatment of the British line. When Hobbes is made the father of the Enlightenment, Locke suffers somewhat in status, even though he is given more space than the rest. He is handled with just criticism, chiefly in two respects—firstly, his failure to divine the deeper meaning of the doctrine of innate ideas; secondly, his taking “reflection” almost entirely as a sphere of ideas or products without any grasp of its possible significance as an activity. His analytic work is given less appreciation than is, I think, his due; we now find it tedious and confused, but it was a great pioneer effort, as original in execution as Hobbes’s brilliantly pawky epigrams. Professor de Ruggiero’s interest is much more in Locke the rationalist than in “the easy and popular writer, simplifying and clarifying philosophical problems for the world at large, whom tradition has portrayed for us” (p. 110); for him there was a “real” Locke much better than the historically influential one. Berkeley, for a change, is given as much space as Hume, but neither of them is found very exciting; presumably they put the epistemological problem ineptly (a true judgment, probably, but not an historically-minded one). Hume’s ethical views, which he himself valued most, are regarded as of scant importance. It is very salutary to us to see our famous trio (they are too diverse to be called a triumvirate) re-expounded and re-valued by a mind detached from both our national pride and our innate respect for empiricism. Our usual picture of the philosophy of the eighteenth century puts these three so much in the foreground as to block our view of the rest: Professor de Ruggiero, avoiding our epistemological bias, gives ample room to the physicists, the deists, and the moralists. Shaftesbury, as is usual abroad, is treated relatively fully, but every line of the exposition is worth while. The confused and confusing literature of the deists, which we nowadays tend to overlook, is well surveyed, though it is probably an error to make the younger Dodwell an *opponent* of deism (his work can be read as a piece of dissimulation characteristic of the deists), and to point to Methodism, which was a popular movement, as a reaction against deistic intellectualism.

T. E. JESSOP.

Eastern Religions and Western Thought. By Sir S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xiii + 394. Price 15s.)

This is an important and beautiful book. It is written with earnest conviction and conspicuous ability. The author thinks that the cleavage between European and Eastern thought was not deep until the beginning of the modern period, and that the present organization of the world, under European influence, is inconsistent with the *Zeitgeist* shining on the distant horizon and with the true spirit of religion. The supreme task of our generation is to give a soul to the growing world-consciousness, which should knit together all human society in an international commonwealth. India has much to contribute to the realization of this ideal, and England should be the interpreter of Asia to Europe. “If Great Britain, which represents the best of Europe, and India, which is the ultimate East, with their distinctive temperaments and traditions, can live together in a political system whose keynote is equality and friendship, and not dominion or subjection, it will be the greatest achievement of history.”

Humanism is now the religion of the educated European. Most of us are

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religious only by habit, sentiment, or inertia. Men have lost the old faith and have found nothing in its place except superstition, in which the starved powers of the soul reassert their claims. The national State tends to absorb all energies and emotions, the national State, which is essentially a huge beast of prey. Nations have become fetishes; but we all feel that we are hastening confusedly to unknown ends. We need a rational faith to sustain a new order of life.

The great periods of history are marked by fusions of two different cultures. The time has come for a fusion of European and Indian thought. We must return to a conception of religion as individual experience. Rites and ceremonies, authority and dogma, are subordinate to the art of self-discovery which is also contact with God. "To say that God exists means that spiritual experience is attainable." This is the fulfilment of man's life, where every aspect of his being is raised to its highest point, "where the whole mind realizes in one quivering instant such things as cannot easily be expressed." This is the "leaping spark" of Plato's Seventh Epistle, and the sudden illumination of Augustine's *Confessions*. "To be spiritual is not to reject reason but to go beyond it. It is to think so hard that thinking becomes knowing or viewing." So philosophy and religion converge into a single realization.

Philosophically, the foundation of Professor Radhakrishnan's teaching is the separation of the empirical person from the real self. "There is an interior depth to the human soul, which is uncreated, deathless, and absolutely real." The spirit of man is different from the individual ego; it is the core of all being. As in Neoplatonism, with which this philosophy has much in common, the soul is the wanderer of the metaphysical world, belonging essentially to a higher order, but fascinated by the finite. The meaning of life is found not in this world, but in superhistorical reality. God, and not the world of history, is the true environment of our souls.

This position is also that of Keyserling's *Unsterblichkeit*, a youthful work which I think he has never surpassed. The self, not the self-conscious ego, is immortal. Post-Kantian philosophy and theology have greatly exaggerated the importance of the individual ego, and have even maintained that the centrality of the self-conscious person is the discovery of Christianity, though the profoundly significant saying of Christ that "he who wishes to preserve his psyche shall lose it" is a sufficient refutation.

The soul that has found itself is no longer conscious of itself in its isolation. "I live, yet not I but Christ liveth in me." This "individualism" is rather world-loyalty, for it leaves no room for the disintegrating worship of one's own creed and group, with the corollary that violence and injustice are the ways to win success for it. The coming struggle is between empires of material values, supported by organized religions and provincial patriotisms, and the sovereignty of spiritual ideals. A living faith in spiritual values is the great need of our age. We must choose, not between Christianity and Hinduism, but between religion and self-satisfied humanism.

Eternal life is the life of the eternal part of us, of the light within us, of intelligence and love. The soul in solitude is the birthplace of religion. "Moses on Sinai, Buddha under the *bodhi* tree, Jesus by the Jordan in the stillness of prayer, Paul in the desert of Arabia, Francis of Assisi in the remote crags of the highlands of Alverno, found the strength and the assurance of the reality of God." Everything that is great in religion rises out of the depths of the soul in the quiet of prayer.

In common with all other philosophic mystics, our author teaches that the purification and ascent of the soul proceed *pari passu* with the knowledge

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of God and of the real world. Progress is by "a species of intuitive identification in which the individual becomes in very truth the partaker of the divine nature." The intellect is consecrated like the other faculties, but the intellect is *nous*, not *dianoia*. Christian theology prefers the word *pneuma* to *nous*, but the meaning is the same.

The Churches, in the Professor's opinion, have wandered far from the religion which the Founder came to preach. But he is half persuaded by Loisy and others that Jesus at first contemplated a political revolution, and was divided between that project and the spiritual religion which belonged to his deeper self. I cannot believe that there was anything of the Mahdi in "the prophet of Nazareth in Galilee"; but the matter cannot be discussed here. He wishes of course to recall the Churches to pure mysticism, and wastes several pages in denouncing the obscurantist theology of Karl Barth, who does not count for much in this country.

He protests most justifiably against the tendency of Western thinkers to regard the defects of European religion as peripheral, those of Hinduism as central. He thinks that the most spiritual elements of Western religion owe much to the direct influence of Indian thought, and supports this view with great learning. Like Bréhier, he finds strong Oriental influences in the system of Plotinus, and wishes to banish not only him but Plato from the tradition of Hellenism. Plato, we have been told, was, from the Greek point of view, a heretic. But Plato is too big a man to cast out of the fold. Greece without Plato would be living Greece no more.

Can we acquit Indian philosophy of being world-renouncing to an unacceptable degree? We may entirely agree with our author in dismissing with contempt the military power and technological discoveries of the West as irrelevant to this question. But does the benevolence of the Hindu sage reflect itself in the behaviour of the nation generally? In a country so religious as India the question is not unfair. A foreigner has said that if he were in a tight place he would like to have an Englishman near at hand. Has the Indian any disposition to run and help? Did he not tolerate complacently such customs as widow-burning, child-marriage, and religious prostitution, which are justly repugnant to Europeans?

It has always seemed to me that the tendency of Indian thought is to deny all value to the passing show, and that in consequence the Indian heaven, of which the world is a moving image, is empty of contents. Between the unreal phantasmagoria of sense and the dreamless sleep of Nirvana the rich spiritual life of the Platonic "intelligible world" is in danger of disappearing. Do the Hindu sages realize that a journey through the unreal is an unreal journey?

The Professor would doubtless answer that the best Indians are not unpractical dreamers, and that the same danger, of treating all earthly things as indifferent, has been exemplified in the lives of many Christian saints. It is so; but the Christian maxim, "thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself," has always been interpreted, whether logically or not, in a peculiar way. Christian love is different from the benevolence of the religions of escape—Stoicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Benevolence does not hurt; love often does. Buddha promises to make us invulnerable; so do Zeno and Seneca; Christ never does. The Christian can bear his own troubles stoically; but he will not leave the wounded man by the roadside; he will rejoice with those that rejoice, and weep with those that weep. This attitude towards the misfortunes of life, which contemplatives would persuade us are of no importance, is an integral part of the original Gospel. It forms a very valuable attachment, holding back some who would otherwise seek salvation in a cloistered

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sanctity. Those who have experienced nothing are made no wiser or better by solitude. There are some who think they are attracted by God when they are only repelled by man.

A Christian may think that India has rather more to learn from his religion than our author quite realizes. But he makes his main point, that we in Europe have much to learn, and more to unlearn, from India. We have neglected our opportunities during our long association with a civilization much older and more mature than our own. It is not too late to remedy our fault.

W. R. INGE.

Reason and Intuition. By J. L. Stocks. Edited with an Introduction by Dorothy M. Emmet. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1939. Pp. xxii + 259. Price 12s. 6d.)

In this book Miss Emmet has collected fifteen papers published by the late Professor J. L. Stocks during the last six years of his life and one unfinished piece of work. In the Introduction she gives a brief account of Stocks's position as a philosopher. There is also a note by Sir David Ross on his contribution to studies in Greek philosophy. It was characteristic of Stocks that he took pleasure in the minutiae of Greek scholarship, though as a philosopher he was critical and constructive rather than interpretative or "scholarly" in the narrow sense. If he was an "Aristotelian" in virtue of his linguistic studies, so also was he in the more important sense that one of the guiding threads in all his thinking was a reinterpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of formal cause. As Miss Emmet says, "he saw the world after the Aristotelian fashion as constituted by different levels of organization, each level providing the materials: which are both the opportunity for the exercise of formative activity at a higher level, and the odds against which that activity must strive."

It is possible that if Stocks had lived he would have produced a comprehensive and systematic philosophy, but it is more likely that he would have continued much as he began, with a preference for special studies of special subjects. This kind of work certainly gave scope to what was perhaps Stocks's most outstanding merit, his capacity for simple, direct and lucid statement; the kind of statement that steers clear of irrelevancies and clears up confusion. His method of approach was empirical and phenomenological. Philosophy for him was a secondary activity, a commentary on the primary activities of man. In his view, however, philosophy must take account of all primary activities, scientific, historical, political, artistic, and religious. This commentary should be not merely descriptive but critical, and might, within limits, be constructive.

The first few essays in this book provide a good illustration of his general attitude and method. The first essay, *Reason and Intuition*, is an attack on the irrationalism which is fashionable at the present day. It then goes on to state what should be meant by intuition, as that aspect of knowledge which is immediate and is of the individual, and to consider how intuition is related to the process of reasoning. In the third essay, *Religious Belief*, Stocks introduces one of his apt and illuminating distinctions, that between *Total* and *Partial* assertions. *Partial* assertions are such statements as can "be established separately and by themselves, and can be relied on to hold good whatever else is discovered," as when we state a man's height, occupation, or family relationships, all of which can be ascertained independently of one another. But if we say he is a good man, that is a *Total* assertion, "Anything

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and everything in the man's life is potentially at least relevant: further knowledge may at any time force a reconsideration and qualification of the judgment." Science consists entirely of Partial assertions, as does History, so far as it refrains from ethical or aesthetic judgments. Religion differs entirely from such studies in that it depends upon Total assertions to the effect that the whole world order is the expression of infinite Wisdom and Love. This conclusion as to religious belief is further elucidated with the help of the distinction between Desire and Affection, which Stocks worked out in an essay in his book, *The Limits of Purpose*.

Most of the other essays are concerned with ethical and political subjects. It must suffice here to mention a few of them, selected rather arbitrarily. Those on Locke's political theory and on Jeremy Bentham are interesting appreciations of two very different but characteristically English political thinkers. The essay on "The Empiricism of J. S. Mill" indicates the interest and sympathy with which Stocks regarded this thinker and makes one hope that his unfinished work on Mill may be completed and published. He criticizes Mill, not for being an empiricist, but for taking a one-sided view of experience. The discussion of "The Philosophy of Democracy" is an attempt to answer a question seldom asked, but of practical importance now when there are many who despair of democracy altogether. The necessary condition for democracy is seen as fruitful interaction between rulers and ruled. Its natural temper is empirical or opportunist. "It will with difficulty look very far ahead, or undertake very drastic and ambitious schemes of reconstruction." Not very warm praise, but warm enough if the alternative is passive submission to an infallible "leader."

A. D. RITCHIE.

Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture. By WERNER JAEGER. Translated by GILBERT HIGHET. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1939. Pp. xxix + 420. Price 15s. net.)

This is the most important book of the century—indeed, of any century—on its subject. Published in German in 1933, it is now accessible in an English translation which reads like an original. It is an account of the greatest work of Ancient Greece—the creation of a human ideal, which in itself is unsurpassed and without which "the culture of the western world would never have existed." Other scholars have written histories of Greece or of Greek literature. This is a history of Greek culture (or rather *kultur*—a different thing); and Greek *kultur* is man's discovery of himself. "Other nations made gods, kings, spirits; the Greeks alone made man." Professor Jaeger's thesis may be summed up in three sentences: "Without Greek cultural ideals . . . the culture of the western world would never have existed" (p. xvii); "the culture of the present . . . needs illumination and transformation by that ideal [the Greek form of culture], in order to establish its true meaning and direction" (p. xviii); "by discovering man the Greeks . . . realized the universal laws of human nature" (p. xxiii). Greek culture is a permanent standard to which European culture (and not only European) must continually recur for self-examination and inspiration.

One might say that the Greek achievement starts with the word *ἀρετή*, a peculiar Greek conception and perhaps the most fruitful of all moral ideas; the idea that everything is capable of an "excellence," a perfection at which it should aim. The supreme task of man therefore is to discover what human "excellence" is and to achieve it; and the greatness of the Greeks is that they did both. *Paideia* traces the steps of the discovery, and the growing purifica-

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tion and enrichment of the human ideal. To Homer it is heroic courage and prowess, to Tyrtaeus the devotion of these powers to the State (but surely this is implicit in Hector's *εἰς δῶνός ἀριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης?*). The City State finds human *ἀρετή* in "Justice," Ionian thinkers place it in the "Wisdom" which creates justice and law, order and welfare. One by one the stars of the human firmament rise above the horizon—the Individualism and Science of Ionia, the Orphic conception of the soul, the aristocratic ideal of Pindar, the vision of civic justice in Solon, the wealth of political, intellectual, literary, and individual life in fifth-century Athens, and a human ideal is revealed to which Christianity had something vital to add, but which Christianity itself cannot afford to ignore. All this rich picture is revealed with admirable insight, knowledge, and philosophical depth in Professor Jaeger's book. The details are as good as the whole. The book is rich in acute judgments and brilliant characterization. (I know, for instance, nothing better on their subjects than the pages on Sappho and on the *Bacchae*.) There are, indeed, omissions. Herodotus is almost ignored. And justice is hardly done to the theological aspects of Greek *Paideia*. By the side of Protagoras's *πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος* stands Plato's *θεὸς μέτρον*, and though the former represents Greece better than the latter, religion is a vital element in Aeschylus and not negligible in Pindar and Sophocles.

The book must have been as difficult to plan as to execute. Who were to be included—all great Greek writers? Or only those important to a history of Greek *kultur*? Sappho is a greater genius than Tyrtaeus or Hesiod or Solon, but she has little relevance to *παιδεία*. Is she to be admitted? Her admission perhaps marks a certain change in the design of the book; for while its earlier parts are definitely a history of the formation of a human ideal, it develops later into a series of studies of the personalities and ideas of the great Greek writers, though some of them contributed little to that ideal or even were destructive of it. We have a picture of successive Greek poets and thinkers rather than of the ideals of Greek *kultur*.

One result of this change of emphasis is that the second half of *Paideia* is free from a weakness which can be observed in the earlier chapters—the temptation to find conscious educational purpose where it is absent, to schematize the free mind of poetry. If Archilochus had been told that there was "a hortatory element in his poetry and that it was born of the need of the free individual to see and solve the problem of human life outside the mythical content of epic poetry," he might have been provoked to an iambus on Professor Jaeger. And perhaps Homer would have been surprised at the judgment that "the *Iliad* has an ethical design." Doubtless it has a deep ethical effect, but this is not from design. Homer is telling a story, not educating; his interest is in the heroism and tragedy of that story rather than in its morals. But because great literature is *μεγαλοφροῦνης ἀπηχῆμα* and because all greatness is educational, he is a great ethical teacher without knowing or intending it. Between Tyrtaeus who does preach and Homer who does not, there is all the difference in mood—and in greatness. Hence the chapters on Homer, where Professor Jaeger has his eyes open for "ethical design," are the least satisfactory part of the book, while the chapters on the Sophists and on Thucydides (the latter a study of historical and political outlook rather than of *Paideia*) are among the best.

This criticism does not affect the importance of *Paideia*. It is a book for scholars, but also for students—not least because they are apt to read only the main Greek authors and therefore to see Hellenism as a series of high peaks and not as a connected landscape. *Paideia* will fill the gaps in their background. And it is a book for a wider public. There is no better way—if

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there is any way—of orientating ourselves in this chaotic world than by studying ancient Greece. There we can discern, as Professor Jaeger says, the true meaning and direction of our own culture, that “vast disorganized external apparatus for living.” Apart from his learned work, Professor Jaeger’s importance lies in what he has done to remind the world that ancient Greece should be regarded not only as a field for scholarship but as a living force in the spiritual and political life of the world. It is welcome news that this volume which ends with Thucydides will be followed by others dealing with “the transformation of Greek civilization into a world-wide empire” and with its relations to Rome and to early Christianity.

R. W. LIVINGSTONE.

Communication. A Philosophical Study of Language. By KARL BRITTON. (London: International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method. Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co. 1939. Pp. xvi + 285. Price 12s. 6d.)

It is notorious that in recent years many philosophers have been preoccupied with questions about the functions of the symbols of ordinary language and of artificial codes. Indeed, the whole task of philosophy, according to some philosophers, lies in some form of linguistic inquiry. What are the sources and the motives of this tendency?

Until the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* no general distinction had been made between the procedure of philosophy and the procedures of the pure or of the inductive sciences. Indeed, in England the very word ‘scientist’ was only invented a century ago, when the standard word ‘philosopher’ was just beginning to appear equivocal. So the problems of the nature of the subject-matter and of the methods of philosophical inquiry as distinct from scientific inquiry have only been attended to during the moderately recent past.

At first the delimitation of the sphere of philosophy seemed simple. The sciences have for their subject-matter the physical world, philosophy has for its subject-matter the mental world. The philosopher has to discover about Mind what Newton and Boyle had been discovering about Matter.

This simple solution, which at the start did much more good than harm, was torpedoed at about the turn of the century from two different sides. Empirical psychology showed signs of becoming a science; and logicians, attending at last to the principles of mathematics, saw that the rigour, precision, and timelessness of mathematical theorems and of logical rules were not derivative from anthropological inductions. Mind ceased to be the perquisite of philosophers, and the subject-matter of a part of philosophy, namely logic, turned out not to have anything psychological about it. So, for a short while, a new solution was adopted. Philosophy was re-Platonized, and its subject-matter was described as being some *Drittes Reich* of subsistent entities, real universals, objective propositions, possibilities, facts or objects of a higher order.

But this multiplication both of numbers of entities and of grades of Being led to troubles. It seemed unpalatable to assert the existence of propositions, facts, and possibilities, underhand to assert the non-actual existence of unicorns and golden mountains, and self-contradictory to assert the subsistence of round squares and of non-subsistent round squares. Certain anti-septic precautions had to be taken.

(a) Among the first was a reconsideration of the notion of denotation. The

expressions which can function as the nominatives of significant indicative sentences do not all denote in the same way, and in some senses of 'denote' certain of them do not denote at all. There are some expressions, which any grammarian would call 'names,' corresponding to which there exist no things or persons for them to be the names of. There are other expressions, built just like designations or descriptions, to which again the world supplies nothing to correspond. And yet the sentences containing these expressions (like 'Mr. Pickwick,' 'the Equator,' 'the present King of France,' etc.) may be significant and even true. 'Logically proper names' had to be distinguished from ordinary proper names, which in turn had to be conflated with descriptions; and different uses of descriptive expressions had to be distinguished. Philosophers learned to ask, not 'What sort of a thing is the Equator?' but 'What sort of an expression is "the Equator"?'

(b) Next, the expansion of formal logic, which was required to render it capable of dealing with non-syllogistic and especially with arithmetical inferences, led Frege and Russell not only to invent new code-symbols for the formulae of logic, but also to consider what were the essential properties of a good symbolism. Among these is the cardinal one of non-ambiguity. Formal differences must be registered by visibly different symbols or symbol-patterns. And this at once made manifest by contrast that ordinary language is tolerant of any amount of ambiguity, not merely in containing equivocal words which engender puns, but what matters more, in allowing similar sentence-constructions to express propositions of different logical form and in allowing dissimilar sentence-constructions to express propositions of the same logical form. There is no inference from the form of words in which we say something to the logical properties of what we are saying. Consequently, though I may know or have excellent scientific or common-sense reasons for believing that something is the case, there still remains open the quite different question of what sort the fact or proposition is. This question is not one for science or common sense, and it may be one for which it is important to find the solution. In its general form the question would ask: What is the logically unambiguous way of formulating what this given sentence formulates in a logically ambiguous way?

(c) A third impulse in the same direction came from the following source. It is, of course, closely linked to the other two. In the construction of a good code-symbolism for formal logic, both for the sake of stenography and to prevent the distraction of attention by differences that make no difference, it is important to have code-signs for any proposition-elements of the same type. Thus the letter x in ' x is mortal' saves us from having to mention Socrates or the Duke of Wellington, and the letters ' p ,' ' q ,' and ' r ' in 'if p implies q and q implies r , then p implies r ' save us from having to insert entire sentences before and after the verb 'implies.' Now for a code-formula to symbolize the common form of a range of formally similar, materially dissimilar propositions, the element-signs must be of the right type to go with each other in that formula. Otherwise the formula is nonsense, i.e. the sentences resulting by implementing the variables with the corresponding ordinary expressions are absurd. 'Socrates implies Plato' and 'To-day's being Tuesday is mortal' are meaningless, though not ungrammatical. Now in most cases we can avoid nonsense by ordinary good sense. But there are cases where we are led unwittingly into nonsense. The puzzles of 'the Liar' and 'the Class of Classes which are not members of themselves' are familiar cases of this. A theory of types, then, seems thus to be required as a part of logic, and its function is to establish rules demarcating significant from nonsensical forms of words. So already, on these three counts, it became clear that

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anyhow the branch of philosophy that we call 'logic' has a lot to do with the rules governing the rôles in signification of language-elements.

Meanwhile Moore was applying the same or a similar prescription to other philosophical problems. For the questions which he canvasses are not such questions as 'Is it true that there is a table before me?' which is a question decidable by common-sense or scientific methods, but such questions as 'What does it mean to say that there is a table before me?' or 'What is the correct analysis of the sentence "I see a table"?' He does not, I think, generalize his procedure as a maxim for all philosophical inquiry, but his influence has been in this direction. In particular, inquiries into the logic of affirmative existence-propositions, establishing as they did that they are synthetic and not provable by *reductio ad absurdum* arguments, inoculated him and others against the superstition that philosophy discovers and describes any special existences. Philosophy is not a special science, and not being, like the sciences, informative, it can only be in some fashion elucidatory of information acquired elsewhere than from philosophizing. Wittgenstein was, I take it, the first overtly to declare that all philosophical inquiries are semantic, concerned, that is, with elucidating the rules governing the significance and the possibilities of co-significance of language-elements. Philosophical puzzles arise because we do not understand the syntax of our language. (But 'syntax' here does not mean what we ordinarily mean by it, namely what makes English constructions like or unlike Latin ones.) He indicates, sagaciously, that just as previous philosophers had mistakenly supposed themselves to be dealing with the facts of empirical psychology, so people will be tempted to construe philosophy, on his account of it, as dealing with the facts of philology—which, of course, is just what has happened.

Mr. Britton, though he entitles his book *Communication; a Philosophical Study of Language*, does not unfortunately enter into any of the considerations which have made philosophers think that linguistic questions are important for or else the whole subject-matter of philosophy. He launches out straight away into more or less specialist issues, so his book is of the nature of a Higher Criticism for the converted only. Those who wish to know why philosophy is more closely concerned with language than with football, or even what the cardinal philosophical problems about language are, are not catered for.

He begins by accepting from Ogden and Richards the distinction between the informative and the emotive functions of language, and uses this distinction as a principle for his subsequent elucidations of the functions of necessary propositions and of value-propositions. In his chapters on Contingent Propositions, the propositions namely which embody information or misinformation about what exists or occurs, he tries to reformulate the Verifiability principle in a way not open to the ordinary charge that it entails solipsism. Statements of fact or alleged fact must be analysable into descriptions of what is directly observed or would in logically possible circumstances be observed by a normal observer, a normal observer being one whose reactions do or would agree with those of the great majority. Apparently it is an analytic proposition that lunatics constitute only a small minority of the population.

Statements about other people's experiences are not directly verifiable or falsifiable by me, yet they can make sense to me, since the impossibility of my introspecting or remembering an experience belonging to another personal history is a causal and not a logical impossibility. My evidence that there are such experiences is that of analogy.

About physical objects the position of non-solipsistic phenomenism is

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adopted by Mr. Britton: ". . . all propositions about physical objects are *most directly expressed* in sentences whose logical subjects are names (or gaps for names) of place-times, and which predicate of these subjects sensible properties and relations." No difficulties, apparently, are felt about the verification of law-propositions.

When he turns to necessary propositions, of which he discerns several kinds, Mr. Britton uses as his key the notions of explicit and implicit tautology. Necessary propositions give no information about the world, but they do give jointly information about the prevalent uses of words and prescriptions about their proper uses. It is a pity that he skirts so shyly round the thorny topic of the nature of mathematical propositions. The world would like to know why arithmetic and algebra are so useful, when 'white swans are white' is so useless. But even about the tautologous sentences that Mr. Britton does describe there raises its head this surely fairly hackneyed question.

Mr. Fowler, in his *Dictionary of Modern English Usage*, is all the time both describing how words and phrases are commonly used and prescribing how they should be used. Why are his assertions not necessary propositions, if they fit, as they seem to do, Mr. Britton's account of what constitutes a necessary proposition? Obviously they are in fact contingent historical records or descriptions of social customs and tastes, and very likely some of them are false. In what way, then, are Mr. Britton's necessary propositions 'about' actual or recommended usages, if they are not so in Mr. Fowler's way? We recognize the bracing unsentimentality of the doctrine that necessary propositions describe only language-rules, but it is nearly time that the message was expressed unambiguously—articulating, for instance, what is the difference between talking shockingly bad English and talking nonsense.

In his account of the significance of value-propositions, Mr. Britton does not go all the way with the extremists. He finds that many ordinary sorts of value-propositions contain a conjunction of an informative and an emotive element. So far as they are informative they state that certain means conduce to certain ends; so far as they are emotive they spur others to ensue those means. The ultimate end is personal happiness, which is not defined merely in terms of pleasure. And when the question is faced, 'How do moral rules state that certain steps would be means to the agent's happiness?' we are reminded that it is often prudent to benefit one's society, that we have social impulses, and lastly that creeds, codes, and institutions tend to gull people into a readiness to do things which are not calculated to be felicitous to themselves. This attempt to distil moral obligations out of self-interest, sympathy, and gullibility is lacking in novelty and truth, but perhaps its prime object was to suggest a way in which verifiable factual assertions might enter into without exhausting the communicable content of value-propositions.

Mr. Britton virtually concludes his book with a long disquisition upon the significance of poetic expressions, in which of course the emotive function outweighs without necessarily annihilating the informative function.

Mr. Britton thus, in his discussion of these points as well as of many other germane points, tackles a number of the issues which are in the forefront of contemporary debates, and that his interests lie in these regions can be inferred also from the numbers of the references which he makes to the publications of Wittgenstein, Carnap, Schlick, Neurath, Wisdom, and others of the 'movement.' And on each of the points which he discusses he has something fresh and relevant to say.

And yet, as a whole, the book must be described as disappointing. For first of all, no trick of presentation is omitted which can serve to interrupt

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the attention or weary the eye. On almost every page there are from half a dozen to a dozen or more words or phrases italicized, nearly half the pages have footnotes, and these disturbances are supplemented by a profusion of apparatus-marks, bracketed asides, parentheses, deprecatory inverted commas, special index-numbers referring to past formulae or examples and the like, and the terminology switches swiftly from the technical to the jaunty—so that the total effect is somewhat like *Science Abstracts* written in the feminine epistolary style. Not only to writers on Communication might the reminder be given that disciplined prose has a communicative efficacy.

And, next, Mr. Britton is too doctrinaire and not sufficiently ratiocinative. Too many things are accepted as premisses or conclusions because they seem clear to the author. And when a general argument is required for what purports to be a philosophical view, it is at the least disquieting to find cited the dicta of anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, physiologists, and literary critics.

Finally, the book is too esoteric. To those who keep themselves in the swim by reading articles and discussions in contemporary philosophical journals and by attending philosophical symposia, most of the topics in the book will be familiar as pertaining to the contemporary debates of a fairly large and very active circle of philosophers. But without such an introduction an ordinary philosophical reader will be at a loss to see what is the drift or object of the book. What is the link between the rejection of solipsistic phenomenalism and the acceptance of egoistic eudaemonism, or between the tautology account of necessary propositions and the emotive account of poetry? What, in a word, is the philosophical problem of communication? And on pain of what theoretical troubles are we bound to accept Mr. Britton's several special theories?

GILBERT RYLE.

Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. By JOHN DEWEY. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. viii + 546. Price 18s. net.)

In his Preface Dr. Dewey says that this book is a development of the ideas about logic which he first presented, some forty years ago, in his *Studies in Logical Theory*. It is in particular an attempt to show how those early ideas can be applied to the "interpretation of the forms and formal relations which constitute the standard material of logical tradition." The argument may be summarized as follows.

Philosophers of the rationalist school have erred in postulating a faculty of Pure Reason. The claim to intuition of *a priori* truths is merely a relic of supernaturalism. On the other hand, the older empiricists erred when they tried to include logic within the scope of their subjectivist psychology. For there are no mental entities such as they supposed. We must consider man from the "biological-cultural" point of view and study his operations in the course of inquiry. Logic is a naturalistic theory. We may say, if we like, that it is normative, but that can only mean that it tells us what ways of inquiry have been found to lead to success. The principles of logic "state habits operative in every inference that tend to yield conclusions that are stable and productive in further inquiries" (p. 13). Unfortunately, most current textbooks of logic are based on an outworn Greek conception of science as the study of changeless species. What we really need is "a unified theory of inquiry through which the authentic pattern of experimental and operational inquiry of science shall become available for the regulation of the habitual

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methods by which inquiries in the field of common sense are carried on" (p. 98). In the course of inquiry into inquiry we discover various recurrent forms. But we must not assume that these have any absolute ontological status. The correct doctrine is that "logical forms accrue to subject-matter in virtue of subjection of the latter in inquiry to the conditions determined by its end—institution of a warranted conclusion" (p. 372). The main distinction among propositions in respect of their form is that between the existential and the universal. Existential propositions have to do with "observed data or facts," whereas universal propositions "prescribe operations which when performed yield new data tending in the direction of a determinate existential situation" (p. 288). It is most important not to confuse universal propositions with generic propositions. "Once it is recognized that a universal proposition is a formula of a possible operation, the chief logical problem about such propositions concerns their relation with generic propositions; that is, their relation with determination of the distinguishing traits which describe kinds. According to the view here stated, the relation is *conjugate*. Universals and generics bear the same relation to each other in inquiry that material and procedural means sustain to each other in institution of judgment. Propositions about kinds and singulars as of a specified kind provide the subject-matter that forms the logical *subject* of final judgment. Propositions about the operations to be undertaken in order to effect the transformation of problematic subject-matter into a unified continuous existential situation provide the predication subject-matter" (p. 274).

In making this summary of Dr. Dewey's work I have retained his terminology and quoted freely in order to convey some notion of his style. Of the argument itself I can only say that I do not think it will convert any philosophers who are critical of the older versions of pragmatism. The publishers are perhaps a little extravagant when they say on the dust-cover that "Dr. Dewey's originality of thought, close reasoning, and relatively simple style combine to make this book the most important work in philosophy of our generation."

There are some curious slips scattered through the book. On page 89 "*gignoskai*," appears as the Greek for "to know," and on page 201 the phrases "*to katholon*" and "*to hekeston*" [*sic*] are supposed to be Greek for "generally" and "severally." On page 344 it is said that Plato did not formulate the Principle of Contradiction. On page 476 it is said that the mathematical theory of probability can derive from assumptions about equiprobability "propositions about what will *necessarily* occur as a matter of frequency-distributions in an *indefinite* series of throws." In the index "R. Poincare" gets the credit for Henri's views about mathematical induction.

W. KNEALE.

Selected Mystical Writings of William Law. By STEPHEN HOBHOUSE. (London: The C. W. Daniel Company, Ltd. Pp. 395. Price 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Stephen Hobhouse's selection from the mystical writings of William Law, published at a very moderate price, ought to be warmly welcomed. It is a reproach to English theology that some of the finest works of our greatest religious writer in the eighteenth century should be hard to procure. The *Serious Call* is well known, and deserves its fame; but the treatises which Law wrote after 1734, when he became acquainted with the writings of Jacob Böhme, the "Teutonic philosopher," are really more valuable.

German histories of philosophy place Böhme in the main line of development in German thought which culminated in Schelling and Hegel, and also,

through his insistence on Will as the constitutive principle of the world, make him a precursor of Schopenhauer. Law does not follow him slavishly. He is most attracted by Böhme's polemic against the forensic doctrine of the Atonement; by his insistence that God is love, and wrath foreign to His nature; by his Christ-mysticism, and by his sacramental view of the visible world. These doctrines are expounded with a fiery eloquence, and in a pure and virile English style such as few of our religious teachers have had at their command.

The two most attractive of Law's works are *The Spirit of Prayer* and *The Spirit of Love*. The former is somewhat marred by extreme anti-intellectualism, a reaction against the rationalism of Deists and anti-Deists alike. He ignores the Platonists, with whom he has really much in common. This is the more remarkable, since his own college, Emmanuel, was the nursery of Cambridge Platonism. Law seems to have known only Henry More in this group, and he disliked what he called "a jumble of learned rant" in More's books. He was separated from the Cambridge men by his High Churchmanship and by his prejudice against "rational theologians." But in John Smith he might have found a philosophy more learned and not less devout than his own, inspired not by the dreams of an illuminated cobbler, but by the thoughts of Plato and Plotinus.

Law was before his time in his dislike of the word supernatural. "The Christian religion is the only true religion of nature; it has nothing in it supernatural." "There is nothing supernatural in the mystery of our redemption, but the supernatural love and wisdom that brought it forth."

In the prosaic eighteenth century Law is almost a portent. In our time he appeals strongly to many who find the apologetics of Bishop Butler very unsatisfying. Baron von Hügel's testimony is worth quoting. "William Law, so far as I know, is the only spiritual thinker of the first rank among the English mystics of the post-Reformation Church. His religious and literary importance are very great."

W. R. INGE.

Reality. By PAUL WEISS. (Princeton: The University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. 314. Price, \$3.50.)

Mr. Weiss has what is rare and refreshing in these days, a robust conviction of the soundness and of the adequacy of man's metaphysical powers. What is rarer still, he has acquired or retained this conviction after a long and not undistinguished apprenticeship in the ways of modern logic. He has produced a highly technical book in language that does not seem to be unduly technical, and therefore, even if what he says must be caviare to many experts as well as to the general, the fare he provides may not seem to be at all exotic. His competence is obvious and his enthusiasm is very likeable. He is very much at home in many mansions, and that is important since his ambitious design is to review epistemology as well as ontology and to show the complementary character of the two.

For myself I must confess that I find the book disappointing. Unfortunately, however, there are so few pages in the book that do not exasperate me that I cannot give adequate reasons for my reaction to the book (if such reasons exist) except at inordinate length. In view of this the best thing I can do, I think, is to assure the reader that I hope I am wrong, and to inform him that the presumption is against me, partly on account of the other work Mr. Weiss has done, partly on account of the truth of the general statements I have made at the beginning of this review. I don't want to deter anyone

NEW BOOKS

from reading Mr. Weiss, but my personal attitude towards his book is unfavourable.

One would expect a good logician to construct a road that plainly avoided the slush and the savannahs of metaphysics, but Mr. Weiss seems to me to be hurried and rather cavalier right through his argument and to be far too reticent about the distinction between what is episodic and what is essential in his exposition. Again, he seems to me to make transitions where there are none by simply saying that the thing is so. (His combination of a metaphysically demonstrable pluralism with an equally indefeasible monism, of a permanent "Now" with evanescent "nows," of "abstract" futures with something present, of a "substantial" but merely "vicarious" identity between knower and known seem to me to be instances.) The surface of Mr. Weiss's metaphysical highway seems treacherous to me even if the road is as well built as I hope but cannot see that it is.

A minor point of difficulty concerns the language that Mr. Weiss has chosen to employ. He is fond of coining unknown words such as "a negate," "an isolate," and he has composed some sentences that seem to me to be intolerable. Take the following, for instance: "We vary in the degree to which we can concretionalize that which we now privationally possess." The meaning seems to be that some of us have better luck than others in getting what we want.

But I hope I am suffering from some contagion of peevishness, and that Mr. Weiss's book is immensely better than I think it is. It discusses questions of great importance in both its parts, entitled respectively "Knowledge and Ignorance" and "Multiplicity and Process." The chapters I personally found most interesting were those on Logic, on Persistence, and on Teleology (called by the author "Mellontological Causation"); but this preference may well be capricious and Mr. Weiss is very well equipped for all his expeditions.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe. By M. OAKESHOTT. With a Foreword by Professor Ernest Barker. (Cambridge, at the University Press. 1939. Pp. xxiii + 224. Price 10s. 6d.)

In his valuable introduction to this collection of documents representative of the political theories of contemporary Europe, Mr. Oakeshott writes: "The debt of modern authoritarian doctrines to Liberalism is impossible to conceal, and anyone anxious to extract the true metal of the Liberal doctrine from the base ore from which it has never yet been successfully separated will look hopefully to modern authoritarianism for relevant and constructive criticisms. But he will look in vain." His remark aptly expresses the disappointment which results from studying the texts which he has here, with great judgment, selected. As systems of political thought—and it is with ideas that Mr. Oakeshott is concerned—the primary texts of the modern authoritarian creeds, more especially those of Fascism and National Socialism, fill the mind with wonder at the credulity of human beings. Without the historical backgrounds of national insecurity or humiliation at defeat in war, without the hot demagogic breath of oratory to give them potency, they appear jejune and empty when they are not palpably false.

By contrast the older authoritarian doctrine of Catholicism has dignity and coherence, and the advocates of Representative Democracy the merit of seeking a complex answer to a complex problem; the merit, at least, of disclaiming crude over-simplification.

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The whole collection of extracts is admirably chosen and it is doubtful to anyone who has read that work whether, without very great expense of space, direct quotation from *Mein Kampf* could have improved on Mr. Oakeshott's summary of its doctrine. With the assistance of Mr. Oakeshott's restrained and highly pertinent introduction and of the documents themselves students of contemporary political thought are now provided with a most useful selection of texts to assist their study of the subject.

E. J. PASSANT.

Books received also:—

- E. MOUSLEY. *Man or Leviathan? A Twentieth-Century Enquiry into War and Peace*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 470. 15s.
- W. M. WHEELER. *Essays in Philosophical Biology* (Selected by G. H. Parker). Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xv + 261. 3 dollars; 12s. 6d.
- V. KRUSE (Tr. by P. T. Federspiel). *Hume's Philosophy in his Principal Work "A Treatise of Human Nature" and in his Essays*. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 67. 6s.
- S. S. SINGH. *The Theory and Practice of Yoga; or the Science of Self-Advancement, Material and Spiritual*. (Obtainable from) S. Singh, Sulakhan Abad, Gujranwala, India. 1937. Pp. 134. 1 dollar, 4s.
- I. EDMAN. *Philosopher's Holiday*. London: Constable & Co. 1939. Pp. xix + 284. 10s.
- VARIOUS AUTHORS. *Reason*. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 21.) Berkeley: University of California Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. 228. 11s. 6d.
- M. GREGORY. *Psychotherapy, Scientific and Religious*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1939. Pp. xvii + 495. 21s.
- E. GILSON. *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*. New York and London: C. Scribner's Sons, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 114. 6s.
- W. McDUGALL. *The Group Mind. The Principles of Collective Psychology and their Application to the Interpretation of National Life and Character*. (First cheap edition.) London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. 304. 7s. 6d.
- W. G. DE BURGH. *Knowledge of the Individual* (Riddell Memorial Lectures). London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 60. 2s. 6d.
- M. FRAENKEL. *Death is not enough. Essays in Active Negation*. London: C. W. Daniel Co. 1939. Pp. 170. 7s. 6d.
- S. C. CHATTERJEE. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge. A Critical Study of some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics*. The University of Calcutta. 1939. Pp. xix + 421.
- VARIOUS AUTHORS. *Causality in Current Philosophy* (Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XIV). Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America. 1939. Pp. 228.
- A. E. AFFIFI. *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Dīn-Ibnul 'Arabī*. London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. xxi + 213. 12s. 6d.
- J. MACMURRAY. *The Boundaries of Science: A Study in the Philosophy of Psychology*. London: Faber & Faber. 1939. Pp. 268. 7s. 6d.
- C. M. PERRY. *Toward a Dimensional Realism*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1939. Pp. ix + 180. 2 dollars 50.
- A. D. WINSPEAR and T. SILVERBERG. *Who was Socrates?* New York: The Gordon Co. 1939. Pp. 96. 1 dollar 25.

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- H. BHATTACHARYYA. *The Foundations of Living Faiths: An Introduction to Comparative Religion*. 1st Vol. University of Calcutta. 1939. Pp. xiii + 526.
- J. B. PRATT. *Naturalism*. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. x + 180. 2 dollars; 9s.
- J. MARSHALL. *Swords and Symbols: The Technique of Sovereignty*. New York and London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 168. 2 dollars; 8s. 6d.
- C. B. GARNETT, JUN. *The Kantian Philosophy of Space*. New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xi + 287. 17s. 6d.
- E. GRAHAM HOWE and L. LE MESURIER. *The Open Way. A Study in Acceptance*. London: Methuen & Co. 1939. Pp. xxvi + 201. 8s.
- C. E. VAUGHAN (Ed. by A. G. Little). *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau*. Manchester University Press. Cheaper edition, 1939. Vol. I: "From Hobbes to Hume" (with memoir), Pp. xxix + 364; Vol. II: "From Burke to Mazzini" (with a list of the writings of Professor Vaughan, by H. B. Charlton), Pp. xxvi + 336. 25s. net.
- M. SCHLICK (Tr. by D. Rynin). *Problems of Ethics*. New York: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1939. Pp. xv + 217. 2 dollars.
- A. COBBAN. *Dictatorship: Its History and Theory*. London: J. Cape. 1939. Pp. 352. 12s. 6d.
- IMMANUEL KANT. *Perpetual Peace*. (Introduction by N. Murray Butler.) New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. ix + 67. 5s.
- International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*. University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Vol. I, No. 3: R. Carnap, "Foundations of Logic and Mathematics," Pp. viii + 71; 5s. Vol. I, No. 4: L. Bloomfield, "Linguistic Aspects of Science," Pp. viii + 59; 5s.
- VARIOUS AUTHORS. *University of Oxford Committee for Advanced Studies. Abstracts of Dissertations for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. v + 306. 3s.
- R. SIMETERRE. *La Théorie Socratique de la Vertu-Science selon les "Mémoires" de Xénophon*. Paris: P. Téqui. 1938. Pp. 79. Fr. 17.70.
- Institut de France. Annuaire pour 1939*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 1939. Pp. 433.
- E. AUGIER. *La Mémoire et la Vie. Essai de Défense du Mécanisme Psychologique*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1939. Pp. 251. Fr. 30.
- P. LAMY. *Claude Bernard et le Matérialisme*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1939. Pp. 102. Fr. 15.
- R. FARNEY. *Le Nous et le Moi. Essai de Synthèse Sociale*. Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne. Pp. 251. Fr. 20.
- V. SOLOVIEV. *La Justification du Bien: Essai de Philosophie Morale (Traduit de russe par T.D.M.)*. Paris: Aubier. 1939. Pp. xxii + 509. Fr. 75.
- J. BOYER. *Essai d'une Définition de la Vie*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1939. Pp. 143. Fr. 20.
- J. PAOLI. *Défilé entre la Bruyère et Bergson*. Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerbers Forlag. 1939. Pp. 58. Kr. 3.
- L. BRUNSHVIG. *La Raison et la Religion*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1939. Pp. 267. Fr. 30.
- V. SOURIAU. *L'Instauration Philosophique*. Paris: F. Alcan. 1939. Pp. 412. Fr. 60.

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- L. VIVANTE. *Indétermination et Création: L'indéterminisme dans ses rapports avec l'imagination créatrice et l'activité morale.* (Traduit par L. E. Lanza.) Paris: F. Sorlot. 1939. Pp. 270. Fr. 30.
- A. N. WHITEHEAD (Traduit et Préfacé par P. Devaux). *Le Devenir de la Religion.* Paris: Aubier. 1939. Pp. 192. Fr. 18.
- G. W. F. HEGEL (Traduit par J. Hyppolite). *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit.* Paris: Aubier. 1939. Tome 1. Pp. vii + 358. Fr. 60.
- Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles:*
- I. É. Bréhier. "Les Études de Philosophie Antique." Pp. 55.
- II. C. Baudouin. "La Psychanalyse." Pp. 150.
- III. le P. M.-D. Chenu. "Les Études de Philosophie Médiévale." Pp. 88. Paris: Hermann et Cie. 1939.
- M. BECK. *Psychologie. Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Seele.* Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff. 1938. Pp. 271. Fl. 6.50.
- H. DINGLER. *Die Methode der Physik.* München: E. Reinhardt. 1938. Pp. 422.
- G. HESS. *Pierre Gassend. Der französische Späthumanismus und das Problem von Wissen und Glauben.* Jena u. Leipzig: W. Gronau. 1939. Pp. 199. M. 7.50.
- I. LICHTIG. *Die Entstehung des Lebens durch stetige Schöpfung.* Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatsch. 1938. Pp. 371. Fl. 6.
- J. J. POORTMAN. *Drei Vorträge über Philosophie und Parapsychologie.* Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff. 1939. Pp. 76. Fl. 1.80.
- H. RICKERT. *Unmittelbarkeit und Sinndeutung. Ansätze zur Ausgestaltung des Systems der Philosophie.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1939. Pp. 185. M. 8.
- H. SCHAMALENBACH. *Geist und Sein.* Basel: Haus zum Falken. 1939. Pp. 328. Geb. Fr. 18.
- G. SIEWERTH. *Der Thomismus als Identitätssystem.* Frankfurt a.M.: G. Schulte-Bulmke. 1939. Pp. 208. M. 8.
- M. WUNDT. *Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts.* Tübingen. J. C. B. Mohr. 1939. Pp. 288. M. 14.
- P. ALBERTELLI. *Gli Eleati: Testimonianze e Frammenti.* Bari: G. Laterza & Figli. 1939. Pp. 250. Lire 30.
- C. ASTRADA. *La Ética Formal y los Valores: ensayo de una revaloracion existencial de la moral Kantiana orientado en el problema de la libertad.* La Plata, Argentina: Biblioteca Humanidades. 1938. Pp. x + 142.
- M. T. GILLIO-TOS. *Il Pensiero di Giovanni Dewey.* Napoli: L. Loffredo. 1938. Pp. xxi + 350. L. 15.

AN APPEAL FOR REFUGEE PHILOSOPHERS

AN organization named "Council for Assisting Refugee Philosophers" has been formed for the purpose of helping philosophers who are seeking refuge in this country from racial or political persecution. The inaugural meeting on March 11th was attended by representatives of the Aristotelian Society, the British Institute of Philosophy, the Mind Association, the Analysis Society, the Philosophical Society of England, the Scots Philosophical Club, the Senior Division of the Cambridge Moral Science Club, and the Oxford Philosophical Society.

The Officers of the Council are Viscount Samuel, President; Professor John Macmurray, Chairman of Executive Committee; and Dr. C. A. Mace, Honorary Secretary.

The Council has already been able to take some effective action on behalf of philosophical refugees. It has under consideration further plans for assisting these philosophers to carry on their teaching and research in this country. In the detailed formulation of proposals to this end, it is working in close collaboration with the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning and with the philosophical societies of this country.

The British Institute of Philosophy is anxious to support to its fullest extent the movement sponsored by the above-named Council, and to announce that it is represented on this Body by the President, Lord Samuel, Professor Muirhead, The Dean of St. Paul's, and Dr. Hilda Oakeley. In common with other philosophical societies in Great Britain, the British Institute of Philosophy is opening a Fund to which those members who desire to help in this pressing need may contribute. It is hoped that many will respond to this appeal. Those who are able to do so can feel assured that the assistance given will not only alleviate very great distress, but will also enable those receiving it to continue making important contributions to the advancement of learning and to the preservation of cultural values endangered in the present world situation.

Cheques, etc., should be made payable to *The British Institute of Philosophy (Refugee Account)*, and sent to The Honorary Secretary of the Institute at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

IN MEMORY OF FREUDENTHAL

PROFESSOR A. WOLF

THE centenary of the birth of Freudenthal should not be allowed to pass in silence, if only because of his great services to the cause of Spinoza study. He was one of the leading pioneers in exact Spinoza research, and his contributions constitute a turning-point in this important and attractive field of investigation.

Jacob Freudenthal was born on June 20, 1839, at Bodenfelde, a village in the province of Hanover. His people were poor, and his early schooling was carried on amid considerable difficulties. At the age of 12 he entered his father's shop, but showed so little interest in it that it was thought best to send him to a school in Hanover with the idea of his becoming a schoolmaster eventually. In 1856 he entered the Jewish Seminary in Breslau, where he continued his studies until 1862. In Breslau he worked under several distinguished Jewish teachers (Frankel, Bernays, and others), and laid the foundations of his sound Hebrew and Classical learning. In 1862 he went to the University of Göttingen, where he studied philosophy under Lotze. His Ph.D. dissertation dealt with some aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. In the course of the 1860's Freudenthal also published some essays on the Greek and Hebrew conceptions of God, and on Alexandrian Religious Philosophy; and he carried on some investigations in medieval philosophy.

When, in 1866, Bernays was appointed Hon. Professor and Director of the Library in the University of Bonn, Freudenthal succeeded him in the Breslau Seminary. Nine years later he added the post of lecturer at the Breslau University, where he was promoted to the rank of Honorary Professor in 1879. It was extremely difficult at that time for a professing Jew to be elected to an ordinary salaried Chair at a German University. The University of Breslau nominated him for the ordinary Chair in Philosophy in 1888, but it took them two years to persuade the imperial headquarters to sanction the appointment. Accordingly, in 1890, Freudenthal resigned his post at the Breslau Seminary, and entered on his distinguished career as University Professor.

Freudenthal's interest in Spinoza was probably first roused by his teacher Bernays, who, in 1850, published an essay on Spinoza's *Hebrew Grammar*. His own first contribution to Spinoza literature appeared in 1887, in the form of a long paper on "Spinoza and Scholasticism," in a volume of essays published in honour of Zeller. In 1895 his essay on "The History of Spinozism" was published in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* (vol. viii). About that time, with the encouragement of the Berlin Academy, Freudenthal undertook a laborious survey of all the original sources of information relating to the life and work of Spinoza. In the course of it, he searched many libraries and archives in Holland and England as well as elsewhere. The results were published in his epoch-making work, *Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas in Quellenschriften und Nichtamtlichen Nachrichten*, Leipzig, 1899. This source-book contains nearly all the available material, carefully collected, and duly annotated. Two Dutch scholars, Meinsma and Meyer, had already done some valuable work in this field, but Freudenthal's book is still the only comprehensive collection of documents for an authentic account of the life and work of Spinoza. Earlier biographers were far too slipshod in their methods and quite unreliable in their

JACOB FREUDENTHAL

results. Five years later Freudenthal produced a *Life of Spinoza*, which is still the best book on the subject. The *Life* was to have been followed by a companion volume on the *Teaching of Spinoza*. Unfortunately he died, in 1907, before completing it. But he left considerable portions of it in manuscript. These were edited by the late Dr. Gebhardt, and published, together with a new edition of the *Life*, in 1927, under the original title of *Spinoza, Leben und Lehre* (*Bibliotheca Spinozana*). This is a bulky volume of about 620 quarto pages. Bigger volumes on Spinoza have appeared since then, but nothing more important or as important, in spite of its incompleteness.

The secret of Freudenthal's success as a biographer of Spinoza may be indicated in a few words. Two requisites are essential for a good biographer—knowledge and sympathy. Knowledge may be acquired by anybody with sufficient intelligence and industry. Sympathy, however, is of a different order. It depends on one's entire life and character. And Freudenthal, as a Spinoza biographer, had the supreme qualification of having lived a life very like that of his subject. Both were brought up at first in a conservative Jewish home; both were eager students of Hebrew, Classical, and Modern Knowledge; both felt it incumbent on them to attempt a conciliation between East and West, between the old and the new, between the religious and the secular outlook; and both suffered in various ways for being what they were. To have lived and suffered in the same kind of way as Spinoza did, is not an enviable gift; but it is literally the *sympathy* that is one of the best qualifications of a great Spinoza biographer.

Freudenthal was fully qualified in this respect as well as by his wide knowledge and critical powers; and his name will be remembered and honoured by those who are genuinely interested in the life and thought of one of the deepest thinkers and greatest characters of all times.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

In his review of my book Professor Stedman asks me a number of questions to which perhaps I may be allowed to reply.

(1) He asks whether I claim only "linguistic consistence" for some statements he quotes. The answer is that I claim that each one is logically valid in so far as they are all consistent with one another and with a great many other statements which, taken together, form my philosophical point of view. But I do not claim that they are all true in the proper sense that historical and scientific statements are, or may be.

(2) He asks whether I avoid "the vaguities and ambiguities" of the metaphysical writers I criticize, implying that I do not. But surely this question is not to be decided by merely quoting two isolated turns of phrase, since I myself expressly reject the mathematical ideal of accuracy, and claim only that my main arguments do not depend upon equivocation or other linguistic abuse. None of these arguments is examined, or even mentioned, in the course of the review.

(3) He asks "by what right" I speak of "*our* sensible experience," etc. The answer in brief is: the right to speak, since all language postulates the existence of other selves. Professor Stedman seems to hold that the public world of experience is built up by each one of us out of a previous solipsistic stage of consciousness. What 'right' has he to this underlying assumption of the sensationalist epistemology?

(4) The answer to this question is that the mind-body relation is specifically dealt with in chapter iv, section ii, §4, and that my central argument is mainly concerned with the relation of spatial to subjective or existential categories. Professor Stedman disdains this discussion, apparently on the ground that any attempt to define and distinguish the terms 'reality' and 'existence' is mere schoolboy silliness.

(5) The answer to this question is that I do not deny the far-reaching character of Descartes' scepticism. But that this scepticism was combined with a professed orthodoxy and submission of all his opinions to the authority of the Church is common knowledge.

May I add these two further comments on the review:

(1) Professor Stedman condemns my arguments by denying "that the 'reasonable' can be pursued once truth is repudiated." But how do I "repudiate truth" by trying to define the meaning of the term? And must we believe a course of action to be 'true,' if we hold it to be reasonable?

(2) He suggests that I apply the term 'metaphysics' to any philosophy I do not agree with. This is quite incorrect. I do not agree with Locke's philosophy, and I do agree with a great deal of Croce's philosophy. But the latter I call a metaphysical writer, the former I do not.

Yours faithfully,

ADRIAN COATES.

ILMINSTER,

April 17, 1939.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

The Syllabus of Lectures and Evening Meetings for the Session 1939-40 is now in course of preparation, and will be sent to members in the early autumn.

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